Efforts to contain the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are an inadequate response to a serious challenge. ISIS is known in Arabic as Daulat-i-Islamiyah fil Iraq wal Sham (Daish). It is an ideologically motivated organisation and has committed cadres. The plans of the US-led coalition of 60 countries to defeat ISIS, mainly through military means, have slim chances of success. ISIS now occupies territories in Iraq and Syria, and is growing both in terms of territory and influence. Over the past few months it has assumed the shape of a quasi-state with territory, a governance system that includes a defined central hierarchy, and a command structure in areas under occupation. It has managed to impose fines and even collects taxes. Starting from June this year, ISIS fighters successfully organised and launched themselves from Fallujah in Iraq, rapidly moved and occupied some important towns in Iraq. Two divisions of the Iraqi army, equipped and trained by the US, surrendered and were decimated in the face of just 1,200 ISIS fighters. Armaments and vehicles provided by the US to these two divisions were captured by ISIS militants. These fighters rapidly advanced from Fallujah towards the northwest of Iraq. At one time, Baghdad was only a few kilometres away. On June 10, 2014, Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq and capital of Nineveh province, fell. The Mosul Central bank was attacked during which ISIS managed to take away $ 425 million in currency and an unaccounted quantity of gold. Baiji city and Baiji oil refinery and Tikrit, the hometown of Saddam Hussein, all rapidly fell. Even now, as the attention of the world is focused on Kobane, the main Syrian Kurdish town on the Syria-Turkey border, ISIS is making progress in capturing territory and influence. Robert Fisk, reporting from Syria, in a recent article for The Independent, ‘Islamists ready for Mediterranean battle’, states that “ISIS-inspired rebels” and the group (ISIS) itself intend to strike from Lattakia, Syria, westward towards the Mediterranean, which is hardly 15 kilometres away. Once on the shores of the Mediterranean, ISIS will start having a significant role in regulating shipping lanes. Just 130 kilometres from Baghdad, Ramadi, the main city of Anbar province, is within striking distance of ISIS. Ramadi is a major urban centre of resistance to ISIS. On September 15, ISIS managed to lay siege for over a week to Saqlawiyah military camp near Baghdad. On September 21, fighters disguised as Iraqi soldiers and using captured US vehicles stormed Saqlawiyah camp. Reinforcements for the Iraqi army were late and inadequately prepared to meet resistance from ISIS fighters and suicide bombers. Nearly 200 security personnel in Saqlawiyah were killed and 70 captives were later paraded in Fallujah. At the end of October, members of the Albu Nimr tribe in Anbar province, again near Baghdad, surrendered to ISIS. Calls by the tribe for reinforcements and munitions from the government did not receive any response. Besides historical factors, the immediate cause behind the major defeat of the Iraqi army in June was the manner of governance of former Iraqi Prime Minister (PM) Nouri al-Maliki, which was plagued with mismanagement, corruption and a sectarian bias. While ISIS was busy in grouping and occupying territory, PM Maliki was trying to wrestle for himself a third term. Maliki had been the PM since 2006. His election at that time was trumpeted as a vindication of the ill-devised plan of Bush and Blair to invade Iraq in 2003. It was portrayed that Iraq had returned to democracy and historical undercurrents would be taken care of by the elected government. At the time of his swearing in as PM, Maliki had support from around the world; there were hopes that the days of Saddam Hussein were well past. These hopes were to be short lived as the sectarian bias perpetrated by Maliki would soon unfold. Tragically, during Maliki’s days, Sunnis were persecuted and denied government jobs and promotions. Being an elected PM, Maliki’s attitude towards the Sunnis was quite incomprehensible. As a result, there were violent clashes in Fallujah between Sunni activists and the government. This situation was exploited by ISIS to its advantage. ISIS grew in strength and challenged the Iraqi government in January this year. Later on, in June, Fallujah became the launching ground of ISIS with help from the Sunnis in its march to capture large areas in Iraq. Sunni tribes persecuted by the Maliki government initially sided with ISIS; this helped ISIS organise an intelligence network in these tribes. The slightest deviation now from ISIS loyalties seldom goes unnoticed. The possibility of Iraqi Sunni tribes changing loyalties and supporting the US-led coalition in opposition to ISIS is now remote. On June 29, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the head of ISIS, declared himself the caliph of Muslims “everywhere”. That was when the name of ISIS was changed to Islamic State (IS). On September 10, President Obama announced a plan to counter the growing influence of IS. The plan intends to “degrade and ultimately destroy” IS. It also envisages dislodging President Bashar al-Assad. Obama avoided using the word war and instead called the plan a campaign. A US-led international coalition of 60 countries was formed to carry out these objectives. In the initial stage, the main reliance is on using air power against IS and airdropping military equipment and supplies to tribes and militias fighting the militants. The impression is that the coalition partners do not seem to show the strong will needed to contain IS. Turkey, an important ally, has only promised to allow humanitarian aid and logistic material flowing through its NATO airbases. Only recently it allowed 250 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters from Iraq to use Turkish territory to cross over to Kobane. The UAE has committed to carrying out airstrikes against the militants. The UK plans to deploy its air force. Germany intends to supply arms to the Kurds. No coalition partner has committed sending its troops into Iraq. Iran, a major influence in the region, refused to join the coalition. (To be continued) The writer is a former inspector general of police. He can be reached at humayunshafi@gmail.com