Retired General Ashok K Mehta of the Indian army, in a recent article, succinctly wrote: “Indian politicians do not understand the games that are played on the Line of Control (LoC) and the tit-for-tat score scratching that goes on. Indian and Pakistani media love to blame the other side as the instigator for the ongoing border skirmishes. Some in the Indian media claim that Pakistan is testing the new Prime Minister (PM) and the new army chief in India. Pakistani analysts argue the flip side of Indian claims. General Mehta summed up the reality nicely, ‘No one is entirely innocent but both sides blame the other for starting the firing.’” Indo-Pak relations were moving swimmingly well when the Pakistan PM visited India. Hardliners on both sides were hard put to float the usual scepticism. PM Nawaz Sharif was well received in India at PM Narendra Modi’s swearing in ceremony. The visit was highly appreciated on both sides of the border. Things changed quickly in just the last two months. Many issues and problems between the two countries are solvable through dialogue. However, reaching the table in search of comprehensible dialogue is not easy. The prickly issue of Kashmir stands out like a sore thumb in every attempt to normalise relations. Both countries have dug in deep over the issue. The history of the Kashmir problem goes far back. Jihadi intrusion has been just one aspect of the total Kashmir debate between Pakistan and India. It would be pointless to discuss the oft-repeated history of the conflict now. Any study of the issue will show that Pakistan and India never followed consistent policies on Kashmir. Despite nearly seven decades of control, India squandered several opportunities to resolve the issue. The status quo India tried to maintain was untenable from the get-go. India failed to build a majority support in Kashmir, thus allowing the proxies to disrupt the status quo at will. Indian reluctance to invest more in the political process resulted in failure to neutralise indigenous opposition in Kashmir also. Over the years, Kashmir remained a thorn in the Indian side. Still, India managed to keep the issue confined without disturbing economic or social progress in other parts of the country. Pakistan’s Kashmir policy remained in the establishment’s domain. It is the sole driver of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Pakistani politicians face grave problems when they push for better relations with India. In Pakistan, the hardliners outnumber the moderates. They have a large reach and can force political governments into desperate situations. Pakistan has seen politicians dishonoured and ridiculed in public when they attempt to go around the hardliners. Relations with India, and especially the Kashmir issue, touch many raw nerves. Indian politicians should show more flexibility considering the perils Pakistani politicians face. The situation changes dramatically when Pakistan is led by army chiefs. General Ziaul Haq and General Musharraf both initiated dialogue with India on bilateral issues. In 2004, the US helped both countries move towards a peaceful and meaningful discourse. President Musharraf offered significant concessions to India on the Kashmir issue. The offers were not galvanic revelations but still presented a notable departure from long stated Pakistan positions. General Musharraf suggested working through different sectors of Kashmir. The important concession implied Pakistan’s willingness to work on some piecemeal solution of the problem. The solution, though unique, had so many pitfalls that Pakistan could not get its allies in Kashmir to go with it. Then, General Musharraf moved a step further by suggesting his most astonishing proposal of removing the referendum demand in negotiations with India. The dropping of the referendum demand, even temporarily, meant that Pakistan would work on a bilateral solution to the issue. India also made important concessionary proposals, giving a seven-point action plan to ease the situation for the Kashmiris and to provide a symbolic share for Pakistan in matters essential to the economic well being of Kashmir. The Indian government showed dedication to the process when it brought out all its big guns to inaugurate the bus service between the two sides of Kashmir. The next step for India was to withdraw the army from the populated areas of Kashmir, allowing people to regain control of normal civic functions. The collapse of the Musharraf regime also saw the process stalled in 2007. President Zardari promised better relations after he entered the President House. However, terrorists struck Mumbai in 2008 and relations took a turn for the worst. Politicians in Pakistan have found it extremely hard to convince the establishment to restart the process. Pakistani politicians dread the defence establishment’s take on relations with India. Any approach to circumvent the establishment and the concerns it has about national security, no matter how trivial they are, would be a grave mistake. Politicians have to sweet talk their way to warm up the establishment for resolution. Any confrontation on this issue is not productive and impacted the political atmosphere in the country. There is no reason to take risks that have failure written all over them. The Kashmir issue has no solution that suits everyone. National egos and political survival issues form the baggage attached to it. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India will not ink an agreement that could bring instant political death to it nor is this possible for its counterparts in Pakistan. No matter how people travail through the many solutions out there, the probability of a just resolution is zero. The best course in such a situation is to find a way to soften the problem through some mutually agreed upon steps. A long-term solution that will prevent knife-wielding opponents from striking is the best bet. The leaders in both countries may be well advised to dissolve this issue by spreading the process over an extended period. Indian and Pakistani state machineries and bureaucracies excel in dragging feet and shoving issues under the rug. Bringing the decision making process to a crawl is their forte. There is a need to extrapolate honed skills for the Kashmir conflict, thus eliminating the need of a “quitclaim” clause in any agreement. The writer is a management consultant based in the US. He is a freelance writer and tweets as @HarPashaa