Nuclear weapons and efforts to curb the spread of nuclear material and technology emerged almost simultaneously in the early Cold War period, highlighting tension that continues to this day. As of 2012, nine states have developed nuclear capability and a few other states are openly signalling their intentions to develop the atomic bomb. Although more than 185 countries have accepted a formal treaty obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons, the threat of new countries developing nuclear weapons remains a major challenge for the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. In the post-Cold War era, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has suffered major blows due to the discovery of secret nuclear activities like uranium enrichment and plutonium separation in North Korea, Syria, Iraq and Iran.
Despite limited success of the non-proliferation regime, the efforts to further the goal of non-proliferation continued, culminating in many different bilateral and multilateral counter-proliferation treaties. The Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), a proposed international treaty, is currently being discussed in the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) to prohibit the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. The desire to secure fissile materials and control their further production is very significant in the achievement of the objective to make this world free of nuclear weapons. Extra importance being attached to this treaty is due to the fact that its successful conclusion will not only be termed as a landmark step towards the realisation of the goal to ensure greater nuclear security across the globe but also erect an insurmountable barrier for potential proliferators. But, over the past decade, different members of the CD, including Pakistan, have been intermittently expressing their concerns about the ambiguities in the scope of the FMCT. The question whether the proposed treaty will cover the pre-existing stocks of fissile material has constantly remained a matter of considerable importance among scholars working on nuclear issues.
More importantly, under the 2009 International Panel on Fissile Materials’ (IPFM) draft treaty, parties to the treaty will have to “declare to the IAEA their stocks of fissile materials in the civilian sector, excess for all military purposes, and for use in military reactors”. But Pakistan and India have always been reluctant to reveal their existing stocks and also do not permit IAEA inspectors to verify their exact locations. Although Egypt, South Africa and Cuba have also voiced their apprehensions about gaps in the pre-existing stocks of fissile material, Pakistan alone has been blocking the start of formal negotiations at the CD since May 2009. Pakistan’s ambassador at the CD, Zamir Akram, has made it plain many times that the Pakistani government will only allow the passage of a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) that covers existing fissile material stocks and does not disturb the deterrence stability in the region.
Pakistan’s nuclear security managers are of the opinion that our country has fallen behind India in producing fissile material and narrowing this gap is essential for achieving ‘strategic parity’ with India. The likelihood of India gaining an edge in nuclear capability must be a cause of concern for our nuclear establishment as Pakistan knows that it cannot win a conventional war with India. My purpose of writing this article is to underscore the point, not often discussed in our country, that Pakistan’s refusal to allow even the start of formal talks on the FMCT is an unsustainable position due to our not very clean record in nuclear non-proliferation and the overall failure on the diplomatic front. Unfortunately, due to our own failings and double standards in fighting terrorism, Pakistan does not enjoy a good reputation in the global community. What is worse is that taking advantage of our collective failure to muster enough support, some members of the CD only blamed Pakistan’s obduracy for the deadlock of the CD. And this is a dirty truth: for the past four years Pakistan is just reiterating the original mantra not to allow the start of talks and the CD is bereft of any viable solution to the problem.
A decent beginning can be made if Pakistan allows the start of talks on the FMCT. The academicians in our country should help bring down the emotional rhetoric on this issue. And for that to happen, we need a realisation of the truth that the world is no more interested in listening to our angry platitudes about threats from the eastern border. Pakistan does not face any fatal threats from the activities of India but only from our internal security challenges and political duplicity. Has anybody ever tried to think about what would happen if the global community started negotiations on the FMCT outside the framework of the CD? Pakistan will face unbearable diplomatic isolation and its credibility level as a responsible nuclear state will fall to zero. After 2014, when Pakistan’s support in the war against the militancy in Afghanistan will not be required, we will come under added pressure from the US and other European countries on this issue. In December 1993, Pakistan supported the UN General Assembly Resolution calling for talks on a “non-discriminatory multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” So, Pakistan cannot afford to appear as a country violating the UN resolution and blocking the CD from implementing its agreed agenda.
Then there is the problem that our government has made no bones about impressing upon the international community the need to address our legitimate concerns regarding the scope of the FMCT. Our political government and nuclear security managers have miserably failed to forcefully and logically present our case on the FMCT on diplomatic fronts. It is highly unfortunate that Pakistani scholars are so ill informed on the issues of national security that in different international conferences and seminars they rely only on hackneyed phrases and diplomatic jargon to fight Pakistan’s case. Our nuclear establishment also does not make any serious effort to select competent people for this purpose, rather a team of incompetent people is preferred that can parrot the official position of the Pakistani government without really thinking about what it means.
Many nuclear experts are of the view that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is already big enough to ensure a stable deterrence in the region. In 1998, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz also stated that there was no harm in signing the FMCT and Pakistan had enough enriched fissile material to maintain the power equilibrium in the region. So, Pakistan should not risk drawing the ire of the international community and let the CD start talks. Thousands of nuclear weapons could not save the Soviet Union from disintegration because an outright economic collapse caused the empire to implode from within. Today, Pakistan faces the same situation and only right policies and honest leadership, not hundreds of nuclear weapons, can save our country from hurtling towards disaster.
The writer is a research scholar and a former visiting fellow at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, California. He can be reached at [email protected]