“One nuclear war is going to be the last nuclear war — the last war, frankly, if it really gets out of hand. And I just don’t think we ought to be prepared to accept that sort of thing” —Lawrence Eagleburger
Let there be no doubt that more than 1.5 billion peoples of South Asia are facing the threat of nuclear annihilation, and the military establishment of both Pakistan and India are doing everything in their power to further exacerbate the threat. The strategic logic behind the pursuit of nuclear capability was that the spread of nuclear weapons would bring stability to the region or reduce the risk of major wars between Pakistan and India. However, the security environment has changed with the advent of non-state military actors. The critical realities of this changing strategic environment demand reduction of nuclear forces to the lowest possible level.
There are a number of ways in which nuclear defence postures of Pakistan and India are contributing to the global threat of a nuclear war. First, the rapidly growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons in South Asia present a unique opportunity for terrorists to attempt to steal nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials.
Second, the continued existence of hundreds of nuclear weapons in the region increases the chances of their accidental or unauthorised launch as a result of false alarms from nuclear warning systems.
Third, both countries’ inability to ensure transparency of all sensitive nuclear materials — highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium — has created a sense of uncertainty, making it almost impossible to keep track of all nuclear materials.
There is ample evidence of al-Qaeda’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. The current leadership of the al-Qaeda will not desist from the use of nuclear weapons once it acquires capability. India’s nuclear security measures are even weaker than Pakistan’s, but the risk of nuclear theft in Pakistan is considered to be high.
In 1994, for the first time, the al-Qaeda attempted to acquire uranium in Sudan to construct a crude nuclear weapon. Jamal al-Fadl, one of al-Qaeda’s founding members, testified in a New York court in 2001 that the former Sudanese president Saleh Mobruk had helped Abu Khabab, al-Qaeda’s chief bomb-maker, in acquiring uranium from South Africa. He even gave information about payment of $1.5 million by the al-Qaeda in return for getting a container full of nuclear material.
In 1998, Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa that acquiring and using nuclear weapons for the defence of Muslims is a religious duty. After the US-led military operation in Afghanistan dislodged the al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, the group continued its efforts to acquire a nuclear device through its sleeper cells in a number of other countries.
Ayman al-Zawahiri said in an interview: “If you have $30 million, go to the black market in Central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist, and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available.” A few months after this interview, the al-Qaeda released a video in which it made public its goal to kill four million Americans.
The global nuclear security regime in its present state is not well-equipped to counter this kind of global threat. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) failed to take action against al-Qaeda’s nuclear activities during the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Although Afghanistan is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA showed little motivation to inspect undeclared nuclear activities. The IAEA inspectors have also miserably failed to detect secret and illegal nuclear activities in many other countries.
While the international community has finally realised that speculations about an extremist takeover should not be taken seriously, internal threats cannot be totally ruled out. Making a fair and reasonable evaluation, Pakistan and India should eliminate a large number of their nuclear weapons because they have become a security liability, not an asset.
Today, more than 46 countries have 1.6 million kilograms of fissile material in their possession. According to the United States General Accounting Office (USGAO), 128 reactor facilities worldwide have at least 20 kg highly enriched uranium.
The fissile material now available in the world is enough to make 62,500 plutonium weapons and 64,000 HEU weapons. If terrorists succeeded in acquiring or fabricating even one nuclear weapon, the world that we know will not remain for very long. But Pakistan and India are doing nothing to stave off this global threat. In fact, both countries continue to adopt military postures that enhance proliferation incentives. The reluctance on the part of both countries to ratify multilateral disarmament agreements like the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty further raises doubts about their commitment to nonproliferation objectives.
Complete information about the exact quantities of nuclear materials will never become available. Given the multifaceted nature of the threat, the only possible policy choice is to reduce the number of nuclear weapons to no more than 50 each for Pakistan and India. Such a small number of nuclear weapons is not only enough to maintain credible minimum deterrence but will also make the threat of nuclear terrorism less likely.
Both Pakistan and India should ratify the FMCT and enter into a bilateral agreement, banning all nuclear weapons testing. There is also need to build a regional regulatory authority with the mandate to monitor security standards for all nuclear facilities. These steps would go a long way in helping to ensure that Pakistan and India are responsible nuclear states and they can be brought into the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty fold.
The people of the world deserve a peaceful and secure future, and we must play our role to make that possible. Pakistan and India cannot afford to be on the wrong side of history. Otherwise, we are all doomed to nuclear self-annihilation.
The writer is a US-based nuclear security analyst, and can be reached at [email protected]