Having visited China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran in an effort to generate ‘collaborative’ diplomacy in the context of President Trump’s tough-on-Pakistan speech lately, the Pakistani authorities finally landed in the US last week where the newly appointed Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi met with the Vice President of the United States. In this interaction, the two sides though gave the impression of being able to hold on to otherwise fractured bilateral relations, the fact of the matter is Mike Pence only reiterated what Trump said. Moreover, Premier Abbasi, in his casual look, addressed some journalists here and there and harped on the same stance that Pakistan is enchanting since Trump’s speech. Importantly, during the UN General Assembly annual session, once again, Abbasi repeated the same mantra. He said, “’having suffered and sacrificed so much due to our role in the global counter terrorism campaign, it is especially galling for Pakistan to be blamed for the military or political stalemate in Afghanistan… we are not prepared to be anyone’s scapegoat.”
Why Pakistani authorities are not accepting and doing what the US leadership wants? Does Pakistan have some options to confront the US? Can the US deter Pakistan to get the job done in Afghanistan or can the former bypass Pakistan (territory) and find alternate supply routes to aid in its forces in Afghanistan? Is the so called ‘collaborative’ diplomacy of any help? And, can peace be realised in Afghanistan in a scenario where Pakistan being non-cooperative is sidelined or kind of punished through economic sanctions and/or increase in drone attacks in areas not done before?
Our so-called ‘collaborative’ diplomacy is pigeon’s approach. Rather than talking meaningfully with the US with a history of interaction with Pakistan, our leadership is overcharged with our geo-strategic significance
These are some of the puzzling questions which, I am sure, Pakistan and US policy makers should be grappling with. One of the major reasons behind Pakistan’s apparent refusal to accept or work on the US counter terrorism demands in terms of targeting, for example, the Haqqani network is the former’s long-held belief that the US needs Pakistan to fight terror in Afghanistan. Here, our policy makers have often cited the country’s strategic location that constrains Kabul’s choices to connect with the Indian Ocean on its own. The post-9/11 US-Pakistan interaction, especially between the two militaries, further consolidated this conviction at least on the Pakistani side. Related to this geostrategic belief is Pakistan’s traditional position on India whose anti-Kashmir and anti-human face was exposed by PM Abbasi in the General Assembly address. Since Kashmir is legally disputed and requires a meaningful resolution where Kashmiris’’ right to self-determination is both accepted and executed, Pakistani state, being smaller in size in comparison with India, relied on lateral force multipliers. Now that the US leadership, both civil and military, seemed to have a different take on what Pakistan believes in, to make the latter change its regional military-strategic stance on India and Afghanistan is not only easy but prone to dangers.
In a scenario based on Pakistan current stance of non-compliance with the US, the latter can act in two possible ways: one, to completely disengage with Pakistan and rely on India and seek Indian help to supply logistics by air, which could be costly a business. But, it is possible without any other feasible option — as Iran and Russia are not likely to allow supply lines from their territory/sphere of influence the US, at least in the short term, relies on India. In this case, the US is fighting its targets in Afghanistan with Indian support, Pakistan is likely to be target too with possible increase in drone attacks whose target and timing would be unilaterally determined. Economic and related sanctions would also be invoked to damage the egoistic state of Pakistan. In such a case, China, Russia etc. will speak on our behalf possibly in the UN with little military support owing to their peculiar domestic and regional policy.
If rationality (cost-benefit analysis) is a guide, confrontational stance will harm Pakistan beyond imagination. Nevertheless, if the latter cooperates with the US, both the states will benefit: Pakistan will stay as an ally with much needed economic assistance and diplomatic support and the US, from its perspective, would be in a tactical position to pursue its objectives without compromising its reputation and economy. If the latter choice becomes bilateral policy, Pakistan then have to take concrete measures against proscribed militant organisations which the world in cluing the US believes is hampering peace efforts in Afghanistan.
Last but not the least, our so called ‘collaborative’ diplomacy is pigeon’s approach. Rather than talking meaningfully with the US with a history of interaction with Pakistan, our leadership is overcharged with our geostrategic significance. The latter worked partly during the Cold War and must not be assumed as a given. We ought to staff mindful of our strengths and weaknesses. The latter surpasses the former. Lastly, pursuing peace in Afghanistan is relative now. Addition or subtraction of one county is not going to impact it in significant way.
The writer is a DAAD fellow. He holds a PhD in Political Science and works as assistant professor at IQRA University, Islamabad. He tweets @ ejazbhatty
Published in Daily Times, September 24th 2017.