A nuclear weapons rush is under way in South Asia as India continues to develop weapons and weapon systems to enhance its defence capabilities. In this effort, it enjoys abundant international support that is making the job easier than it would otherwise be.
Since independence, India has always sought to carve out an exception for itself in the nuclear sphere. Today it is expanding its capacity to produce bombs and thermonuclear weapons, adding cruise missiles to its arsenal, deploying nuclear weapons at sea and now diverting these weapons to space.
After the 1974 nuclear test, India was barred from nuclear trade. It converted the materials and equipment acquired from Canada and the United States, ostensibly for peaceful purposes. This encouraged India to keep expanding its nuclear weapons programme and it again tested warheads in 1998. India still refuses to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which binds all states except the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China, to forsake nuclear weapons.
The situation changed altogether when George W Bush administration signed a nuclear agreement with India to build nuclear power plants. In 2008, the United States signed a civilian nuclear trade deal with India. This was a game changer with severe consequences in the region.
In 2016, the European Union-mandated Conflict Armament Research’s report stated that seven Indian companies have been found incorporating components used by the IS to fabricate improvised explosive devices
One wonders why India’s nuclear record is not under greater international scrutiny. New Delhi was denied access to the global nuclear order for three decades for reasons known to everyone:
(a) the country has never signed the NPT or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;
(b) it misused the civilian nuclear technology in 1974; and
(c) it continues to fabricate nuclear weapons at a rapid pace.
Lack of wider awareness suits India. Most Indians are unaware of the risks attached to Indian safety and security structure.
In 2016, the European Union-mandated Conflict Armament Research’s report, stated that seven Indian companies have been found incorporating components used by the Islamic State to fabricate improvised explosive devices.
The seven India-based companies reportedly contributing to the supply chain of IS IEDs were: Gulf Oil Corporation (detonating cord), Solar Industries (detonating cord), Premier Explosives (detonating cord), Rajasthan Explosives and Chemicals (detonating cord), Chamundi Explosives (safety fuse), Economic Explosives (detonators) and IDEAL Industrial Explosives (detonators).
The West has expended a lot of time and effort to install a rules-based system for countries like Iran. The Iranian problem has uncovered substantial weaknesses in the NPT, especially the absence of a clear divide between civilian and nuclear programmes. The question is, has India separated its civilian and military nuclear programmes? Is India really trustworthy in this regard in view of its track record?
At the bottom of the debate is a vexatious secrecy and the irresponsible attitude of India towards the non-proliferation regime. How can a country be trusted with enriched uranium and nuclear components after it is known be a serial offender in terms of diverting peaceful technology to weapons uses?
Apparently, the global order is based on biased perceptions.
What might change India’s calculation that more deals and weapons would not equate to more security? One way is for New Delhi to take steps to improve relations with its neighbours and to “take away the enemy image,” the way Mikhail Gorbachev accomplished the feat to end the Cold War. The safest route to reduce nuclear dangers on the subcontinent is through concerted efforts to improve relations. A nuclear arsenal built by proliferation, as India did in 1974, is inherently unstable.
The writer is a freelancer