The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the principal multilateral organisation seeking to promote the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, has, over the years, grown into a pre-eminent entity of the global nuclear governance system. Established in 1957 and based in Vienna, the organisation envisioned itself as a “global platform for nuclear security efforts”. The role of the IAEA in later decades became even more critical due to the perceived threat of nuclear terrorism and concerns about the security of nuclear weapons after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the agency’s role assumed importance in the 21st century with the growing interest of many developing countries in nuclear energy on the one hand and the failure of the international community to deal with the nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran on the other. Some countries even argue that after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, an initiative started by President Obama, the IAEA should be given the mandate to carry the nuclear security drive to its logical end. The concept of the IAEA arose in response to the deep fears of proliferation of nuclear weapons and great expectations resulting from the discovery of nuclear energy. In 1953, US President Dwight D Eisenhower, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, proposed the creation of an agency that would regulate and promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy under a safeguards system. The ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme was based on an erroneous assumption that nuclear technology was too complex for less developed states to master. Furthermore, strict export controls on highly enriched uranium (HEU) were designed to ensure the monopoly on nuclear technology by a few advanced countries. In this wilful ignorance, the seeds of the current global nuclear disorder were sown. The programmes of the IAEA provide international safeguards against the misuse of nuclear technology and encourage nuclear safety, including radiation protection and the implementation of security standards. Promoting the peaceful applications of nuclear technology is the primary function of the agency’s work and this function also takes up the biggest chunk of the organisation’s operational regular budget. However, over the past two decades, particularly after the surfacing of illegal nuclear activities in Iraq, Syria and North Korea, nuclear safeguards, i.e. measures to prevent the diversion of nuclear technology, materials or specialised equipment, have become the main focus of the IAEA’s nuclear activities. The implementation of safeguards has considerably expanded since the creation of the IAEA. In 2010, IAEA safeguards practices were applied in over 170 countries across the world. In addition to the safeguards system, 115 states that are signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have also signed additional protocols (AP). This AP system was adopted by the IAEA after the discovery of nuclear-related sites in Iraq. Saddam’s regime was secretly working on a sensitive nuclear programme despite the IAEA’s safeguards implementation in the country. The AP, a positive step towards strengthening the agency’s inspections mandate, became legally binding for a given state only when ratified by such state. Under the AP system, IAEA inspectors can ask a country for complete information and access to the nuclear fuel cycle, which was earlier excluded from safeguards agreements. However, membership of the IAEA is not universal — the agency has 159 member states, just 82 percent of the current UN membership of 193. The IAEA has always claimed to be one of the most efficient and well-managed UN agencies. World leaders are frequently seen emphasising their aspirations for a nuclear-free world but are reluctant to foot the bill for the operations of the agency. The IAEA’s technological resources and budget fall short of what is needed to prevent and punish NPT violations. The annual budget of the IAEA is almost $ 120 million — little more than the payroll of the Washington Redskins football team. Another issue often raised about the IAEA is the increasing politicisation of its governing bodies as the IAEA was originally designed as an ‘apolitical technical agency’. The IAEA’s inspectors have been found involved in spying on military sites but no practical steps are taken to throw such ‘bad apples’ out of the agency. IAEA officials have sometimes breached confidentiality in protecting countries’ sensitive nuclear information. Recently, evidence has emerged suggesting how the IAEA’s carelessness in handling secret information helped the Israeli government in assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists. It is also alleged that the IAEA has been biased and selective in the application of its standards. In 2005, Iran was considered by the IAEA for non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards agreement. Even though non-compliance findings themselves were notoriously subjective, Tehran addressed every substantiated and lawful concern by 2008, as confirmed by the IAEA. However, then the IAEA raised possible military concerns based on foreign intelligence, which was largely outside the legal authority of the agency to pursue because they did not clearly involve the diversion of nuclear materials to nuclear weapons uses. This explains why many countries consider the IAEA little more than an extension of western intelligence and a biased inspections shop. In order to restore confidence in the agency, the first step should be to reform its funding stream. The agency always seems to be working under political pressure from Washington because the US and its allies contribute 65 percent of its budget. Developing countries like China and India should contribute more to the IAEA’s budget so that no single power can influence it in the mad pursuit of its own interests. The need for the IAEA in the field should be decreased with the use of new technology to monitor and evaluate countries’ nuclear activities. The quest for a more stable nuclear order should eventually lead to some form of international control of nuclear energy. The IAEA can play a prominent role in carrying the struggle for a nuclear-free world forward. The IAEA may take on new roles in the future, such as verifying fissile materials from dismantled weapons, thus contributing to both nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament. However, only a strong, independent and impartial agency can play such a wider role. The writer is a research scholar and a former visiting fellow at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, California. He can be reached at rizwanasghar7@hotmail.com