The Swiss talks between the United States and Iran have produced movement where, only days ago, all one could hear were war horns and ultimatums. The US Treasury has issued a temporary licence allowing transactions involving Iranian crude, petroleum and petrochemical products through Aug 21. Tehran says the blockade has been lifted, some frozen assets are being released, and a reconstruction plan has been launched. Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has begun to recover, while Brent crude has slipped below $80 as markets price in reduced supply risk.
That Pakistan and Qatar, the mediators, say the two sides have agreed on a roadmap towards a final deal within 60 days is commendable progress. Peace appears closer than it has in weeks, but it remains beyond grasp. A roadmap is only as strong as the mechanisms behind it, and the process is now entering the phase where diplomatic language must be converted into enforceable practice. Technical talks are to continue in Bürgenstock, working groups are being formed on sanctions, nuclear issues, monitoring and dispute resolution, and a High-Level Committee is meant to provide political oversight. These are useful structures. They are also vulnerable to sabotage, misreading and delay.
The nuclear file already shows the difficulty. US officials have suggested that inspectors should return under the emerging framework. Iran, however, has denied making new commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency. This is no minor difference in opinion.
Hormuz is another unresolved theatre. A communication line has been created to avoid incidents in the Strait of Hormuz and secure commercial passage through one of the world’s most important energy routes. Tanker traffic may be slowly resuming, but the strait’s future management remains contested. Reports that Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi are heading to Oman for further Hormuz consultations only underline that the waterway cannot be secured by a US-Iran understanding alone.
Lebanon may be even more difficult. Iran’s foreign minister has called the Lebanon deconfliction cell the first real test of the process. He is right. If Israeli strikes resume, the memorandum will quickly lose authority. No agreement can survive if one front remains active while diplomats claim de-escalation elsewhere.
Pakistan’s role must now move beyond breakthrough diplomacy. That is why Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s reported visit is significant, especially coming on the heels of the Switzerland talks. If the US-Iran process creates even limited sanctions space, Pakistan must use it to reopen a serious economic conversation with Tehran, beginning with energy. The Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, long trapped between US sanctions, pricing concerns and Pakistan’s own indecision, cannot be treated as a slogan. Nor can it be revived by sentiment alone. Islamabad should press for clarity: whether future sanctions relief can cover cross-border gas, whether volumes and prices can be renegotiated, and whether Pakistan can avoid both a legal penalty and a strategic opportunity cost. *