The outcome of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting in Seoul, South Korea has once again evinced Pakistan’s strong dependence on China’s friendship. Since the eve of the summit, China has reiterated its opposition to India’s induction, which in Pakistan’s eyes, is a testament to a friendship that can weather the salvo of any future challenge. As geopolitics and self-interest slowly take hold, however, Pakistan might find itself isolated once again if China chooses to support India’s bid for membership, an outcome that might not be too far off. In such a situation, it is of paramount importance for Pakistan to scrutinise its foreign policy objectives, and reassess its relationship towards India. The struggle for NSG membership, in turn, provides the perfect platform to do so.
It seems ironic to many that the very organisation which was founded in the wake of the first Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 is now so amenable to India’s membership. It has to be noted, however, that India does have a strong case for NSG membership, and its application has much more credibility than current members of the elite nuclear group. Yes, India is not a signatory of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but neither was France when it was allowed to join the NSG. China itself continued to expand its nuclear arsenal after it joined the NSG, and Brazil, although not a nuclear armed state, still does not have the Advanced Protocol (AP) arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which are necessary precursors for membership. India, on the other hand, does uphold the AP with the IAEA. From a legal and precedent standpoint then, India’s application does warrant merit. Alas, it is the tragedy of our world that geopolitics and not legality, govern state relations and global politics. And this is where Pakistan comes in.
In the great political game that is overshadowing Asia, China sees itself pitted against India, which is backed by the United States of America to serve as a counterforce to China’s increasing influence. Pakistan, naturally, find itself in China’s corner because of its historical alliance with China, but also because of its inveterate hostility towards India. Despite this nuanced struggle that would come to define our future, China and India have several things in common, and have a history of collaborating on global issues. Although Chinese money would soon inundate Pakistan’s economy, China is also India’s largest trading partner and holds a much more significant economic interest in India. More importantly, however, as China increasingly asserts itself in the South China Sea, it cannot afford to isolate India and in addition, the United States. It is only inevitable then that China would adopt emollient measures towards India, which would come at the expense of Pakistan, and potentially result in India’s induction into the NSG. This is exactly why Sushma Swaraj, the Indian foreign minister, labelled China’s reticence towards Indian membership as a mere “procedural block,” and not redolent of a more ideological opposition. This possibility makes it all the more incumbent on our government to alter its foreign policy objectives, especially our policy goals towards India.
Any such introspection can, however, only take place when our leaders begin to think out of the circumspect foreign policy we adhere to. The Indian government has claimed that it has no qualms over Pakistan joining the NSG, and perhaps it would be wise on behalf of our leaders to adopt a similar policy. This might result in a concerted effort for NSG membership for both nations, resulting in possible membership in the NSG, a task that is much more uphill for Pakistan than it is for India. It is equally crucial for Pakistan to adopt a more reconciliatory attitude towards India in the economic domain, and allow India access to our local markets, as well as to trade routes into Afghanistan and Central Asia. It is, obviously, easier said than done, but economic incentives such as access to 200 million potential consumers, and cheaper trade routes to large markets can entice the Indian government, which prides itself on its business-friendly approach. This will not only give Pakistan economic leverage over India, but also pave the way for friendlier relations with Afghanistan and Iran, both of whom enjoy close economic relations with India.
Increased reliance on China and our obsession with India have left Pakistan isolated on the global stage. The peripatetic Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has ensured that India is the local hegemon, and that India has stakes in important strategic partners such as Afghanistan and Iran. It is all the more pertinent then that Pakistan diversifies its foreign policy objectives, and views India as a potential economic partner, and the lobbying for NSG membership must be the start of this venture. Certain seemingly insuperable obstacles such as the Kashmir dispute, the rising tide of extremism on both sides of the border, and the military-industry complexes in both nations remain, and which will hinder Pakistan and India’s rapprochement. But if Pakistan continues to view India as its traditional enemy — the vice versa holds true in India — our harrowing trend towards a global pariah will become unavoidable.