Although the Sindh High Court (SHC) has reinstated the Inspector General Sindh AD Khawaja to his post, the ongoing exchange of rather harsh words between the federal and Sindh government has already generated buzz on media; raising some pertinent questions. The foremost of which inquires the credibility of an IGP’s protection of his officers, and in turn, public from politicisation if he can be removed with a mere pen stroke. However, the Supreme Court has now decided to deliberate upon the matter and is expected to look upon the future implications of his premature departure. Even before this particular controversy, the IGP was rumoured to have gone on official leave last December. Given the crucial nature of the police mission where even a Station House Officer is hardly allowed vacations, the IGP’s leave — that too, for 15 days — remains shrouded in mystery. Further, can Sindh even afford a change in its security leadership amid the ongoing Karachi operation as well as the implementation of National Action Plan? The present circumstances necessitate the presence of an operational public safety apparatus. Ideally, public safety, also known as safeguarding public interest, is to be determined by democratic public oversight, which includes different tiers of public safety commissions. These bodies should, thus, hold the powers to accurately interpret the parameters of public safety. Public interest cannot and should not be entrusted to any individual or left ambiguous. Using their rightful authority, public oversight should ensure transparency, merit and professional autonomy of police. The selection of police chiefs and the length of his tenure need a standardised transparent procedure in the light of professional competence, apolitical credentials and integrity. At present, Police Service of Pakistan is entrusted with the responsibilities of police leadership. Their assessment, appointment, training, career planning and even placement tests are conducted by its establishment division, largely relied upon the professional input of federal government. On the other hand, states enjoy autonomy in synchronising policies in the US. During his previous tenure, US president Barrack Obama constituted a special Task Force as well as incorporated various recommendations about policy and oversight standardisation; trust-building; crime reduction; police training and safety of officers. The Sindh IGP’s removal has once again reared the oft-discussed provincial ability to repeal controversial federal laws; in this case, Police Order (PO) 2002. Since Sindh Assembly accepts Police Act (PA) 1861, it should hold authority over law enforcement. However, the federal administration has, to date, controlled police legislation. While the Police Act 1861 does not elaborate upon the tenure of police chiefs, the provincial legislature could have easily made use of structural framework illustrated in PO 2002. Following its procedures would have protected the police officers from the whims of the ruling political elite. PO 2002 also provides an opportunity to the removed IGP to be heard by the public safety commission, which could comprehensively investigate the matter at hand. A mere glance at the track record of police chiefs serving across the country shows a very dismal state of affairs. During the last 15 years, Sindh and Baluchistan police were administered by 17 and 15 chiefs with an average tenure of eleven months and a year respectively. Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had 13 and eight police chiefs respectively, who served on average for 14 and 22 months respectively. The federal capital had 15 chiefs in the same period, whose average tenure lasted a year. These figures contrast starkly with Kenya, where the constitution instructs its president to appoint IGP for a single four-year term with parliamentary approval, according to Article 245. Amid such a scenario, it is difficult to ascertain who actually benefits from the present system. In essence, both the public and honest police officers lose. Frequent changes of officers and brief tenures adversely impact the morale of all officers in addition to increasing uncertainty. As many as two Rangers Director Generals were transferred from Sindh during the ongoing operation. However, these changes were only made because of their promotion to Lt Generals. The IGP Sindh had recently established transparent arrangements for the recruitment of over 20,000 officers through a selection board. To boost the morale of as many as 1,152 officers, desperate for long-overdue promotions, were elevated from sub-Inspector ranks to deputy superintendents. In addition, 900 dependents of martyred and deceased employees were also recruited to extend welfare to them. He also worked on the compensation package for martyred; increasing from Rs 2 million to Rs 5 million. In order to effectively get rid of ever-increasing colonial influence over the police department, the administration urgently needs to depoliticise the forces and transform the structural framework. It needs to establish operational autonomy and accountable policing. Only a legally defined and well-protected mechanism would guarantee the professional and operational autonomy of police so that it can be held accountable to democratic public oversight. The writer is a police officer and tweets @alibabakhel