Ever since the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021, optimism in Pakistan regarding the Taliban regime has been diminishing. This is primarily due to an increase in terroristactivities that evoke painful memories of the decade from 2007 to 2017, when Pakistan was subjected to the worst forms of religious-driven terror, largely from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP issue has once again become a bone of contention between Islamabad and Kabul , with the latter being accused of harbouring TTP fighters who use Afghan soil to train, reorganize, and plan attacks on Pakistani soil. Pakistan, for a significant portion of the nascent Taliban 2.0 rule, has adopted a policy of restraint. Not only that, but its security managers have also engaged in a series of negotiations with the TTP. However, this effort was criticized by counter-terrorism pundits and analysts who argued that such negotiations will embolden the TTP and provide them with the space needed to once again infiltrate Pakistani areas (erstwhile FATA and Swat). Unfortunately, it appears that the ad hoc nature of governance prevailing in Pakistani policy extends to security policy as well. To Pakistan’s misfortune , this is precisely what transpired . When Pakistan withdrew from the ill-conceived round of negotiations, a salvo of terror attacks struck the country. Over the past two years, there have been lethal attacks on Pakistani security forces, foreign nationals, and civilians. The attrition rates are too staggering to be ignored for the sake of bilateral goodwill with Kabul. The policy of restraint has, in fact, created a strategic vacuum not only for the Taliban but also for other militant outfits like the Baloch Liberation Front ( BLF) allowing them to rearm themselves with the sophisticated weaponry left behind after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistani security managers overlooked the tactical threats posed by the US withdrawal as a misplaced triumphalism prevailed in the upper echelons of the executive offices in Islamabad, with the country’s Prime Minister hailing the Taliban’s victory as “breaking the shackles of slavery.” 2023 was the deadliest year for Pakistani security forces in the decade, with nearly 500 personnel lost to terror attacks. Reports suggest the overall number of casualties to be around 1000. The first quarter of 2024 witnessed a further increase in militant activity in the KPK and Baluchistan regions. These attacks depict a new strategy, with militant actors predominantly targeting security forces to demoralize collective counter-terror efforts and gain an upper hand in guerilla warfare operability. Islamabad blames the Afghan Taliban for providing safe havens to the TTP, but the major onus lies with Pakistani security managers who failed to pre-empt the threat matrix. There were no “good” or “bad” Taliban in the first place. The Jihadist mindset that permeates the Taliban is concomitant with that of the TTP, given the latter’s active support of the Afghan Taliban’s insurgency against the US war efforts. The TTP is being utilized as an asset by the Afghan Taliban to achieve strategic influence in Pakistan’s North West region. Pakistan faces a renewed TTP which now enjoys active support from a neighbouring country where anti-Pakistan sentiments are fuelled along ethnic lines. Islamabad is awakening to certain realities, chief among them being the miscalculation in dealing with previous Kabul governments on aggressive footing. For the Afghan Taliban, there are imminent threats as well, particularly the rise of ISKP and its lethal modus operandi of carrying out devastating attacks against soft targets, civilians in particular . While the Taliban does carry out operations against ISKP, this remains a veneer to keep the international community mollified with respect to the Doha accords, where the Taliban promised not to allow Afghan soil to be used to launch terror attacks. However, the situation for Pakistan is different, as the Taliban regime is hosting agitators as well as aggressors that directly harm Pakistan’s interests. Furthermore, for well over two years, the interim government has not functioned as a state, which explains the lack of formal institutions required to run day-to-day operations. Pakistan, in response, has adopted reactionary policies that are bound to have fallout effects. This primarily includes the expulsion of refugees. While not all Afghan refugees are subject to return, the optics were quite negative due to humanitarian concerns and the media portrayal of the issue. This also tends to exacerbate overall Afghan sentiment towards Pakistan, which is certainly not conducive in the long run. The Afghan government needs to grasp the reality that they have to operate in the region with regional powers. Pakistan iscentral to the prospect if they seek formal international recognition. China, Russia, Iran, and the Central Asian republics all have their respective interests in Afghanistan. However, they are carefully observing the various threats emanating from the country. While the Afghan Taliban are attempting to cultivate relations with the Chinese, it won’t be long before terror activities targeting Chinese interests (such as CPEC) become a confrontational matter. The Afghan government is miscalculating Pakistan’s significance in the regional arena. Its plausible deniability over TTP actions cannot hold for long as it restricts Pakistan’s diplomatic response options to real-time security threats. Eventually, a disproportionate response from either side would damage bilateral ties and embolden spoilers to take advantage. Both Kabul and Islamabad stand to benefit from cross-regional cooperation that would include energy production, trade transit, and the flow of goods. This is an impending phenomenon, but a fact of political compulsion is that no polity can tolerate active militancy on its soil, especially Jihadist extremism. Pakistan, on the other hand, needs to adopt a comprehensivestance. It must revisit its counter-terrorism doctrines and address the ideological root causes if it wants to avoid a recurrence of the events that occurred in 2007 and onwards. Dealing with Islamist regimes is different from bilateral engagements with republican states . The former do not always act as rational actors because ideological inclinations affect decision-making, even at the cost of the well-being of their own citizens. Pakistani strategy makers need to formulate a comprehensive long-term strategy that addresses security issues and the regional economic outlook for the coming decades. Short-term reactionary policies do more harm than good. Hammad Waleed is an independent researcher who writes on issues pertaining National Security, Geopolitics, Counter terrorism and Public Policy. He can be reached at hammadwaleed82@gmail.com