In Pakistan, historically, the political evolution of the society has been nipped in the bud by an all-powerful military establishment because of which state policies have always fallen short of being coherent. The more the military establishment made incursions into democratic spaces, the more shaky institutions of state got and the more fragmented the polity became. The “sovereign” role played by the GHQ in Pakistan is an example of such a scenario. The more military officials got involved in issues of politics, governance, and national interest, the more blurred the line between national interest and hawkish national security became. Allowing the military to bludgeon this country’s democratic processes has proven to be a big mistake.
Instead of deterring the growth of democracy, the goal should be to empower the populace of Pakistan sufficiently to induce satisfaction with the Pakistani constituency’s role within current geopolitical realities, such that a dis-empowered populace does not succumb to ministrations of destructive political ideologies.
The discourse endorsed and disseminated by the BJP serves to emphasise, reinforce, and create cultural myopia and monocultural identities. The short-sightedness of the BJP will prove detrimental to the constitutional integrity of India
Now I turn to India. The ultra-nationalist right wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), currently in power in India, and its votaries have completely ignored how diverse communities can grow historically within the framework created by the combined forces of modern national and transnational developments.
The discourse endorsed and disseminated by the BJP serves to emphasise, reinforce, and create cultural myopia and monocultural identities. The short-sightedness of the BJP will prove detrimental to the constitutional integrity of India.
The increasing communalisation of Indian politics is a juggernaut that seriously questions the myth of secularism in India, and the increasing religiosity in Pakistan is just as damaging. As a poignant reminder to the students of Indian history and sub continental politics, I would like to point out that Jawaharlal Nehru observed in the Constituent Assembly of India that the greatest danger to India will not be from Muslim communalism but from the Hindutva, which could potentially become expansionist and communally belligerent. Such irregular politics polarizes these ethnic groups into Hindus and Muslims who are required to disavow their cultural, linguistic, and social unities.
Although former Prime Minister (PM) Nawaz Sharif and PM Narendra Modi extended the olive branch to each other, the ideological and power rivalry between India and Pakistan transcends the Kashmir dispute.
During the last decade and a half, each military crisis between India and Pakistan has been followed by attempts at diplomatic rapprochement, which have turned out to be fiascos. The two countries go through sporadic peace-making efforts, characterised by negotiations. For instance, in January 2004, the then Indian PM, Atal Behari Vajpayee, and the Pakistani President, General Pervez Musharraf, agreed on “the resumption of a composite dialogue” on all issues “including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides”. Musharraf assured the Indian government that he would not permit “any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner”. But this joint statement could not mitigate the existing scepticism.
Many observers interpreted the joint statement as a tacit admission of Pakistan’s past support for the LoC in Kashmir and an indication of its resolve to finally end military confrontation over the dispute. However, there was also considerable scepticism in India on the nature of change in Pakistan’s policy: was it tactical or strategic? Similarly, the Pakistani government feared that India was taking unfair advantage of Islamabad’s restraint to consolidate its political and military grip over Kashmir.
At the time, Vajpayee and Musharraf took a judicious approach to nuclear warfare, and a dangerous situation mellowed.
Considering Pakistani foreign policy is dictated by Rawalpindi, not Islamabad, it remains to be seen what sort of impact elections in Pakistan will have in Indo-Pak relations. A civilian government in Pakistan, particularly a coalition government, cannot take a call on foreign policy without the intervention of the security establishment and military.
Military interventions and self-promotion in the name of democracy, which is a given in autocratic and oligarchic forms of government, must be strongly discouraged by constitutional means and methods in both India and Pakistan.
Vis-à-vis my homeland Kashmir, regardless of the possibility of nuclear restraint in South Asia, a resolution of the Kashmir dispute and insistence on accountability for human rights violations would put a monkey wrench in the drive in both countries to beef up their nuclear arsenals.
The writer is the author of Fiction of Nationality in an Era of Trans nationalism, Islam, Women, and Violence in Kashmir, The Life of a Kashmiri Woman, and the editor of The Parchment of Kashmir. Nyla Ali Khan has also served as guest editor working on articles from the Jammu and Kashmir region for Oxford University Press (New York), helping to identify, commission, and review articles. She can be reached at [email protected]
Published in Daily Times, June 27th 2018.