Recent history repeats itself, and it may be useful to remember that Imran Khan and Gen. Bajwa’s past hybrid governments were expected to be on the same page early to the 2022 no-confidence vote against Khan.
It is a good move for the government to create the National Intelligence Fusion and Threat Assessment Centre (NIFTAC) within the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA). However, there is needed an urgency cannot afford to wait as the TTP and BLA continue their campaign of terror and bloodshed in KP and Baluchistan escalates. The Jaffar Express kidnapping in Baluchistan, targeted strikes in Dera Ismail Khan and Gwadar, and deadly incidents on police officers in North Waziristan, all highlight the increasing skill and reach of militant organizations. Proposals for Provincial Intelligence Fusion and Threat Assessment Centers (PIFTACS), a potential attempt to simplify threat analysis across federal and provincial lines, were also outlined during NACTA’s sixth Board of Governors meeting, where NIFTAC was approved. However, NACTA has witnessed successful launches in the past. Before it became obsolete, the Joint Intelligence Directorate, which was authorized in 2016, was heralded as a revolutionary development in intelligence collaboration. Likewise, previous frameworks for counterterrorism, such as the National Internal Security Policy (2018-23), which placed a strong focus on non-kinetic tactics, were not put into practice. Officials have now reverted to their previous plans with a heightened sense of urgency in response to another wave of extremist attacks. This entails giving NACTA the authority to serve as the primary civilian CT authority in the nation. It also entails ending the pattern of ignoring NACTA following violent outbursts. To identify and dismantle militant networks before they launch an attack, it entails bolstering and supporting provincial CT units. It is also necessary to address the ideological aspect of this conflict. Long-term stability in volatile regions like Baluchistan and the combinead districts of KP hinges on resolving long-standing local grievances, as stated in the National Action Plan, the government’s main strategy document on counterterrorism. Initiatives for deradicalization, development, and reconciliation cannot just be idle platitudes in a policy document.
However, the important reason is that political intelligence creates conflict with other intelligence organizations because it serves as the civilian government’s eyes and ears. Because the military and civilian leadership agree, the administration is hopeful that NIFTAC will succeed this time.
The state needs to give priority to reforms in areas that have long experienced poverty, marginalization, and security operations lacking political will
Under the direction of the ISI director general, the Khan administration also authorized the creation of a comparable organization, known as the National Intelligence collaboration Committee, to improve intelligence collaboration. NACTA was also designated as one of the nation’s two dozen intelligence organizations, while nothing is known about the NICC’s future. Additionally, the government intends to establish provincial danger assessment centers. However, NACTA has had trouble integrating among the provincial CTDs because it lacked a valid method for cooperation, and the combating terrorism units already have abilities facilities.
Previously, the national the coordinators at NACTA, suggested creating a national CTD and placing all CTDs under its jurisdiction, with NACTA serving as the secretariat for the CTDs at the national level. The goal was to lessen the dependency on serving and paramilitary organizations while quickly and effectively combating the threat of terrorism. But there has not been any evaluation of this concept. According to sources, the government had chosen to name a senior military officer as the subsequent head of NACTA to improve the organization’s functionality after he left the body. But NIFTAC’s leader, who is also a member of the armed forces, will also oversee NACTA’s business.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa also approved a hybrid security model last month, which substitutes police for security troops in regions with a reduced risk of terrorism. Within 15 days, the police were supposed to take over security in the districts of Buner and Upper Chitral. Nonetheless, security forces would still oversee overseeing security in the extremely unstable southern districts. The apex committee approved CSM will provide police with weapons, ammo, and innovative technology. According to an official statement, the cabinet, which is led by Chief Minister Ali Amin Khan Gandapur, authorized Rs567.7 million for police equipment purchases.
Although these provincial actions are directly tied to combating terrorist threats, it is unclear how they would align with NIFTAC’s goals. NIFTAC’s mission is to ensure the successful execution on the National Action Plan (NAP) and to confront new security threats, just like the NICC. NIFTAC would also have to coordinate with individuals in charge of provincial police operations and provide them with information and practical guidance if it were to take the position of NACTA.
Indeed, NIFTAC could need to update NAP, which lost emphasis during a review a few years ago and had its twenty points reduced to fourteen. Although some of the previous draft’s terms have been kept, some have been changed, and the updated plan now includes a few new ones. However, NAP’s focus should be limited to terrorist organizations, their support systems, ideologies, and nexuses; it cannot incorporate any ideological design. It will no longer be useful if it stops focusing on terrorism.
The perception that higher-ranking security institutions are intruding on the territory of civilian security institutions must be refuted by the government. Police officers may become even more disheartened because of this view, particularly in KP and Baluchistan where they are constantly confronted with terrorist threats. Massive adjustments are required to rebuild public trust in the police and the system because of their negative reputation and involvement in wrongdoing.
In short, the state needs to give priority to reforms in areas that have long experienced poverty, marginalization, and security operations lacking political will, as this publication stated last year. Furthermore, it is necessary to remove any extreme and sectarian groups that continue to function in the public domain. They support the same ideals that give rise to armed groups and suicide bombers. It is crucial to revive NACTA. However, acknowledging that CT is more than just coordination cells and technology is also important. It involves political will, sustained investment in impacted communities, and a resolute dedication to carrying out the promises made thus far. The question that remains revolves around if this government will, like its predecessors, fail to carry out its mandate.
The writer is a PhD candidate at QAU and has worked at SDPI.