“Anybody in my opinion has the ability to make a very inexpensive cruise missile. It is not a matter of technology. It is just a matter of when it is going to happen. So, we just have to decide when (and how) we are going to be ready to deal with that situation.” — Gen John Jumper (r), former chief of staff, US Air Force Today’s world is best characterised by an increasing danger of globalised terrorism, coupled with undiminished threats emanating from rogue states. And there is a real possibility that these perceived threats will continue to define the global security environment in the decades to come. Non-state actors have turned to asymmetric strategies, aimed at inflicting maximum damage on non-combatant civilians, with the goals of creating an atmosphere of terror and eroding public trust in the governments’ ability to protect them. An ideal weapon for rogue states and other non-states looking to pursue these goals is cruise missiles. Easy to hide and highly adaptable, cruise missiles have gradually emerged as one of the most deadly weapons of modern asymmetric warfare over the past two decades. The success of US Tomahawk cruise missile strikes on terrorist bases in Afghanistan and Sudan has further enhanced global interest in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. These unmanned vehicles are able to carry both conventional and nuclear warheads to countries where it would be too costly or impractical to launch an attack with manned aircrafts. Guided cruise missiles were first used operationally when Nazi Germany attacked targets in London and Antwerp with V-1 cruise missiles in World War II, over seventy years ago. The fast-moving cruise missiles suffer from the inherent weakness of inaccuracy but their capacity to strike military bases, population centres and deployed military units can result in hundreds of thousands of deaths. And if these missiles are armed with biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, they could have devastating consequences. In cases where cruise missiles are used to deliver a weapon, accuracy of even two hundred meters is considered tantamount to pinpoint-precision. However, with the proliferation of modern technology like Global Positioning System (GPS), countries are becoming increasingly able to improve the accuracy and lethality of these weapons. The nuclear non-proliferation regime has clearly failed to prevent cruise missile proliferation. According to many estimates, tens of thousands of cruise missile are available around the world and the threat is growing with time. Terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have the potential to acquire cruise missiles through purchase or indigenous development and they can threaten cruise missile attack to coerce other countries into taking some undesirable actions. Because these cruise missiles are relatively smaller in size and much simpler in design than other manned aircraft, they are easily able to slip through defences to hit their targets. Cruise missile are precision weapons designed to stay below enemy radar and are usually categorised by launch mode and the nature of the intended mission. The two broad categories are land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and both can be launched from ground-based launcher, aircraft, or submarine. Both can carry all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) but LACMs are the primary cause of concern because of their ability to strike land targets ranging from small buildings to big cities. Their flight paths are strongly affected by both the effects of gravity and the atmosphere in which they operate. Strategic cruise missiles are a key part of the Obama administration’s efforts to modernise three legs of its nuclear triad. These missiles are going to play a key role in US contingency plans against other nations or terrorist groups. Russia and other nuclear powers have been deploying nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on strategic bombers and show no signs of curtailing their ALCM and SLCM capabilities. Their use could increase the probability of an accident involving strategic nuclear forces. The inability of radars and early warning systems to distinguish between a Conventional prompt Global Strike (CPGS) weapon and nuclear warhead can lead to serious misunderstandings with potentially disastrous consequences. The short flight time of cruise missiles also leaves little time for an assessment of the situation. In the post-cold war period, many other countries have developed short and medium-range missiles. The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war made it evident that some non-state actors have also acquired missile capability. The US’ prompt global strike programme has showed that missiles will cause heavy damage even if they are used as a limited conventional warfare tactic in the years to come. Curbing the spread of missile technology is particularly difficult because of lack of recognition of the threat it poses. Different technology control regimes have slowed down the pace of development of missile technology but they have largely failed to prevent its spread to other countries because of the duplicity of approach. At present the international regimes for missile non-proliferation are far more voluntary in nature. In addition, cruise missile technology has generally been ignored in prevention efforts. More than 26 years after its establishment, the Missile technology Control Regime (MTCR) faces serious challenges to its relevance in the years to come. The regime has not only totally failed to prevent the spread of cruise missiles but also lacks the required regulatory framework to check the development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Pakistan, India, Iran and North Korea have successfully advanced their missile programmes with foreign assistance. Many other countries that are not MTCR members have remained involved in selling sensitive missile technology to other members. In addition, because of its voluntary nature, the MTCR cannot mandate any forceful action against member countries violating its guidelines. The threat of the proliferation of missile technology is rapidly increasing but global export control regimes are not equipped to tackle this challenge. The MTCR urgently needs to address all these concerns related to WMD delivery systems if it wants to avoid the fate of becoming totally incapable of mitigating the dangers associated with the global nuclear trade. The writer can be reached at rizwanasghar5@unm.edu