The horror of what happened in Bannu is difficult to overstate. According to security sources, terrorists first targeted a passenger vehicle in Ping Musa Khel with an improvised explosive device, leaving seven people martyred and several others injured. Then, in an even more depraved act, they struck the vehicle carrying the dead and wounded. There is no political vocabulary that can soften such barbarity. Those who target civilians and rescuers are not rebels or aggrieved actors. They are enemies of Pakistan and enemies of life itself.
This is exactly why the state’s description of Fitna al-Khawarij goes beyond mere rhetoric. These networks now seek soft targets because they cannot face the state directly. Their strategy is to create fear in markets, roads and villages, and to make ordinary Pakistanis feel that normal life itself is unsafe. That design must fail. The people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have paid an unbearable price, but they have repeatedly refused to surrender their homes to terror.
The Bannu attack has also unfolded against a wider cross-border security dispute. On Friday, the Afghan Taliban claimed that it had carried out an operation against alleged ISKP hideouts inside Pakistan. Islamabad outrightly rejected the claim and stated instead that two “rudimentary” drones originating from Afghanistan had entered Pakistani airspace and were subsequently detected and brought down by Pakistan’s air defence system. Kabul’s version of events, therefore, appears more like a propaganda screen meant to shift attention away from the very real and internationally acknowledged issue of the continued presence, tolerance and patronage of militant networks on Afghan soil.
The Ministry of Information’s fact-checking account put the matter more bluntly, saying that terrorist camps, including “those of Daesh and more than two dozen other terrorist organisations,” are located, run and patronised from territories under the control of the Afghan Taliban regime. Pakistan has long argued that Indian-linked hostile networks seek to exploit Afghan soil and militant proxies. The appearance of drones in this theatre raises an unavoidable question: how did the Taliban regime, with its rudimentary air capability, acquire, operate or facilitate such systems?
The Taliban regime cannot have it both ways. It cannot demand respect for Afghan sovereignty while allowing territory under its control to be used against Pakistan. It cannot issue statements about security while refusing to dismantle sanctuaries, supply lines and facilitation networks. And it cannot pretend to be a responsible authority while groups hostile to Pakistan find room to train, regroup and strike from across the border.
As for what Pakistan should do, the answer lies in sharper border control, air-defence readiness, diplomatic pressure, financial disruption of terror networks and, where necessary, calibrated action against verified terrorist infrastructure. The distinction between the Taliban regime and ordinary Afghans must remain clear. Afghan civilians should not be made to pay for Kabul’s reckless choices. Pakistan does not seek war with Afghanistan, but it will not outsource the security of its citizens to a regime that denies the fire while feeding the fuse. *