An Afghan government delegation and various elements of the Afghan Taliban finally met this past week in Murree, a few miles from where once Pakistan’s oldest brewery stood. A toast might be premature but would certainly be in order if the heady brew from Murree — Pakistan’s Camp David — did end up jumpstarting the Afghan peace process. The breakthrough (as Pakistan’s foreign office has dubbed it) has been welcomed across the board, as it should be. Anything that could be a harbinger of peace in a country ravaged by four decades of war must be appreciated despite the obvious limitations of the process. The moot was certainly groundbreaking but not necessarily an earthshattering one. That it was the first official such face off between the two parties was perhaps its most noteworthy takeaway point while the presence of the Chinese and US observers was the most crucial one. While face-to-face meetings have been held between Afghan government officials and the Taliban previously, both the sides took pains to label them unofficial. The presence of effective international powers, especially China with its leverage over Pakistan, as observers has the potential to have them as guarantors if the process eventually leads to a tangible peace deal.
No less important, however, is the venue and the host — Pakistan — of the nascent peace process. While Pakistani officials and analysts would want one to believe that the former Afghan president, Mr Hamid Karzai, was the reason that such a process could not be set in motion, the fact is that the timing and evolution of the Afghan conflict and Pakistan’s priorities kept it from offering any such option to Mr Karzai. I have maintained in this column for years that Pakistan’s singular objective in Afghanistan has been to win a seat for the Taliban at the negotiations table in Kabul if not win that city for them. Dictating Afghan domestic and, even more outrageously, foreign policy has been Pakistan’s desire all along. The Taliban were kept — if necessary by arresting them — from speaking to Kabul till Pakistan felt the time was right for talks i.e. international forces led by the US were on their way out of Afghanistan. In 2010, the Taliban’s second-in-command, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, lost Pakistan’s good grace (and consequently his freedom) for trying to talk to Mr Karzai. In fact, taking Mullah Baradar, who had both military and political influence over the Taliban cadres, out of the equation did set the peace process back significantly.
The Murree moot also vindicates those who have maintained that Pakistan exercises tremendous clout, if not outright control, over the most lethal Taliban affiliate, the Jalaluddin Haqqani network, which is run currently by his son, Sirajuddin. According to media reports, Jalaluddin’s brother, Ibrahim Haqqani, and Sirajuddin’s brother-in-law, Yahya Haqqani, who is also an operational commander of the terror network, attended the Murree session. The presence of the Haqqanis, who have been held responsible for most of the so-called spectacular terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, particularly inside Kabul, at the parleys indicates that the taps of terror could be shut off if there is a desire to do so. The other key Taliban participants also have a long history with both Pakistan and the so-called Islamic Emirate. The Taliban’s former minister for public health, Mullah Muhammad Abbas Akhund, and minister for agriculture, Mullah Abdul Latif Mansur, who attended the Murree meeting, are both graduates of Pakistan’s Haqqaniah seminary. Another key Taliban man present was the former acting foreign minister of the emirate, Mullah Abdul Jaleel. The three men claimed to be representing the current de facto leader of the Taliban and, more specifically, of its Quetta Shura, Mullah Muhammad Akhtar Mansoor.
The Taliban’s demands in Murree were consistent with their previous stance and included the removal of their names from various international sanctions lists (ironically one participant, Yahya Haqqani, is on the US list of designated terrorists), release of their men from Afghan and US prisons and the withdrawal of foreign troops. So if the timing and venue are of Pakistan’s choosing and the Taliban have not budged much in their demands what did the Murree meeting gain? For starters, it gets the US and, much more importantly, China off of Pakistan’s back in the short-term. The Chinese are loath to invest in unstable countries and now seem in a hurry to get back to multi-billion dollar projects like the Mes Aynak mines in Afghanistan. Additionally, it buys Afghan President Dr Ashraf Ghani precious breathing space at home. With little to show in return for his nine-month long courtship with Pakistan, Dr Ghani has become increasingly beleaguered at home. At the time of this writing an ice-breaking meeting between Dr Ghani and the chief critic of his Pakistan policy, Mr Karzai, is still on schedule. How long the breather for Dr Ghani lasts will depend not just on such iftaar socials but what exactly he is able to extract from the Taliban — and in return for what — in the follow up talks. The deadly bombing in Khost over the weekend indicates that the government’s ceasefire demand has been spurned.
It is highly unlikely that the Taliban would be offered government positions unless they implement a ceasefire, lay down their weapons and form a political party to join the democratic process in Afghanistan. The Afghans in and outside parliament would not offer the Taliban on a platter what they have not been able to win on the battlefield. In the 21 years of its existence the Taliban have not been able to evolve from a fighting machine to a political entity and Pakistan has no other political partners — not even Dr Ghani — in Afghanistan. And therein lies the rub. With no political horse to bet on Pakistan is more likely than not to drag the peace process through to the end of 2016 to see the last US troops off on the pretext that Taliban field commanders like Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir, Hafiz Abdul Majeed and Mullah Baz Muhammad are not amenable to talks. The Taliban on its part has been vacillating over the Murree process by first posting and then removing an article on its website that all but disowned the meeting. The current Taliban stand is that only its political commission in Qatar has the authority to conduct talks with both the Afghan and foreign emissaries. Defections to and onslaught from Islamic State (IS) as in Nangarhar are an increasing Taliban concern as is losing political ground to Dr Ashraf Ghani. The Murree brew has certainly broken a stalemate but it would have to age considerably before it can make a meaningful contribution to Afghan peace.
The writer can be reached at [email protected] and he tweets @mazdaki