This state has major distortions in its conception and formulation. We used religion as a means to coalesce consensus and cultivate opinion on seeking independence. The Quaid, after gaining the state, suggested keeping religion out of state matters — to the uninitiated that is patent secularism. Soon after his death, however, our equally venerable leader, Liaquat Ali Khan, proposed and included the Objectives Resolution as a preamble to the constitution; this was meant to appease the religious lobby, by now raising their head and seeking their own footprint. It was only a matter of time before someone made it a part of the constitution. General Ziaul Haq did the honours through his Majlis-e-Shura, pleasing his Saudi mentors no end; in return they loaded him with oil money and a wide spread of Salafi-Wahabi madrassas introducing this nation to competitive Islam. Weapons would soon follow as would drugs to finance those weapons. Soon the tussle for the young nation was to keep it from becoming a theocracy. It did however earn the infamy of becoming a famed drug route and an arms free-market. Before Zia did his deed, the ultimate liberal of Pakistani politics, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had the Ahmedis ostracised from the pale of Islam; he followed by reinforcing the religious façade through introducing prohibition on alcohol. This nation had lost its way even before it had consolidated its freedom. Would you care to list the culprits of this sorry saga? The most profound names in our history are included! In 1947 the Dogra ruler of Kashmir dithered in acceding to the new state of Pakistan on the expected lines of a Muslim majority state; a rebellion followed and he asked for the support of the Indian army to fight the rebellion. India sought an instrument of accession, which the Dogra ruler was happy to furnish and the Indian forces were allowed into Kashmir. The Quaid ordered his troops into Kashmir to fight off an engineered occupation and accession. The British chief of the newly liberated Pakistani army refused to fight Indian forces because they belonged to the British Crown and the Quaid was forced to order the use of lashkars (militias) from the tribal regions to supplement some troops of the Pakistani army under the command of then-Brigadier Akbar Khan to fight India’s troops. The current divide of Kashmir, one-third with Pakistan and two-thirds with India is how the first Indo-Pakistan war ended. Two influences from the experience became a part of the concept of the fledgling state: one, lashkars were a handy force in moments of difficulty; and two, our relationship with India soon after independence became that of an enemy. The Quaid used his best judgement under trying circumstances, unwittingly forging the future disposition of his state. Lashkars or their modern offshoots, militants and armed groups, remained in the service of the state when needed, and Pakistan’s foreign policy was pushed under the rubric of an inimical India. The story of India-centricity and use of armed groups in pursuing interests in Kashmir goes a long way back. The 1965 Indo-Pak war was a consequence of ‘Operation Gibraltar’, codename for pushing in irregular forces in Kashmir to stir up a rebellion — this should sound familiar. This was conceived by none other than the then-Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Secretary Aziz Khan, and GOC 12 Division Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik. Soon after the war Foreign Minister Bhutto championed a 1,000 year war with India. India-centricity became endemic; the 1971 war when East Pakistan was lost to an armed Indian incursion only sealed the fate of what by then had become an entrenched facet of Pakistan’s national outlook. Since then our foreign policy towards India has remained stuck in a groove. As Pakistan grapples with another insurgency on its western borders the legacy position towards India is openly being called into question. Then there are other factors like the civil-military imbalance that find an increasing mention of the military stalling a change in the foreign policy towards India; this is proffered popularly as the critical anchor around which the military retains enhanced relevance in national affairs and dominates the decision process. Such postulation fails to take into account how India-centricity has tended to find its place in the conception of the state and how it has found nourishment through history mostly based on how relations between the two states have taken shape over time and how all leaderships have internalised the sensitivity of the involved issues. It will always need a statesman in both India and Pakistan to change this course. It will also need a willing India now, more than a willing Pakistani military, to change the inimical dynamic. But yes, in terms of a distortion, it remains one that has afflicted how the Pakistani state has grown over the years in all its manifestations. The final distortion without question remains frequent military rule that has alternated with political governments. Beginning with the ‘Rawalpindi Conspiracy’ to dislodge the Liaquat government by a radical-left communist putsch, it was to embed another unfortunate tradition of the military: finding opportune moments of weak political establishments or a divided polity to intervene and assume control. General Ayub Khan found it handy to enforce a martial law under his name rather than do the dirty bidding on Iskander Mirza’s behalf. Towards the end of his rule in 1969 the conditions had worsened enough again to warrant another martial law; when asked to enforce martial law Yahya quietly asked Ayub to relinquish and did the dirty deal while assuming power — divine justice, they call it. General Ziaul Haq responded to the political opposition’s goading to unseat Bhutto, his benefactor. The politicians of thence were equally to blame in not sustaining a political order. The final episode of the Musharraf rule was a consequence of an entirely personal clash between Mian Nawaz Sharif and his army chief, following Kargil. Indecision by the prime minister, more than anything, on sacking Musharraf provided the backdrop of an uncertain political environment in the country so conducive for the military to justify intervention. Our work in the backdrop of such a historical legacy is cut out for us. To begin with, let’s ask a few questions of ourselves: how uncertain is the prevailing political environment in the country? How divided is the polity and how is such a divide neglecting issues of strategic decision-making and routine governance? Considering that an insurgency afflicts the nation, is there a consensus or a stated policy on how to handle this menace? Can we as starters convene a Commission of all political parties, a la the 18th/19th amendment kind, which could in a prolonged serious deliberation with all stakeholders design a security and a foreign policy for the state which can retain bipartisan support and concurrence of the nation? That just might help rectifying the three overarching, interlinked and dominating distortions in our national make-up and help us right the course. Someone should seem to be in charge. Dissension, chaos and uncertainty are anathema to a state; when that happens, the void engenders adventurism. The writer is a political and defence analyst