Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was a lone star under Ayub Khan’s regime, who enjoyed exceptional influence among both the masses and the military establishment. Despite being from a landed aristocratic family from Sindh and studying in the west, Bhutto’s vision of Pakistan was laced with a complicated identity of Socialism and Islam. For instance, although back in 1960’s the eastern wing of the country was virtually located in South-East Asia, Bhutto saw Pakistan more as a part of the Middle East. He saw the unresolved issue of Kashmir as very important, in line with the same mindset. While he campaigned for Ayub’s presidential election campaign in December 1964 against Fatima Jinnah, not only did he accuse Fatima, the sister of MA Jinnah, of being a CIA agent but also promised masses that once they voted Ayub into presidency, he himself will make sure that an action oriented campaign is launched in Kashmir to liberate it from Indian occupation. For good measure, he added that Fatima Jinnah would never have such a vision. The irony was that she herself was supported by rightwing parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami under Maulana Maududi. Following the January 2, 1965 presidential elections, which Ayub won comfortably thanks to the indirect nature of the polls and state pressure on the electoral-college, Bhutto and his like-minded allies in the military command decided to undertake an offensive in Kashmir. Such an offensive was long thought about ever since India’s poor performance in the Indo-China war of 1962, which had convinced the Pakistani military and public that taking Kashmir from India was indeed possible. Back in 1962, although Ayub restrained from intervening in Kashmir because of pressure from US and Soviet Russia, he was dubbed a feeble leader for not taking advantage of India’s vulnerable position. In April 1965, border skirmishes between Indo-Pak forces in the swampy Rann of Kuchh, again gave the Pakistani military the impression that they were wholly superior to their Indian counterparts. With a mix of demagoguery and media propaganda, Bhutto as Foreign Minister created the impression that it was only because of lack of will on Pakistan’s part that the Kashmir issue had not been resolved in this country’s favour. The Indian military’s poor performance in the Indo-China war of 1962 convinced the Pakistani military and public that taking Kashmir from India was indeed possible Ayub was presented a position paper on Kashmir just before the presidential elections, which he had not read until a couple of months after his election. Once read, Ayub rejected the proposed covert military action, which was later to be named ‘Operation Gibralter’ in Kashmir as he insisted on a diplomatic solution. He also wanted to concentrate on the economy and development work. Regardless, the majority of commanders in the army were itching for another fight following the Rann of Kuchh episode, and if they were to face any doubts from the people, they had a demagogue in Bhutto to remove those. It would be hard to believe in today’s Pakistan that as Foreign Minister, Bhutto had the masses and the majority of the military command under his spell. Just months before the operation in Kashmir, Bhutto used to chair meetings of army commanders in the absence of Ayub. Bhutto’s hawkish viewpoint on Kashmir were so upsetting for Commander in Chief General Musa Khan that he complained to Ayub that Bhutto was ‘brainwashing’ his commanders. Despite all this, Bhutto and the military commanders he had influence over prevailed, all on the basis of hyped up stories about popular revolts breaking out in various parts of Kashmir. According to the plan, AK regulars were to infiltrate Indian occupied Kashmir and forment a violent uprising. The operation failed miserably. To salvage its honour, Pakistan launched ‘Operation Grand Slam’, which also failed because of poor strategy and command. Until September 5, 1965 the war was restricted to the peripheries of the LoC. This was according to Bhutto and his commanders’ plans. However, on September 6, India opened a new front on the international boundary at Lahore and Sialkot. Pakistan had to give many sacrifices to save these two cities. Four months later, both countries had to be pacified at the Soviet sponsored Tashkent Agreement. While Ayub could never recover from this fiasco, Bhutto emerged as a beacon of hope, despite his earlier warmongering. The writer is a sociologist with an interest in history and politics. He tweets @ZulfiRao. He tweets @Zulfirao1 Published in Daily Times, September 6th 2018.