In my last column for Daily Times (October 13, 2012), I made an argument that it is the lack of knowledge, politicisation and propaganda against the drone strikes that is causing people to hate drones and the US. Hence, in the sequel, I will attempt to educate the people on what exactly are drones, how they are used and whether they should they be used or not. To begin with, “Drones have been a blessing for us.” This is not the statement of an American soldier, but rather a stance one of the soldiers of the Pakistan army posted in South Waziristan when I talked to him about the drone strikes. The weapon, according to the soldiers on the ground, has lifted the burden off the Pakistani soldiers to fight in a rugged terrain against militants who use civilians as a cover. It must be clear to everyone that the reason why the US government has invested millions of dollars in this technology is not to kill civilians, especially, when they have other more lethal means to do that. The entire philosophy behind the drone technology is precisely to minimise civilian casualties in guerrilla warfare where the terrorists use civilians as a shield. People need to realise that the US has been forced to use this weapon, and while the collateral damage is there, every effort is placed into minimising the damage. For instance, a drone has the capacity to destroy a small compound, but what has killed civilians more is, at times, not the drone itself but the amount of TNT that is stored by the militants in the compound, which is unknown to the drone operator. Due to this, the US shifted its strategy to hit the compounds less, and I have been actively raising voice to bring the civilian casualties to zero; drones must be used when the militants are out in convoys, or the compound is not in a population centre. The new strategy by the US has substantially reduced civilian casualties manifold as evidenced by several research reports. Misconceptions also revolve around the drone strike operators. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the drone pilot is not sitting in his comfortable seat somewhere in the US, munching on a Big Mac while playing with the joystick and casually killing everyone that he spots with a beard. In fact, drone operators are exactly in the same condition and situation as the actual pilot with an additional restriction that they cannot kill at their own convenience. If anything, unlike the fighter pilots who can bomb entire localities during combat, drone pilots are finding specific targets, and in numerous cases do not strike and abort the operation when the cost of civilian damage is too much. The job is rigorous and the burn out rate is greater than it is for normal fighter pilots. What people do not also realise is that drones cannot be conducted single handedly by the US. It is done in collaboration with the ISI. Pakistan’s intelligence services provide the ground intelligence and the target list of the people who have to be droned. The targets are selected carefully and the permission to kill is given after scrutiny through proper channels. However, there are also signature strikes that are time-constrained and evade the proper channel, and these are where civilian deaths occur mostly. But signature strikes account for a small percentage of the drone strikes which are more calculated, and with time becoming even more precise. When we talk about strikes, it is important to understand how targets are classified. There are three types of targets: 1) Militants who are a threat to both Pakistan and the US; 2) militants who are a threat to only Pakistan, and 3) militants who are a threat to only the US. Now Pakistan has been completely in coherence with the US over the militants who were dangerous to both the US and Pakistan, and those who were a threat to only Pakistan. Where the drones became contentious was when the US, due to rising attacks in Afghanistan from the Pakistan side by the Haqqani network, pumped up its drone strikes against them, who were not really a threat to the interests of Pakistan. Many in the international media came to believe that it was the ISI that was sponsoring the Haqqanis whereas the truth is that the Pakistan army, in the midst of an already exhausting battle, did not want to open another front with the Haqqanis. The inaction of the Pakistan Army against the Haqqanis was taken as ‘full support’ to them from the army in the international media. The issue of who to strike, followed by the events of Raymond Davis and Salala had a fallout effect on the ISI and CIA relations, which ruptured the views on drone strikes in Pakistan. People in Pakistan must also be aware that drones are only a temporary weapon designed to give an edge in the battlefield, the same way the use of the machine gun once provided an edge and victory to its users in the battlefield. In fact, talks about ending the drone strikes are already in progress in the policy-making circles of the US. It is not because of Imran Khan’s anti-drone rally or any other issue but largely because the job has been done and the militants are on the run, something that the locals in FATA truly appreciate according to the research I have done. What will enable a complete victory over the militants is how the advantage acquired by the drone strikes is used in the post-drone scenario to deal with the militants. The tragedy in Pakistan is that most of us here view the US as an enemy, but the reality on the battleground is that our army is being helped by the Americans to defeat the true enemies of Pakistan. When understanding the US, our premise is that the US is against Pakistan, and is actively trying to destabilise and fracture the country into segments. When we use this lens to view the US, we are likely to develop conspiracy theories and hatred towards the US. If we keep sentiments and conspiracy theories aside, drone strikes have actually helped the Pakistan army in the battlefield. They are making the lawless area of FATA far more secure for the future by flushing out the brutal and regressive-minded militants who are suffocating the people and pushing them into a war that they do not want to be a part of. The strikes, thus, must be continued, and made more precise. Since the drone strikes are likely to end in a matter of months, the policymakers in Pakistan should be actively thinking of the post-drone policy against the militants and forcing the militants to drop their weapons. Without an effective post-drone strategy, the advantage acquired against the militants through drone operations will go in vain. Understanding drones can actually enable us to use the weapon and situation in a far more positive way for the national interests of Pakistan. The writer is the Visiting Scholar of Asia Programme, Woodrow Wilson Centrer