Pakistan is divided into
four linguistic-ethnic groups and lacks a national ethos. Again these are irreconcilable trends leading towards two different poles, and the post-colonial state of Pakistan has failed to bridge gaps between them by taking recourse to secularism, the only alternative to end fragmentation. However, it is not easy under a conservative and religious divide. What we have observed from the case of blasphemy law and its rejection subsequently led to assassination of the minster for minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti after the governor of Punjab was killed. Pakistan has to develop its own version of secularism, suitable for its own situation rather than taking direct inspiration from western secularism, secularism that would entail respecting each religious sect besides respecting each religion.
The post-colonial Pakistan has remained unsuccessful in accommodating diversity– diversities of ethnic groups, languages and religion, as firstly evidenced in its bitter conflict with the Bengali nationalist demand, which culminated into another partition in 1971, and now manifest in Balochistan and others tribal provinces. The ethnic regional-polarisation emerged with the partition but presently it has reached a new intensity. The regional identities like Sindhi, Baloch, and Pathan, after the independence, have felt alienation from the “Punjabisation of Pakistan”. Then, the ruling elite, used militarisation and Islamisation as strategies to paralyse the voices of regional identities but from 2008, the dialectical contradiction between centralizstion or centre and regional identities widened, caused political instability. Non-Panjabi ethnic classes are highly discounted with the Punjabi ruling elites, who are reluctant to accept the multi-ethnic composition of the country, reducing it to law and order problem rather than national integration.
The central-centered identity of Pakistan as a newly created ‘unified entity’ was imposed on the divergent ethnic sub-nationalities, which produced a clash between ethnic nationalities and state-sponsored nation building projects; these sub-nationalities feel alienation from the state-sponsored nation building process and continues to look it with suspicion. The ethnic sub-nationalities feel marginalisation of their identity and are very conscious of their separate identity; for instance, Wali Khan, a Pashtun nationalist, the son of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, declared in the 1980s, “I have been a Pashtun for 4,000 years, a Muslim for 1,400 years and a Pakistani for 40 years.”
Therefore, the post-colonial Pakistan has an ethical bias and is an undefined identity state. Recently, the debate is going on the nature of the identity of the Pakistan and Jinnah is resurrected everyday through newspapers and periodicals and even discussed in news platforms. The Jinnah of 1947, “You are free;… free to go to your temples, … free to go any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan, you may belong to any religion caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of state… that we are all equal citizens of one state. Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in the course of time, Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense… but in the political sense as citizens of the state.”
However, everybody knows that Pakistan is not going towards this direction but in its reverse. But there is debate now, and in between widespread ethnic and sectarian violence is the desire of people to live in peace, but there are many who want to make Pakistan a religious state. There is a reassertion of religious identity among the youth, who equally wants secularism to prevail and the major claim put forth is that Pakistan was never governed by any religious party, which is true. Pakistan has never been able to solve such contradictions, yet taking recourse to secularism seems to be the only remedy for many of its ills. However, the post-colonial Pakistan is neither secular nor theocratic but a precarious mixture of both. It remains to be seen whether Pakistan would be able to define its identity and solve such contradictions or not and whether it would be able to implement secularism to protect minorities in its territory or not post the 2013 elections.
(Concluded)
The writer is a student of M.phil South Asian studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and can be reached at [email protected]