Pakistan is a confounding case study of the interplay of religion and politics. The nexus of religion with politics in a country with a secular framework of rule is surprising in many ways. Though constitutional engineering has been attempted time and again to make this nexus congenial, viable and adaptable, yet a rift and identity conflict still prevails and Pakistan seems locked on the horns of dilemma, between a wave of orthodoxy and escalating voices of modernity. The most astonishing fact in this regard is the long term countenance of dissidents upon these orthodox outfits and a tacit alliance that hangs on always, and which has rendered tremendous acceptance and legitimacy to these nonpolitical state actors in the statecraft where negotiations and bargaining are always underway.
These two processes work simultaneously, although seemingly independent but depending and complementing each other on many occasions. This befuddling enigma cannot be comprehended without cogitating over its historical roots. Three broad factors have resulted in the emergence of this strange and tacit alliance, which are a policy of militarisation, failure of centralised democracy and lack of circumspect leadership.
The conundrum lies at the time of inception and before that during the liberation struggle for Pakistan. The slogan of religion was raised by the educated elite of the freedom movement, which in reality had nothing to do with religion. It was political manoeuvring to get the maximum support of the masses for the cause of a separate state. Having achieved this objective, the slogan of Islamic sharia and system turned nugatory for the leadership. Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan always stirs wrangles and altercation. A school of thought is of the firm belief that he had a vision of an Islamic state while others dispute it with the argument that he had a dream of a modern day republic. What was Jinnah’s original outlook is not of much use here but one thing is sure that it was out and out instrumental use of religion that dominated the discourse before and even after the partition.
In the post-independent period the migrated elite from India was standing with no constituencies in the newly independent Pakistan. Sloganeering was done in the name of religion during the freedom movement, ergo naturally the state was under pressure to accommodate Islam and placate the masses. Though the movement for a separate homeland in the name of religion was bitterly opposed by the religious clergy of that time, many of them migrated to Pakistan later on.
Here appeared a trio of predicaments that included reluctance of incumbent governments in drafting the constitution, escalating voices for the imposition of Sharia and political unrest at large after the death of Jinnah. The Objectives Resolution of 1949 was nothing but a political move on the part of the leadership to console the masses that the government was up for the imposition of an Islamic system. In fact, it was the confused leadership of that time who was western educated, ready to go ahead with a western style of governance but was caught within its own pledges that it made to the masses to motivate them during the freedom movement.
Having achieved independence, now they were reluctant regarding any religion-based legislation. Delaying tactics were resorted to to divert the attention of the masses. The draft of the constitution was still in the process of being made. Anti-Ahmedi riots broke out in 1954. This was the first successful show of the non-elected Islamic militancy in Pakistan, which also gave a way out to the political elite that started channellising these politically motivated vociferous religious forces to use them as the state’s raison d’tre.
The policy of militarisation that followed from very early days made the military a giant in the polity. Stints of army rule were the continuation of the policy of militarisation in a weakly institutionalised country, which made it a mammoth actor that suppressed and constrained democratic rule and norms in Pakistan. An illegitimate way of entering into the power corridors and the intention of seeking popular acceptability made religious forces indispensable for military rulers and resulted in the emergence of a symbiotic relationship between the two. To further sustain and consolidate its position, the army projected animosity with the archrival India; here religious forces also came to the rescue as a strategic asset. This eventually carved an alternate spectrum of power, acceptance and legitimacy for those forces, making them a preponderant actor in the state’s sphere where they always have tremendous influence.
The collapsing state of federated democracy in Pakistan has endowed a protean ability to these state-sponsored political actors of getting adjusted with any form of rule, and subsequently carrying out their obscure agenda of Islamisation, propped up by street mobilisation and militancy. This policy was aided by praetorian rule and fuelled by Ziaism, which has not only pulverised the societal basis but also wedded it with intolerance, extremism, pseudo-Islamic legislation that not only deteriorated the state but placed it on tenterhooks.
The clouds of gusty radicalisation are proving a bleak proposition for the future. How can this manipulation in the name of religion be called off when these actors have support, popular acceptance, and a discourse that is grounded in the basis of the state’s polity? Refuting their acceptance and existence would be deemed imprudent and inane because they have a very forceful presence with their demagogy and agitative fracas. The argument of bringing them into the contours of national politics is also inconsequential where these forces always contest elections and have significant vote banks.
Substantive democracy and constitutional rule is the only way out and that needs to be strengthened. It could dwindle the army’s hegemonistic influence in the state, which as a result will weaken the alternate power sphere of these forces where these actors assert themselves apart from the constitution. The state must abandon the policy of tacit backing for these forces. They must be welcomed in the national political spectrum if they can get the support of the masses, which is the true spirit of representative democracy. The deliverance of democracy will shrink the power base for them from where they manoeuvre and manipulate for their real interests, and could fix the perplexing issue of the religio-politico nexus that lies at the heart of Pakistan’s quandaries since its provenance.
The writer is a lecturer of International Relations at Fatima Jinnah Women University and teaches Politics of Pakistan at NUST Business School