When Field Marshal Asim Munir sat down for lunch at the White House this summer, the symbolism was lost on no one. For the first time in years, Washington treated Islamabad not as a junior partner in counterterrorism but as a central player in the evolving Asian order. That moment came against the backdrop of a simmering India-Pakistan crisis in May and a full-scale Iran-Israel conflict in June; two flashpoints that underscored the dangers of a multipolar, volatile neighbourhood.
The sudden rise in Pakistan’s global profile invites a fresh look at century-old geopolitical maps. Early in the 20th century, British geographer Halford Mackinder sketched the idea of a “Heartland” pivot state, territories whose control could tilt the world balance. Later, American strategist Nicholas Spykman argued instead for the “Rimland”, the coastal belts of Eurasia, as the true prize.
The sudden rise in Pakistan’s global profile invites a fresh look at century-old geopolitical maps.
In 2025, Pakistan finds itself at the intersection of both theories. Its inland geography makes it a pivot between South Asia, Central Asia, and the Gulf. Its 1,046-kilometre coastline on the Arabian Sea makes it a rimland state, critical to maritime energy and trade arteries.
The old idea that suddenly feels new
Pakistan´s geography can amplify political and military choices, as Pakistan sits at the seam of great-power interests and energy, trade, and security corridors, bridging the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea to Central Asia, bordering China and India, and straddling overland/sea routes fit both Pivot-Rim state profiles. Pakistan’s geography, since independence, has always been a destiny, but 2025 has elevated its profile in new ways. Today, Pakistan embodies both: a pivot inland and a rimland anchor at sea.
Pakistan’s capacity to talk to Washington, Beijing, Gulf capitals, and (via backchannels) Tehran while engaging Europe on trade and security is textbook pivot cum Rim state diplomacy. Washington´s outreach to “Rawaplindi”(Army Chief) for crisis hedging with India and Afghan-Gulf-Indo-Pacific linkages, in sync with civilian diplomacy, opens multiple doors for Pakistan into the decision rooms of major powers.
What changed in 2025-and why it matters?
In the middle of recent crises, Pakistan found itself courted, consulted, and treated with unusual seriousness. For a country long dismissed as peripheral, these weeks demonstrated something profound: Pakistan is again a pivot state in Mackinder’s sense, and simultaneously a rimland state in Spykman’s sense. Its geography has made a comeback.
The logic of Mackinder’s pivot is that geography at the crossroads of civilisations forces others to take notice. Pakistan’s location does exactly that. To the north, it touches the underbelly of Central Asia, a region rich in energy and minerals but landlocked and unstable. To the east, it borders India, a rival nuclear state with which it has fought multiple wars. To the west, it borders Iran and Afghanistan, two countries central to any discussion of Middle Eastern security. Lastly, to the northwest, its short but critical frontier with China links it to the rising superpower of the 21st century.
This makes Pakistan a geopolitical hinge. Any crisis in one direction, from Indian aggression, Afghan instability and Gulf tensions can quickly spill across borders. And when it does, major powers are dragged in, whether they like it or not.
The May clash with India illustrated this perfectly. Within hours, Washington, Beijing, and Riyadh were on the phone. Shuttle diplomacy began. Not because of altruism, but because Pakistan’s geography makes regional instability a global problem. This is exactly what Mackinder predicted about pivot states: their conflicts cannot remain local.
Spykman’s rimland theory fits Pakistan equally well. Spykman argued that whoever controls the rimland controls Eurasia, because it is here that trade, energy, and naval power intersect. Pakistan’s rimland position thus complements its pivot status: it is at once a land corridor and a maritime sentinel.
With over 1,000 kilometres of coastline along the Arabian Sea, Pakistan commands some of the most strategic waters in the world. Gwadar Port built with Chinese investment, anchors the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), giving Beijing a potential warm-water outlet that bypasses the Malacca Strait choke point. Karachi Port is Pakistan’s commercial lifeline, handling the bulk of trade, energy imports, and shipping. Makran Coast overlooks the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of global oil passes.
When the Iran-Israel war spread to the Gulf in June, this rimland advantage became visible. Tankers rerouted closer to the Pakistani coast to avoid Iranian missiles. Insurance premiums soared, and suddenly the Makran coast was not just a barren shoreline but a strategic vantage point for global energy markets.
Pakistan today is a rare hybrid. It is both a pivot state inland and a rimland state at sea. Inland, it connects China and Central Asia to South Asia and the Gulf. It is a nuclear-armed balancer in a neighbourhood of rivals. At sea, it anchors one of the busiest energy highways in the world, with the potential to become a hub for trade, logistics, and naval security.
This dual identity explains why Washington, Beijing, Gulf capitals, and even European policymakers suddenly view Pakistan not as a peripheral problem but as a strategic hinge. When crises unfold, whether in Kashmir or Hormuz, Islamabad is a player that cannot be ignored.
Pakistan’s pivot-rimland role touches every facet of its statehood; On land, nuclear deterrence and conventional balance with India remain central. At sea, Pakistan’s navy has become more relevant, tasked with coastal defence, submarine operations, and maritime domain awareness. The lesson of 2025 is clear: maritime modernisation is no longer optional. CPEC and Gwadar symbolise Pakistan’s dual geography. Overland routes from Xinjiang and Central Asia terminate at rimland ports. If Pakistan can ensure reliable logistics, energy throughput, and customs facilitation, its geography translates into economic rent.
Islamabad’s ability to speak simultaneously with Washington, Beijing, Gulf capitals, and Tehran is a classic pivot function. But with its coastline under the spotlight, Pakistan can also brand itself as a rimland stabiliser, by hosting maritime security dialogues and energy coordination forums. Pakistan’s global diaspora ties trade, remittances, and political narratives across continents. In pivot-rimland logic, diaspora is not a soft background is a multiplier of influence.
Pakistan’s geography has made a comeback. The challenge now is simple but profound: to turn attention into leverage, leverage into strategy, and strategy into lasting influence. If Islamabad seizes the moment, Pakistan can finally transcend its image as a crisis-prone state and emerge as what both Mackinder and Spykman foresaw in different ways-a state at the crossroads of world power.
The writer is a senior retired military officer and presently a doctoral candidate at Ecole Des Pont Business School Paris.