Amid the intensifying operations of Indian proxies inside Pakistan, particularly across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, a crunch question comes to the fore: what are the real objectives of this hybrid militant network, one that curiously blends religious extremists like TTP with ostensibly secular outfits such as the BLA under Indian patronage? Is its focus confined to disrupting CPEC, or are these proxies in fact aligned against something far more consequential, namely the emerging convergence of Pakistan’s and America’s economic interests?
A few months ago, Jerusalem Strategic Tribune published an article by Daniel Runde, a careful and deliberate analyst not given to idle speculation. A member of the same political party as Donald Trump, educated at Harvard University, and serving as Senior Vice President at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Runde argued that the time is not far off when Pakistan’s wealth could match the scale of Saudi Arabia’s today.
The unrest in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan is not merely about CPEC, as is commonly assumed.
This assertion was not made in a vacuum. Runde pointed to a structural shift in American military and industrial needs. The United States, long dependent on petroleum, is transitioning toward electrification. Even before the specter of an Iran United States confrontation loomed large, he noted that collaboration with Tesla aimed to introduce thousands of electric vehicles into military use by 2027. Beyond vehicles, the future battlefield will depend on drones, robotics, and energy weapons, all of which require critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, and copper.
Here lies the strategic dilemma. China already dominates the global supply chains of these minerals, refining the bulk of the world’s nickel, copper, lithium, and cobalt. Its reach extends beyond Asia into Africa and Latin America, consolidating a position that raises serious national security concerns in Washington. The question Runde posed was simple yet profound: how will the United States secure access to these resources in a China dominated landscape?
Runde’s response was just as pointed as the question itself: Pakistan could emerge as a pivotal partner, provided bilateral relations were recalibrated. The country holds the world’s fifth-largest copper reserves, with the Reko Diq deposits alone estimated to contain copper and gold worth nearly one trillion dollars-not million, but trillion. Beyond Reko Diq, significant mineral wealth is believed to lie across Gilgit, the Himalayan belt, Karakoram, and the Hindu Kush.
Seen against this backdrop, the recent surge in terrorism within Pakistan acquires a different meaning. If Indian proxies are operating via Afghanistan to destabilize regions rich in mineral resources, the objective becomes clearer. Persistent insecurity in these regions would prevent Pakistan from harnessing its mineral wealth, thereby delaying or derailing its economic ascent.
An equally troubling dimension is the role of certain domestic and overseas actors. When Pakistan and the United States began exploring cooperation in the mineral sector, resistance surfaced from unexpected quarters. During the Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum organized by OGDCL in Islamabad, attempts were made to dissuade international participation. Overseas activists even wrote to the visiting American delegation, led by Eric Meyer, urging a boycott. The effort failed, but the intent remains questionable. Why oppose an initiative that could unlock Pakistan’s economic future?
This question gains further weight when juxtaposed with ambiguous political responses to counterterrorism operations. No responsible analysis should descend into cynicism about political actors, yet it is equally incumbent upon them to clarify why, at critical junctures, their posture appears misaligned with state priorities.
Once the dots are connected, a coherent picture emerges. The unrest in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan is not merely about CPEC, as is commonly assumed. That is only part of the story. The fuller truth is that Pakistan’s mineral potential, and the emerging possibility of US Pakistan cooperation in this domain, lies at the heart of the contest.
The increasingly abrasive tone of S. Jaishankar reflects a deeper strategic unease. Pakistan, for its part, is engaging both China and the United States simultaneously. While CPEC continues to advance under Beijing’s partnership, a parallel avenue of cooperation with Washington is opening in the mineral sector. This dual engagement alters the regional balance in ways that are difficult for India to ignore.
India is frustrated. Through proxy unrest and efforts to discourage international engagement, certain actors aim to undermine Pakistan’s emerging US partnership in critical minerals. Yet Pakistan’s dual engagement with China on CPEC and the US on minerals demonstrates a strategic maturity India cannot easily counter. The task is simple but vital: safeguard sovereignty, secure mineral wealth, and ensure no external effort derails this historic opportunity.
The writer is a lawyer and author based in Islamabad. He tweets @m_asifmahmood