It has been argued that one of the biggest downsides of colonialism, which may persist in post-colonial societies, has been the undermining of indigenous methods of conflict resolution. With the advent of liberal institutions and international peace, it was assumed that Western models of conflict resolution were not only effective but also universally applicable to all societies. This was one of the major flaws of the liberal peace era — and hence the rise of protracted conflict in Africa and South Asia. Over the last two centuries, Pakistan’s Pakhtun tribal areas (also known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA) have witnessed repression of cultural norms and social structures. While the British Raj imposed the primitive notion of collective responsibility to tame the Frontier tribes through the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), Pakistani state persisted with a similar policy, giving little or no regard to the local culture. Many argue that it was the state’s understanding and acknowledgment of Pakhtun culture that led it to persist with the FCR. Yet, historical evidence suggests that retaining the FCR had to do more with keeping FATA as a de-facto territory, and later using it as buffer and proxy with Afghanistan, than mere ‘acknowledgment of culture’. In this post-colonial politics of dealing with ‘others’ or those on the periphery — the biggest casualty has been the Pakhtun Jirga — a centuries-old Pakhtun conflict resolution mechanism and a major building block of Pakhtunwali, the Pakhtun culture. Where certain African societies, especially Rwanda, have successfully used their indigenous methods of conflict resolution to curb or control internal conflicts, Pakistan has failed to do so. Pakistan’s use of Jirga has remained as vague as its policies towards tribal areas. And even when Jirgas were used in post 9/11 context, the backing from either the military or previous governments was half-hearted. Even though the situation in Afghanistan regarding Jirga is far from good, the country still acknowledges the institution, using it for formal approval of the newly-elected presidents and endorsing major policy decisions. Evidence suggests that retaining the FCR had to do more with keeping FATA as a de-facto territory, and later using it as buffer with Afghanistan — than mere ‘acknowledgment of culture’ Though not highly publicised, events suggest that when given backing and used effectively, Jirgas have somewhat helped the state and military by delivering results in the terror-hit FATA region since 2004. Importance of Jirgas can also be understood through the fact that dozens of peace Jirga gatherings have come under attack from the TTP and other militant groups, coupled with targeted killings of tribal Maliks and Khans. Lashkars, formed by tribal Jirgas, have provided a line of defence against militant groups and cross-border infiltrations. In 2009, when the military failed to achieve results in the Bajaur agency, the Salarzai tribe, through a Jirga, formed a Lashkar to fight the TTP militants. The tribe was called on again in 2014, when a tribal Jirga announced to form another Lashkar to fight the TTP. In the same year, a Jirga of the Mamond tribe in Bajaur agency formed a Lashkar, which ultimately played a major role in curbing violence in the region. One of the major reasons for relative peace in the Khyber agency in FATA was that tribal elders regularly summoned Jirgas and formed Lashkars to fight local militant groups. Yet, because the FCR is in place, the Political Agent and military hold a veto over any Jirga decision. The FCR provided a framework for Jirgas and tribal elders under the provision of Sarkari (state) Jirga presided over by the Political Agent of the respective agency, with the Olasi or people’s Jirga only limited to an advisory role. Yet, according to various studies by Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme (CAMP) in FATA, a majority in FATA preferred Olasi Jirga as it provided them with an easy and impartial means to resolve conflicts and seek justice. Such trends suggest that even if the government tries introducing reforms and introduces the country’s judicial system to the region, complications and trust deficit would still exist. Thus, the proposed bill of 13th amendment and implementation of Rewaj Act in FATA also presents the state with a dilemma. The Jirga provides an interesting debate between modernity and indigeneity. An argument that ‘recognising the importance of Jirga and Pakhtunwali in law-making is equivalent to going back to primitive times’, is somewhat flawed. Countries like Canada and Australia have constitutional provisions for indigenous conflict resolution methods. On the other hand, indigenous Gacaca courts in Rwanda, the Chief’s courts in Swaziland, and Buddhist elders in Cambodia still play an active role in conflict resolution in their respective societies. Given the fragile situation in FATA, any reforms that need to be introduced should give importance to tribal cultural values, albeit, not at the cost of basic human rights. The Jirga has historically played an important role in maintaining the social fabric of Pakhtun societies, and thus any effective strategy to sustain peace in FATA should include Jirga as the primary means of mediation and negotiation for local insurgencies and conflict resolution. This is because before any merger or reforms, the state has to ensure peace in FATA and resettle the internally displaced persons. The writer is a PhD (Politics) Candidate studying at the University of Newcastle, NSW, Australia. He also consults Islamabad based Center for Research and Security Studies. He tweets @faruqyusaf