A United States congressional panel has demanded cutting off all US assistance to Pakistan to persuade Islamabad to act against the Afghan Taliban, and has also criticised important developments in Pakistan-US relations. A brief analysis of the current state of Pakistan-US relations were the main areas of contention and uncertainty. Vital US interests related to links between Pakistan and indigenous American terrorism, “Islamist” militancy in Pakistan, policies toward the Afghan insurgency, Pakistan’s relations with its historic rival India, and allegations on Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency ISI were stated. Ongoing terrorism concerns and the US foreign assistance programmes for Pakistan were recommended to close with an analysis of current US-Pakistan relations.
Vital US interests are seen to be at stake in its engagement with Pakistan. This has led US congressional panel to an intensive scrutiny of the bilateral relationship, and sparked much congressional questioning of the wisdom of providing significant US foreign assistance to Pakistan that they believe may not have the intention and to be an effective US partner. In the post-9/11 period, assisting in the creation of a more stable, democratic, and prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy has been among the most important US foreign policy efforts. Now global and South Asian regional terrorism and a nearly decade-long effort to stabilise neighbouring Afghanistan are becoming the top-tier concerns.
Although Obama administration officials and most senior congressional leaders consistently recognise Pakistan as a crucial ally in US-led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, long-held doubts by some US Congressmen’s views about Pakistan’s commitment to core US interests have deepened over the course of time. Congressman Matt Salmon, Chairman, Asia and Pacific Subcommittee of House Foreign Affairs Committee, remarked that Pakistan should be treated as a foe, and insulted the Pakistani military and intelligence services as seen to be intentionally failing to distinguish among Islamist extremist groups, maintaining links to Afghan insurgent, and anti-India militant organisations operating from Pakistani territory as a means of forwarding Pakistani’s perceived security interests.
US-Pakistan relations are fluid at present, but running a clearly negative course: still based on several national interests shared by both countries, yet marked by levels of mutual distrust and resentment that are likely to catalyse a new set of assumptions for future ties. The tenor of criticism from congressmen has been increasingly negative. These included allegations that Pakistan is providing a safe haven to Afghan Taliban groups to launch operations into Afghanistan.
There would be limits to what Pakistan can assist, and the circumstances of congressional report and subsequent developments could have had a major impact on both administration and congressional perceptions of the utility of current US aid programmes. First, in terms of the breakdown of US financial transfers to Pakistan, based on figures compiled by the Congressional Research Service, from 2002 to 2011 Pakistan is supposed to have received approximately $5.7 billion in security aid, $7.47 billion in economic aid, and $8.9 billion in Coalition Support Fund transfers. Thus, out of $22 billion, US aid to Pakistan has totalled approximately $13.2 billion in 10 years. The remaining $8.9 billion, or 40 percent of the total, has actually been reimbursements to Pakistan for the costs it has incurred in fighting the al-Qaeda and its allies, and not aid.
A substantive reevaluation of aid levels and of the bilateral relationship between US and Pakistan is important for the regional stability. Such rethinking becomes more evident therefore to ignore significant reductions, as well as new restrictions and conditions suggested by the congressional figures that have issued some of the strongest criticisms of Pakistan as a US ally seen in decades. There appears to be growing misperception among some US Congressmen that US military aid has done little to stem religious-based militancy in Pakistan, and hindered country’s economic and political development. Many working for the Indian lobby in the US influenced Congressmen, thus urging US policy to target effective nonmilitary aid, and the US administration to reach out directly to people of different Pakistani regions instead.
Pakistan’s powerful army and intelligence services have, for years, fought to root out the Taliban and the Haqqani terrorist network, and have sacrificed thousands of civil and military lives to protect Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan, and prevent India from increasing its negative influence in the region. Under American pressure, the Pakistan army recently waged an indiscriminate military campaign, Zarb-e-Azb, against the Afghan Taliban and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in the ungoverned border region. And the Haqqanis were relentlessly targeted to operate in relative safety in Pakistan. Indian lobbyists in US Congress continue to beat the drums that Pakistan army has helped engineer the integration of the Haqqanis into the Taliban leadership. While such pressure makes no sense, severing ties as the United States did in the 1990s after Pakistan developed a nuclear weapon is unwise. The two countries still share intelligence, and Pakistan allows American drones to target militant leaders in the border region. Given that Pakistan has the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal, America needs to be able to maintain a dialogue, and help Pakistan keep the weapons out of the hands of extremists.
The threats, however, remain. Pakistan has suffered repeated mass-casualty attacks by the Taliban and is fighting to neutralise stability in the region. The last few years were by far the most tumultuous in a decade of tense and mistrustful relations between Pakistan and the United States. In Washington, several members of Congress have demanded for sidelining Pakistan and giving India a larger stake in Afghanistan. Others object that it is important to carefully consider that Pakistan cannot just be ignored. In Pakistan, sceptics are also considering to push for new rules of engagement.
These problems will not yield to quick diplomatic fixes. Barring a fundamental re-thinking, US and Pakistan should get used to making the best of an ambiguous alliance, and one that going forward will be limited, transactional, and security-centred, featuring competition over the endgame in Afghanistan, cooperation in the fight against the Taliban, and a non-threatening favourable conditional aid structure. Despite the common security interests and a deep democratic kinship, there is ambiguity toward the bilateral relationship from officials in both countries. In Congress, there is outright opposition to supporting the funding deal. While disengagement is not an option the continuation of relations today illustrates limited collaboration is the best that can be expected. Pakistan will seek trust while the US will push to secure the power of its Afghan allies. Finally, military and economic aid to Pakistan will be on even grounds and results-oriented. In the long run, the US can hardly afford a minimalist relationship with Pakistan. It must engage Pakistan on multiple dimensions. The alternative to such a creative rethinking is not ideal to contemplate.
The writer is a professor of psychiatry and consultant forensic psychiatrist in the UK. He can be contacted at [email protected]