In the shadow of the snow-capped Himalayas, the Chenab River begins its vital descent, flowing from Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir into the heart of Pakistan’s Punjab. This journey is one of life, sustenance, and sovereignty for millions. Yet today, that life-giving flow stands imperiled not by nature but by a calculated policy shift. India’s recent decision to dramatically expand the Ranbir Canal, increasing its capacity from 40 to a staggering 150 cubic meters per second (cumecs), announced just days after a fragile ceasefire, is seen by Pakistan not merely as infrastructure development but as retaliation-a deliberate squeeze on Pakistan’s lifeblood cloaked in the guise of national security.
This aggressive move coincides with New Delhi’s abrupt suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), a landmark agreement brokered by the World Bank in 1960 and widely regarded as one of the most durable water-sharing accords in history. For over six decades, the IWT has stood as a rare pillar of stability in a volatile region. India’s unilateral actions-diverting massive quantities of water from the Chenab-mark an alarming shift from diplomacy to coercion. This is far more than a technical violation of water-sharing rights; it signals a potential trigger for hydro-aggression that threatens regional peace.
The backdrop for this escalation is the tragic Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025, where 26 civilians lost their lives in a popular Kashmiri tourist valley. The attack was widely condemned, including by Pakistan, which denied involvement and proposed a joint investigation. Yet, rather than choosing cooperation, India responded with a series of escalatory measures: closing the Wagah-Attari border, expelling diplomats, artillery exchanges along the Line of Control, air strikes, and most dangerously, undermining the IWT itself. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ominous declaration that “blood and water cannot flow together” now appears literal in the engineering of a canal designed to choke the Chenab before it reaches Pakistani fields.
India’s retaliatory weaponization of the Chenab risks triggering a far graver humanitarian and ecological disaster
Legally, India’s actions are profoundly serious. The IWT carefully allocates the Indus basin waters between Pakistan and India. Pakistan, the lower riparian, is entitled to approximately 80% of the flows from the western rivers-the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. India’s rights are limited to restricted irrigation and hydropower use, strictly regulated to protect downstream flows. Article II(1) guarantees Pakistan’s “unrestricted use” of the Chenab except in narrowly defined cases. Article IV(3) explicitly prohibits India from undertaking any action materially affecting the river’s flow to Pakistan. The Ranbir Canal expansion to 150 cumecs-over 5,200 cusecs-vastly exceeds the Treaty’s irrigation limits, which cap India’s withdrawals at 1,000 cusecs in summer and 350 cusecs in winter to irrigate no more than 400,000 acres.
Beyond the quantitative violations, India’s failure to notify Pakistan about this project breaches Annexure D, Paragraph 7 of the Treaty, which mandates transparency and consultation. Acting unilaterally after suspending the Treaty signals a dangerous erosion of the very architecture of trust that has preserved the IWT for decades. This is not new rhetoric. India’s hardening stance on water followed the 2016 Uri attack, but the recent actions are immediate and real. In early May 2025, Pakistan witnessed a drastic reduction-up to 90%-in Chenab flows, officially attributed by India to “maintenance” at the Baglihar Dam. Punjab’s farmers helplessly watched as their crucial paddy sowing was disrupted. The Ranbir Canal’s expansion threatens to institutionalize such crippling shortages, especially during the dry season when irrigation demand peaks.
The consequences extend far beyond agriculture. Reduced Chenab flows besides damaging Punjab’s agriculture, also jeopardizes the wetlands and biodiversity of the Sindh delta, vital to migratory birds and fisheries that rural communities depend on. Furthermore, India’s upstream control over silt management raises the risk of artificial floods if dams are flushed without warning-a potential “water bomb.” The fragile Himalayan geology, compounded by aggressive dam construction such as Pakal Dul and Ratle, risks erosion and irreversible ecological damage, with serious cross-border consequences.
India may frame the Ranbir Canal expansion as a development project, but public statements reveal the true intent. Union Water Minister CR Paatil’s vow to block “not a drop of water” from reaching Pakistan makes clear this is about punishment and coercion, not progress or regional cooperation.
Geopolitically, this escalation threatens to destabilize an already volatile region. The IWT has long been a firewall, surviving wars and diplomatic breakdowns, but its collapse could open a Pandora’s box where water becomes yet another front in a multidimensional conflict. Pakistan has declared India’s move unlawful under the Treaty and international law, notably the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which forbids unilateral withdrawal without just cause or mutual consent.
In response, Islamabad is preparing legal challenges at international forums, including the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the World Bank. Yet the path to justice is fraught. India may contest jurisdiction, and the World Bank has taken a cautious stance. Still, international pressure must mount. This is not merely a bilateral dispute-it is a critical test of whether international water-sharing agreements can survive attempts at weaponization by dominant upstream states.
The window to respond effectively is narrow. India’s Chenab storage capacity is currently limited-about 0.198 million acre-feet, far below the 1.7 million acre-feet permitted. The expanding of Ranbir Canal project, costing billions, will take years to complete. But India’s plans to expand dams like Pakal Dul and Ratle, and potential diversions to northern states, signal a long-term strategy to dominate river flows.
Pakistan must act decisively across three fronts: diplomatically, by rallying international support beyond traditional allies, engaging climate justice advocates and multilateral institutions who recognize water as a shared human right; legally, by framing its case not only as a treaty violation but as a precedent-setting threat to international environmental law; and domestically, by accelerating urgently needed water reforms. Pakistan’s canals lose over 30% of water to seepage, and outdated irrigation wastes up to 60%. Investments in water-efficient agriculture, reservoir modernization, and projects like the Cholistan Canal are critical.
Most importantly, Pakistan must assert its riparian rights by developing storage and hydropower infrastructure. Strategically located dams on the Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus would bolster water security by regulating flows, mitigating floods and droughts, and generating clean energy, while demonstrating “accrued rights” under international law. This dual engineering and legal strategy will strengthen Pakistan’s negotiating position and incentivize India to respect the Treaty rather than undermine it.
The Pahalgam attack was a tragedy that Pakistan condemned and sought to investigate jointly. Yet India’s retaliatory weaponization of the Chenab risks triggering a far graver humanitarian and ecological disaster; one engineered not by terrorists but by policymakers. The Chenab is not a tool of vengeance; it is a shared artery of life for over 250 million people. Let it flow, not in the service of conflict, but in the spirit of peace, justice, and mutual survival.
The writer is three-time member of the Punjab Provincial Assembly and a former minister of irrigation.