‘Afghanistan’ the land of mysticism and divinity has unfortunately fallen under the trap of religious extremism, Afghans who once spoke about Sufism and Irfan, now are known for violence and brutality. However, this book emphasises the ‘New Taliban’ generation, accordingly, the main purpose of the author is to narrate the story of the Taliban’s transition, ‘from the old world of self-styled clerics to the new world of young, mobile-holding, tech-savvy morality police’. It also investigates how the old Taliban is relevant to the newly emerged force of Taliban in Afghanistan. Considering that the new Taliban have not changed much ideologically, they are still firm on their established religious grounds. The potential change is obvious in terms of an evolutionary process that has changed the old rigid ideological Taliban to a more rationally balanced force, which is gradually gaining acceptance from the world. Hence, ‘Return of the Taliban’ is an in-depth analysis of the current Taliban regime and its evolutionary history in Afghanistan. The author has heavily relied on focused interviews and chronological history of events, justifying the Taliban’s future endeavours and potential global response. He has addressed the core issues from the success of the Doha Agreement to the rise of the Taliban to power and the demise of the US-supported Ghani government. The main points in this book are based on the transitional phase of the Taliban, though, the author claims that the new Taliban’s top leader appears to be cut from the same cloth as Mullah Omar in every regard. But he also emphasises the transformative period of the Taliban leadership from Mullah Omar to Hibatullah Akhundzada. The second point to be mentioned is focused on the US urge for peace negations during 2017-21 at Doha, as the US was well aware that ‘if the policy of using force is continued for another one hundred years, the outcome will be the same’. It further insights into the role of Zalmay Khalilzad (Zal), the US special envoy in Doha negotiations, and his unsettled disengagement with Ashraf Ghani despite being old-day colleagues in the US. Zal was in the opinion of forging negotiations with the Taliban and the Afghan government. Ghani’s denial and blind cushioning on his close allies have asserted his ouster from Afghanistan, knowing the fact that ‘Afghanistan had no legs of its own to stand on’. However, Ghani’s decision was reinforced by his close trusted allies ‘Hamdullah Mohib’, his national security advisor and ‘Amrullah Saleh’, the assertive vice president of Afghanistan and other regional stakeholders who played a certain role in sealing Ghani’s doom. The US also turned its back upon realizing Ghani was a lost cause, unable to make any decision on his own, unfortunately, he left Kabul swiftly and silently. The third point to consider is the US withdrawal and fall of the ‘mighty’ in Kabul. Taliban’s ascendance to power has raised many concerns and paved the way for more realties, failure of the twice-elected Ghani government and the Afghan army, which was heavily aided and equipped by the US and trained by India. On the other hand, the Taliban succeeded in securing collaboration and peace agreements, and tribal alliance between the local Afghan and Taliban before seizing power in Kabul. Secondly, US disenchantment from the Afghan government, the US was convinced that ‘if these guys aren’t still ready to fight for their country and flee in every direction, are they worth our support?’ In addition, the US was extremely concerned about the corrupt elements in the Afghan government and heavy financial dependence on US funding that was two-thirds of the Afghan budget. However, the Taliban’s ascendance to power was not a miracle, it was more a calculative strategy and the only viable option in Afghanistan. Though many of the critics related their victory to the old Mullah Omar regime, their leadership was clear that ‘there is a huge difference between us, in comparison to 20 years ago. There will be a difference when it comes to the actions we’re going to take, this has been like an evolutionary, complimentary sort of process’. Their hold was further strengthened by addressing governance issues, security concerns, viable economic decisions and managing their internal and external rivalries. Yet, there are still many other issues that need to be addressed as women’s empowerment and education, they strictly abhor working women’s presence. Besides that, there are other aspects such as financial crises and the challenges of internal cohesion and lastly, legitimacy. The fourth point and very much noticeable change were that the new Taliban generations have mastered the use of sophisticated social media tools, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. It contributed as an opening forum for the narrow-minded rigid foot Taliban soldiers and their leaders. Interestingly, ‘the Taliban had hired one or possibly more public relations firms during their insurgency years to facilitate their social media presence by projecting their key ideas, using hashtags, amplifying messages across platforms and helping them to create potentially viral images and video clips’. The fifth point is about the assertive role of religion that is deeply rooted and associated with Deobandism. The religious factor is very much embedded in the Afghan system and it also facilitates other religious groups to ally or differ on the religious grounds. Finally, the author offers a very promising future among Taliban and major stakeholders, it emphasizes the geostrategic importance of Afghanistan for its neighbours and other potential actors. Taliban effectively is engaged in wider diplomatic ventures for profitable trade deals and the social and formal acceptance, to be included in the global community. Accordingly, the Taliban government is engaged with China, Iran, Russia, India, Turkey, and Central Asian states and following a very assertive foreign policy towards the world. Yet the global actors are looking for more assurance and a more moderate role of the Afghan Taliban, especially for the Afghan women. Without any doubt as the author has mentioned that if the Taliban want to succeed in building a stable and independent Afghanistan they have to part ways with rigidity, exclusivity and the use of oppressive tools. A shift is also needed from one of guns and graveyards to one of potential and peace is a burning desire-and long-awaited right-of the people of Afghanistan. Thus, the Taliban’s future is not very promising nor is dark as it was in the decade of 90s. The positive side is that the Taliban are very well aware of their internal and external challenges and they are building their governance system, which is not democracy in a true sense but highly inspired by the traditional Islamic system. Lastly, the Afghan Taliban are no longer a primary threat to the national security of the US and Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries, which will stabilise Afghanistan as a sovereign state. The writer is assistant professor at the Centre for South Asian Studies of University of the Punjab, Lahore