Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, the Durand Line remains a contentious issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and is said to be the main reason for strained relations between the two countries. Afghanistan calls it the Durand Line after the British diplomat Sir Mortimer Durand under whose watch the demarcation was done following a treaty between him and the Afghan ruler, Amir Abdur Rahman in 1893. Pakistan considers the Durand Line as the international boundary recognised and confirmed by different Afghanistan governments on several occasions. In fact, Afghanistan was the only country in the world to oppose Pakistan’s membership in the United Nations in 1947 taking the plea that it did not recognise the Durand Line as a permanent border. From King Zahir Shah to President Najibullah Khan, all Afghan governments had supported the Pakhtunistan movement in Pakistan based on its claim that the ethnic Pashtuns ought to be given the right of self-determination. Afghanistan had reaffirmed the Durand Line agreement by making additional treaties with the British in 1905, 1919, 1921 and 1930, but Kabul claimed that these were signed under duress. In particular, the 1919 treaty signed in Rawalpindi after the Third Anglo-Afghan War upheld the Durand Line agreement. Some of the objections that emanate from the Afghan side regarding the validity of the Durand Line are as following. The agreement was forced upon the Afghan King Abdul Rahman Khan after negotiations with the British government in 1893. Secondly, it was signed only for a period of 100 years, which expired in 1994. And thirdly, the agreement was made with the British government and not with Pakistan, hence making it invalid now. Writers and analysts of Afghanistan and Pakistan supported stances of their governments, but people were not informed about the facts and realities, and also what the UN had to say about this issue. Pakistan as a successor state to British India derived full sovereignty over areas and its people east of the Durand Line, and had all the rights and obligations of a successor state. As the treaty was inked in Afghanistan and was further ratified in subsequent pacts of 1905, 1919, and 1921, it negated the claim that it was a forced treaty. Finally, nowhere in the treaty it was mentioned the treaty was for 100 years. As stated earlier, the basic reason for strained relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been non-acceptance of the Durand Line by the latter as an international border between the two countries because of its leadership’s perception that Pashtuns on both sides were inseparable. In July 1947, a month before the partition and independence of the subcontinent, the then Afghan government informed the British government that the tribesmen in the tribal areas wanted to dissociate themselves from India. Afghan government, of course, meant the tribesmen wished to be part of Pakistan, and the then governor of the NWFP, Sir George Cunningham, after touring the tribal areas and meeting the tribal chiefs declared that the people wanted to retain the same ties with the new state of Pakistan as they had with the British India. After the establishment of Pakistan in August 1947, Kabul argued that Pakistan was not a successor state to Britain but a new state that was carved out of British India. It is worth mentioning that in the NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), a referendum was held in July 1947, in which 289,244 votes were cast in favour of NWFP’s union with Pakistan, and only 2,874 votes for union with India. Moreover, the world courts have universally upheld the binding bilateral agreements with or between colonial powers, and are passed down to successor independent states, as was the case with most of Africa. A unilateral declaration by one party, however, is of no consequence and has no effect. The Afghan government has yet to produce evidence to back its claim. In fact, it is argued that Afghanistan has refrained from taking the issue of the Durand Line to the UN, the International Court of Justice or any other global forum because of the weakness of its legal case. Traditionally, the people divided by the Durand Line close to the border have enjoyed free movement across the Pak-Afghan by simply producing a rahdari (permit) issued to them for identification purposes. In July 1948, Kabul announced that it did not recognise “the imaginary Durand or any similar line.” It named a few busy squares in Kabul and Jalalabad as Pakhtunistan, and began celebrating Pakhtunistan Day in presence of Pakistani Pakhtun and Baloch dissidents by hoisting the flag of Pakhtunistan. Of course, Pakistan could be blamed for joining the Afghan jihad, and playing into the hands of the US and the west, which have been creating Frankenstein’s monsters of imperialism, later posing a serious threat to their creators as well as to the world at large. After Soviet forces entered Afghanistan on what they claimed was the request of the Afghan government under the treaty signed between the then Soviet Union and Afghanistan, the US and the west supported the jihadi groups and warlords to resist the Soviet forces. When 9/11 took place, Afghanistan was controlled by people who were earlier lauded as freedom fighters when they fought against the Soviets. In 1996, the Taliban were able to rise to power, as the people were fed up with the death and destruction as a result of infighting between the religious groups and warlords. Coming back to the subject, almost all Afghan borders were demarked in the second half of the 19th century. Among them, the Durand Line was the only border in respect of which the king of Afghanistan was taken into confidence. The borders with Tsarist Russia and China were determined through dialogue between Britain and Russia. Similarly, the Afghan-Iran border was fixed through dialogue between Iran and Britain. Afghanistan never raised the border issue with other countries; therefore, it does not seem to be on a high moral ground when it comes to a border dispute with Pakistan. Those voicing against the Durand line need to realise the new realities. The reality is that there are more Pashtuns living on this side of the Durand Line than in Afghanistan. The referendum of 1947 and the decision of the tribal jirga (traditional assembly of local leaders) of FATA are the strongest and undeniable facts to judge the affinity of Pashtuns. The writer is a freelance columnist. He can be reached at mjamil1938@hotmail.com