With the army chief’s express orders to the field commanders to retaliate in full force in case of another ‘aggression’ being enacted against them by the ISAF forces, US-Pak-Afghan relations have entered a new phase of unpredictability, if not outright hostility. The general’s response, which was prompted by the ISAF’s recent attack on the Pakistani post in Mohmand Agency killing 24 Pakistani soldiers, is logical and in a way inevitable, given a series of vitiating events: the ‘unilateral’ drone attacks on tribal areas, the Raymond Davis affair, the May 2 killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, the attack on the US embassy in Kabul, and the recent NATO/ISAF attack in Shalala. The other factors that provided a backdrop to the current souring of relations are the stalled US civilian assistance under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act and more than $ 2 billion due under the Coalition Support Fund (CSF). As a sequel, Pakistan has suspended NATO supplies to Afghanistan, shut the CIA-run Shamsi Airbase, and also boycotted an important international conference in Bonn, ignoring the US and other countries’ requests. However, thanks to the overdrive of right-wing media, people are being led to look at the deteriorating US-Pak relationship not in the light of our immediate and long-term national interests and strategic imperatives, but from emotive and value-based perspectives. People are being told to be content with the mere fact that we as a nation have not blinked at US bullying. But in this gung-ho mood, we are ignoring the basic of principle of international relations: proportionality of power. Let us not forget, states do not react in emotional terms alone. In fact, it is not uncommon to see states becoming insensitive even to international laws, treaties and conventions, let alone moral and ethical considerations, when it comes to protecting their national interests and boundaries. The annals of international relations are therefore more a repository of the violations of international law than a primer on the evolution of an international order. Self-interest and the survival instinct often dictate states’ conduct even among allies. And self-interest gets morphed into selfish interest in the contingencies of war, requiring allied states to be more wary of each other’s motives than those of their enemies. For all Stalin’s imploring, the Anglo-American leaderships delayed the opening of the ‘eastern front’ against the Germans during the Second World War. And when they did, they did it in their respective self(ish) interests. The division of Germany, the drawing of an ‘iron curtain’ across Europe, and the subsequent ‘Berlin Crisis’ manifest a series of the jealously guarded national interests of the allied powers, which went beyond the objectives of the alliance against the Axis powers. No wonder, the terms ‘allies victory’ was not universally applicable. Long before the war ended, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had seen the British empire withering away as much by the ravages of war as by the imperial ambitions of its closest ‘ally’, the US, which was under the watch of his fellow capitalist President Roosevelt. Pakistan and the US too may not emerge equally successful from the Afghan imbroglio, unless the former has a clear roadmap of its own, not necessarily conflicting with that of the US. The ideal framework for both countries would be one based on common objectives and strict adherence to international laws. Which raises the question: do we have a clear roadmap? Tasking the parliamentary committee on security with formulating concrete proposals for future Pak-US relations definitely shows that we do not have such a roadmap. Obviously, US leverage over our political system and the establishment’s penchant for the theory of ‘strategic depth’ are the real barriers. As a result, whenever the US has transgressed international laws, we have assuaged our collective ‘ghairat’ (honour) by seeking an apology from the US, leaving the real causes of the recurring clashes between the two unaddressed. True, the last military ruler set the pattern of the ambiguous Pak-US relationship for his own political, military and financial objectives. But the current democratic government could have refused to follow suit, leveraging the enormous popular support that it enjoyed at the start of its term. But it did not, and that led to a high stakes game among the PPP government, the establishment and the US. Using its financial and political clout, the US played its hand as it does, keeping a balance of power between the civil and military leaderships. On the other hand, the civilian government placated both the US and the establishment, expecting that the US would support it vis-à-vis the powerful establishment, and the establishment would protect the ‘strategic interests’ vis-à-vis a transgressing US. Behind this defeated policy was the civilian leadership’s traditional weakness and ineptness that impels it to abdicate its right to formulate foreign policy mirroring the democratic aspirations of the people. However, this arrangement is coming under strain as the endgame nears in Afghanistan. Now the civilian government is caught between a rock and a hard place. Neither can it support an ‘aggressor’ US, nor can it trust the ‘wily’ generals. Recent statements clearly reflect paranoia in the government that the US is about to ditch it. The suspicion finds more credence in the US indifference to the Memogate scandal caused by a US citizen. Until now, the government has been rather lucky as the establishment itself is caught in a number of quandaries. It has to decide whether to fight, on the US prodding, those Taliban it considers its strategic ‘assets’; and whether to end this ‘corrupt and inept’ government, and if so, at what cost? The answers to these questions become more difficult given the establishment’s weakening grip over the levers of power, thanks to the ongoing democratisation of the world, the Arab Spring being the most recent manifestation. Moreover, judicial obstruction to Bonapartism has attained a degree of insurmountability. Finally, the civilian government still enjoys the support of a wide array of coalition-partners representing all parts of the country. In this complex web, neither the US, the government, nor the establishment can dictate terms. Therefore, it’s time we clearly defined the nature of our strategic partnership with the US, clearly delineating the objectives, strategy and tactics of the war. It is significant also because the shocks of recurring confrontations with the US strain our institutional harmony, economic health and political stability, if not the future of the war on terror. In any case, the fragile economy, weak democracy, and rising jingoism are not helping by pitting us against the US-led coalition of 39 countries. If the US has to save face in Afghanistan and we want to avoid committing hara-kiri, a heavy dose of realism, statesmanship, and well-defined security and foreign policies will be required. The writer is a lawyer and academic. He can be reached at shahabusto@hotmail.com