The MoU signed in Doha between the government of U.S and leaders of Afghan leadership is a charter of promises, if delivered upon will herald the exit of the American forces from the longest war it has been embroiled in. Though the document may be seen as an diplomatic milestone, the conditions holding it together are filled with many ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ that can break at any unfulfilled promise.
Within less than twelve hours of President Trump talking to the Taliban Political Chief, Southern Helmand province Afghan Checkpoint came under attack by the Taliban. 43 attacks took place this Tuesday alone. As per reports 20 policemen/Afghan soldiers were killed in these attacks. Attack was also carried out at the central Uruzgan province.
The Taliban claimed the ceasefire agreed upon was with U.S forces and not with the local forces. The issue lies between two different agreements that have been signed. One is the US and Afghan Declaration while the other is the Doha Declaration.
Briefly stated, the deal stipulates the following conditions:
The basic term of withdrawal of troops is ‘the degree to which the Taliban fulfills its commitment in the peace deal not to allow Afghanistan to be used as a base of operations by insurgencies such as al-Qaida and the Islamic State.’ (npr, February 29, 2020)
The deal can be crushed due to the chasm yawning between the current Afghan political dispensation and the Taliban on issues of ideology of state to be followed and pattern of governance
Within 135 days of signing of agreement, U.S will withdraw her forces leaving only 8,600 on ground and her allies too, will withdraw their forces in the same proportion.
By 10th March roughly 5,000 Taliban prisoners will be exchanged for 1,000 Afghan security force prisoners once talks between Afghan government and Taliban are ready to commence.
U.S will not only lift sanction it had placed on Taliban, it will also work towards lifting of sanctions against them by the UN as well.
Of course, the timing is perfect for Trump with the U.S elections looming ahead in November. So far as Taliban are concerned, the deal grants them legitimacy as a strong political entity.
The snags between now and till the time the actual exit takes place are many. They can disrupt the peace process, sending it to an early grave. For example, lifting of sanctions internationally can be a painfully lengthy process that can create restlessness in the Taliban ranks leading to militancy.
Various benchmarks of performance have to be met for the foreign forces to withdraw. The deal signed can at best be termed as a MoU opening the gate to achieve peace. The deal can be crushed due to the chasm yawning between the current Afghan political dispensation and the Taliban on issues of ideology of state to be followed and pattern of governance. The fact that U.S and her allies failed to strengthen institutions, an expanded role they chose to embark upon in Afghanistan will weigh heavily against the success of an Afghanistan sans foreign boots on ground.
Talks are to be held in Oslo, Norway, sometime in mid-March. It will bring on table officials of Afghan government, representatives of civil society, opposition members the Taliban with an objective of devising the path leading to ending the war. Other supporting nations facilitating the process will be representatives of U.N, Germany, U.S and Indonesia.
Many issues need to be addressed. It includes the formula of collective power sharing and women rights among others. Although Ashraf Ghani ‘won’ the elections, his rival Abdullah Abdullah refused to accept the result. Afghanistan is a democratically fragile nation, a fact well recognized. Regarding women issues, Taliban did not allow women to go to schools, working or making a public appearance without a male escort. Has anything changed for the Taliban in this approach? Likelihood is no it has not. But in the greed to grasp political legitimacy and power, they may well agree to the conditions laid out. For now.
Will they follow through with their promises? Maybe and maybe not. Likely the latter. There can be a mix of two reasons for this. First, a genuine unwillingness to change route from their old ways and with foreign forces gone, there will be no one to force their hand. Two, once the forces clear out, Afghanistan can transcend into in-fighting. With an on-going battle, Taliban will be in no position to keep its promises. Ashraf Ghani was brainwashed by India in viewing Pakistan through their eyes; a nation not serious about combating terrorism and that Pakistan was equally insincere with Kabul. He is effectively the ‘new Indian face’ of Kabul. He ‘linked the release of Taliban prisoners with the group breaking ties with neighboring Pakistan,’ in addressing a public gathering at eastern Nangarhar province.
Pakistan, on the other hand will be regionally on a strong footing vis a vis Afghanistan once the U.S forces and allies leave and/or reduce forces. ‘Washington is well aware that the Haqqani group was responsible for terrorist attacks on the Indian diplomatic establishmentsin Afghanistan. But today US self-interest dictates that Sirajuddin’s mainstreaming in Afghan political life and a potential elevation eventually to a leadership role at the national level are useful and necessary, since he can deliver peace.As for Pakistan, it can rest assured that a regime in Kabul with Sirajuddin in a commanding role will be amenable and never play footsie with Indians.’ (MK BHADRAKUMAR, FEBRUARY 26, 2020)
Bringing Sirajuddin on board, strengthens Pakistan’s hand, abruptly cutting off Indian influence on security agencies in Afghanistan. Another beneficiary will be China. With U.S out, it can strengthen its footing regionally. China shares a border with Afghanistan via the Wakhan Valley. China’s BRI initiative will gain impetus increasing trade and opening routes.
The fact is; U.S may exit- U.S however is doing so without offering a ‘responsible exit’ that ensures peace to Afghanistan. Does it lay ground for permanent peace? The answer is no. It does not. It focuses on Taliban not attacking the American and allied forces as they exit and break their connection with other ‘terrorist’ groups- it fails to focus on giving long lasting peace to the Afghan people.
The writer is a lawyer, academic and political analyst. She has authored a book titled ‘A Comparative Analysis of Media & Media Laws in Pakistan.’