The US’s designation of the Haqqani network as a terrorist group was not unexpected. The US State Department’s intent was telegraphed ahead, aimed as much at limiting the network’s funding as eliminating its safe haven on Pakistani soil and alleged support for it from the Pakistani military establishment. No doubt Islamabad expected this development, and must have thought out appropriate responses in the near two years this issue gestated in the US Congress. Yet it chooses to stick to its usual ambiguity, its initial response terming it an “internal American matter”. Internal or not, the Haqqanis are housed in Pakistani territory, which will invite sanctions if not checked, that too to eventual US satisfaction. Indeed, the situation grows grim for Pakistan as the US authorities move to tighten the noose around the Haqqani network. Much has been made in the international press about Pakistan’s ‘hedging policy’ regarding the Haqqanis, about Islamabad’s game plan of using the outfit to resist increasing Indian influence and a growing presence of personnel in Afghanistan, especially as occupation forces begin preparations for the 2014 pullout. Despite Islamabad’s repeated denials, there is enough in its hosting of the Haqqanis, and tolerating their border incursions, to suggest active support for the group. However much such strategy might have been profitable in the past, continuing with it in the present circumstances is clearly counter-productive for Pakistan, and the larger war effort. Even if the proxy war strategy, enduring since the CIA-ISI novelty of the anti-Soviet jihad, were to be accepted as initially feasible, there can be little doubt it has now crossed its sell-by date. If the press can notice ominous signs of erstwhile proxies straining at the leash, supporting the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the like, enabling suicide attacks and espionage inside Pakistan, so too must the security establishment. That the prospect of finally ditching the Haqqanis seems to unsettle elements in the deep state is more a reflection of policy inertia rather than serious strategic or tactical thinking. Perhaps Islamabad needs a textbook lesson in cost-benefit analysis, especially where national security imperatives are concerned. We have endured sanctions before, but these are not the 1990s, and the economy cannot survive deficits bloating further. The IMF will not come to the rescue, neither will other donor agencies as long as Washington is displeased. Such economic strangulation for the sake of the Haqqani proxies does not make sense. Especially as the longer we shelter them, the more the chances that they will help the TTP hit us to maximum effect. We must move with the world, not against it. The Haqqani network is a regressive element at the best of times, and a criminal terrorist one in the present scheme of things. It has no place in a progressive society, which is why the state should leverage the moment to root it out once and for all. *