The ongoing tense environment following an attack on the tourists in Phalgam, Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK), on April 22, 2025, to which Pakistan has already condemned and assured India of its fullest cooperation during an impartial investigation, is not slowing down. Hence, the situation has the potential to expand into violent military engagements along the Line of Control (LOC). The unfortunate incident led to the killing of some 26 innocent people who were mainly visiting this beautiful region. Therefore, “the possibility of yet another military engagement between India and Pakistan, similar to February 2019, exists with varying degrees of probability, thus challenging the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. Until the probabilities of military engagements are minimised, the possibilities of peace and stability in the region would remain elusive.” I have also written that the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is an automatic choice to respond to India’s aggression in any domain. At the Line of Control (LOC), the Pakistan Army is fully prepared to respond, but the PAF will play an all-important part. Likewise, at sea, the Pakistan Navy will respond using its immense capabilities, but the PAF will be needed to blunt the IAF at all times. This short article reviews the PAF’s winning strategy so that the people of Pakistan are reassured of a solid defence of their motherland, In Sha Allah. During peacetime, crises, conflicts, and wars, the PAF has consistently performed to the people’s satisfaction and, therefore, has earned the well-deserved title of the Pride of the Nation. How does the PAF beat its arch rival, the IAF, which is at least four times larger in arms, equipment, and budgets? Experts in air warfare often raise this question and develop a new answer. I will also attempt. Over the decades of an enduring rivalry with the IAF, the PAF has mastered itself in multiple spheres. From acquisition to employment and from strategy to execution, the PAF has outsmarted the IAF in all domains. Since Quaid’s directives in April 1948 to become an air force that is second to none, the PAF has never looked back. Let’s analyse the induction first. In the early 1960s, when the IAF started procuring the erstwhile Soviet aircraft and related equipment, the PAF opted for the US inventory of aircraft and equipment. The decision proved efficacious during the first full-scale war in September 1965, when the PAF defeated the IAF on the ground and in the air, and it was recognised by all quarters. However, the credit cannot be given to arms and equipment alone because the decision was made by the leadership of the time, and the legacy lives on. PAF has been blessed with exceptional leadership since its inception, hence the winning strategies. The young and dynamic leadership has, over the decades, devised various deployment and employment strategies that have one thing in common: they are creative and aggressive. The PAF leadership has mastered the art of entering into the hearts and minds of the IAF leadership, and hence, the aerial engagement is won even before they see each other in the air. This has been the case in all aerial engagements, the latest being in February 2019. It is necessary to mention that power is an inherently offensive tool of warfare; therefore, even during missions under the banner of defensive counter-air operations, its employment must be in an offensive mode. However, it is difficult to understand why the IAF leaders ignore this precept and employ their capabilities with a defensive mindset, ultimately leading to losing engagements in the air. Fast-forward to the 1980s, when the IAF had SU-30 MKI, Mig-29s, Harriers, and Mirage 2000s, the PAF went for the state-of-the-art Fighting Falcon, the F-16s, and therefore once again terrorised the hearts and minds of the IAF leadership and the pilots. Likewise, the decision to develop the JF-17 Thunder also proved to be a game-changer because the PAF was able to replace its F-7s, A-5III, and some of its Mirage III and V. However, to fill a potential gap, the PAF leadership under the incumbent Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmad Babar again opted for the best available war machine, J-10 C. The J-10C is a multi-role fighter aircraft with enhanced air combat capabilities, a 4.5 generation fighter jet with a delta-wing design, capable of air superiority and strike missions. The aircraft was selected, the manpower trained, and inducted for operations in a record time of less than one year. Now, in combination with F-16 C&D, JF-17 Thunder, evergreen Mirages, the J-10C is giving sleepless nights to the IAF leadership and the pilots who cannot negotiate with this package, even with Rafael, SU 30, Mirage 2000, and Mig 29, and upgraded Mig 21. I fail to understand why India’s political leadership chooses the IAF to initiate a conflict once it knows that the IAF does not have a winning mindset, as proven in all previous aerial engagements with the PAF. Next week, in Sha Allah, I will delve into other aspects of the PAF’s winning strategy. (To be concluded) The writer of this article has authored three international books: “Nuclear Deterrence and Conflict Management Between India and Pakistan” “South Asia Needs Hybrid Peace” and “Understanding Sun Tzu and the Art of Hybrid War.”