The Umayyid genius for a
reasonably decentralised rule unshackled the Islamic state system and Muslim society, opening them to evolution, expansion and absorption of ideas from neighbouring civilizations. Thus began the enrichment and rise of Islamic civilisation. Arts and crafts, architecture, music, sciences, medicine, literature, industry, state institutions, the art of warfare and state building progressed admirably. Islam spread from Turkey to Sinkiang overland and along the rim of the Indian Ocean to India, Malaysia and Indonesia, this time propelled by the winds of trade.
The peak of the Islamic state and paradoxically its epilogue too, was the Ottoman Caliphate. Under the Ottomans, the system evolved to its ultimate emirate-sultanate model. The executive, judicial and independent groups of eminent religious scholars were clearly acting as mutually balancing and stabilising forces throughout the Ottoman Empire. Until one of the Ottoman sultans, with good intent but far reaching effects, thought of compiling all the past edicts of the scholars pool into an official compendium for ready reference by the judiciary. This compendium (Mechelle) was spread over 16 large volumes (it was compiled over 1869-1876) and inadvertently, largely diminished the extremely important counterbalancing role of independent scholars. As a result the sultan became an unrestrained autocrat, the state-employed judiciary subservient and the scholars redundant. This undid the Ottoman Caliphate, as by then around it, Europe was fast decentralising and democratizing, exercising a strong pull over the wobbly Ottoman administration.
WW I and II saw the Muslim power crash decisively and the rise of Europe and the US, whose democratic system of governance came to be considered an animus to the Muslim concept of the caliphate when erroneously compared to the latter day decomposed Ottoman model, whereas the original Medinite model was refreshingly participatory and representative in essence. Following the Umayyid, Abbasid, Fatimid and the early Ottoman state systems, these too were more or less similarly crafted except for the hereditary rulers.
Then why is it that all subsequent attempts to impose Shariah rule invariably failed? That happened in the Frontier in 1831, Daghestan in 1859, Afghanistan twice in 1918 and 2002, Sudan in 1889, Nigeria a few years ago, Mali in 2011, Yemen in 2012 and now through the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt has just begun its experiment. The Saudi Arabian model is a monarchy legitimised by a cooperative clergy and Iran is ruled by the clergy in the name of religion; therefore, they do not qualify for the discussion in question. What went wrong with these attempts can be an educative study. They failed mainly because the concept of caliphate/emirate they projected was neither updated nor synchronised with the contemporary world, and, therefore, was resisted externally. Internally, it failed for the same reason that the Medinite Caliphate did after the Prophet: over-centralisation of state powers in one man at the top for life.
Because of these two major defaults, there appears a strong world revulsion to the Islamic system of governance, call it caliphate, emirate or what have you. This opposition has gradually evolved into a major cause of global friction between Muslims and the rest of the world. This state of universal friction between followers of a major religion, almost one-third of the world population and the rest, if allowed to continue, can devastate world peace and stability. For the Muslims, this stunted concept of Islamic self-governance is confusing, self-contradictory and seriously divisive. Muslim societies are falling apart trying to grapple with built-in controversies of the proposed system, defended tenaciously by a majority of religious scholars who prohibit enquiry and research into matters of faith. One is aware of the dark apprehensions that a reference to the caliphate evokes in the mind of the modern world. For an objective analysis it may be noted that the original concept of the caliphate was participatory in essence, inclusive, and that of a welfare state. The caliphate also introduced a rudimentary system of elections during a period when everywhere else chieftains, kings and emperors were ruling and democracy as we know it today was at least 700 years away. The model British Parliament was set up in 1295 AD.
There is a need to engage heated proponents of the Islamic system of governance in a purposeful dialogue to bring them up to the present times. They have to shun literalist interpretations of Islam and remove friction with the systems prevalent today. The Islamic system of state is not necessarily anti-democratic nor is it a monolith. All it needs is to be evolved and rationalised. Its enthusiastic proponents and potential practitioners will have to scale down their ultra-photosensitivity to modernity, incorporate guarantees of basic human rights, avoid notions of military expansion, give up religious policing, recognise and absorb the power of communication, TV and the internet, guarantee a participatory form of governance and universal education. In short, the concept and content of their model for the caliphate must match and not clash with the minimum standards of a universally acceptable form of governance. There is a serious requirement to end this needless ferment in the world through wisdom, knowledge, patience and empathy without prejudice. There is a strong subterranean pulse among the radical/extremist entities and visible urge among various segments of Muslim societies for a welfare Islamic state system that should be addressed and not confronted. That once done, should ensure viable world peace and harmony as a result.
(Concluded)
The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan army and can be reached at [email protected]