I am still looking for the intellectuals who made us believe that the nuclear states do not go to war with each other due to the presence of undefendable nuclear weapons. Perhaps the dicta held its ground during the Cold War era because, after the establishment of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, primarily fought against each other through proxies. However, assuming that the same would happen in South Asia too was perhaps too optimistic or naive.
In the presence of an active dispute between the two neighbouring states, the possibility of military engagement remains with varying degrees of probability. The degree of probability will depend on the evolving international and regional environment, as well as the political will to resolve the dispute by military means of either state.
In this brief article, it is argued that the situation in South Asia differs significantly from the Cold War era. Therefore, we must not be under the illusion that there is no space for war under the nuclear overhang. India and Pakistan have had at least three violent military engagements since the overt nuclearisation of South Asia in 1998.
The 5-Day War between India and Pakistan in May 2025, initiated by India and restrained yet well responded to by Pakistan, was not the first and not the last military engagement of the 21st Century. It had all the ingredients to expand horizontally and vertically to be declared as an all-out war, which may have led to a disastrous nuclear exchange.
The Cold War principles are valid only for rational people and not for the likes of India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who follows a hardline Hindutva Philosophy of his terror outfit, RSS. Modi has converted India into a Hindu State from a well-established secular state. Modi cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons because he has an outright conventional superiority over Pakistan in all the domains. However, if it were not for the brilliance of the Pakistan Air Force, India would not have sought a ceasefire within five days. Even after the ceasefire, Modi continues with the war mantra and has warned that the war is not over.
Modi cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons because he has an outright conventional superiority over Pakistan in all domains.
Following the unfortunate incident of Pahalgam on October 22, 2025, in which at least 26 innocent lives were lost in an unprovoked attack, which was allegedly planned by India but blamed at Pakistan, IAF carried out multiple missile attacks in Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK), Sialkot region across the Working Boundary, and deep inside Pakistan across international borders in Bahawalpur and Muridke areas, on the night of 6th and 7th May, 2025. Most of these attacks were made on the mosques and madrasas to show the world that these were training centres of terror outfits. However, India’s attacks on the Neelum-Jehlum Hydro Project are a serious attempt to sabotage Pakistan’s efforts at water security and must be treated as an act of war.
Pakistan responded swiftly with all its operational resources deemed necessary at the time and claimed shooting down at least five fighter jets of the IAF, including French-built Rafael aircraft. Even though claims and counterclaims are part of the warfare, international sources have now confirmed that the PAF has become the first air force to shoot down a Rafale aircraft, and the number is more than one.
The Modi-madness did not stop here, and India continued to attack Pakistan’s counterforce and countervalue targets deep inside Pakistan on May 8 and 9, 2025. Pakistan exercised extreme restraint, but Modi forced it to show its muscles, and Pakistan did so to Modi’s entire satisfaction. In the meantime, Pakistan had convened the meeting of its National Command Authority (NCA), which is responsible for outlining parameters for a possible nuclear response. It was only after Pakistan’s strong response on May 10, 2025, that India approached the Trump Administration to broker a ceasefire. However, the Indian leadership continues to warn Pakistan of another round of military engagement soon, particularly so if Modi faces a strong reaction from its hardline supporters to attack Pakistan and take revenge for its downed aircraft.
Ideally, the nuclear deterrence should deny the enemy the initiative; however, if it still attacks another nuclear state, that means the enemy is not impressed with the deterrent value (DV) of its opponent. The framework for calculating the DV has already been provided by me and published in a NUST Journal in June 2024.
My definition of nuclear deterrence is ‘Dare Not’, but unfortunately, our decision-makers still think that the mere presence of nuclear weapons will be able to convince Modi-type leaders to desist from undesirable acts of war. Well, good luck in the future too.
The writer of this article has authored three international books: “Nuclear Deterrence and Conflict Management Between India and Pakistan” “South Asia Needs Hybrid Peace” and “Understanding Sun Tzu and the Art of Hybrid War.”