Unpacking the details of US-Pak relations is complicated. Still, the view that the US needs Pakistan to continue its efforts in Afghanistan lacks any merit. The perception, supported in some segments of the elite and the media, ignores the fact that the US’s decision to invade Afghanistan was not dependent on Pakistan’s cooperation. The US sought Pakistan’s assistance, and not a partnership for invading Afghanistan. When the Pentagon planned the Afghan invasion, it did not look at Afghanistan in isolation. The attack started after mulling over the downsides of the decision to invade. Donald Rumsfeld, in his book, inferred that the US considered the issue as an Afghanistan and Pakistan problem. President Obama, after taking over the White House, echoed Donald Rumsfeld’s approach and tied Pakistan irreversibly with Afghanistan. He chose to call it his “Af-Pak policy”. It should have been clear to Pakistani defence analysts that the US would look for solutions that work with both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and not just Afghanistan alone. The US never had any desire or even the inclination to allow Pakistan’s security apparatus to have a smidgen of control over the situation. The US expected the Pakistani establishment to follow the US’s policy in the area and not inject Pakistan’s goals into the policy. The Obama administration’s evaluation that Pakistani intent in Afghanistan was well above Pakistan’s diplomatic and military stature in the area is not far off the mark. John Kerry also sent a loud and clear message to Pakistan. He said, ý”We obviously want a Pakistan that is prepared to respect the interests of Afghanistan, and to be a real ally in our efforts to combat terrorism.” The US’s emphasis was on “a real ally” not a partner or a player. Mr Kerry implied that Pakistan should follow the US’s policies and not create situations in FATA or Afghanistan that might become unmanageable. The Pakistani defence establishment, caught up in its own narrow strategic depth doctrine, lost the bigger picture presented by the US. There is no ambiguity now that the decision to interfere after the leftists’ takeover in 1978 impacted subsequent events in the area. The implausible imprudence at the top in 1978 hurt Pakistani national interests. A course correction was needed after the Soviets left Afghanistan, but the involvement intensified even more. The ghost of British imperial mindset rapidly climbed higher in Pakistan policy mavens. The Pakistani establishment felt it should continue the business the British left unfinished in Afghanistan. Pakistan, however, was drawn into the imbroglio after the left-leaning coup in Afghanistan. The coup challenged long-held social and cultural values in Afghanistan. The leftists never had a traditional political base or the social acceptance that King Zahir and President Daud enjoyed. The coup leaders, sponsored by the Afghan army, represented two small urban groups replete with factional conflicts. In a decentralised tribal country like Afghanistan, capturing the capital alone could not have completed any coup or revolution. The factional rivalries and many inopportune attempts to ingratiate in society backfired horrendously. The result was a series of coups that cost many lives, including that of the leaders. Divisive rivalries eroded the already narrow support for the left and nurtured the other side of the extreme, the jihadi mindset. The heavy-handed effort by Pakistan to take advantage of the situation also plunged Pakistan deeper into a generational conflict. Soviet involvement did not help the leftists. The published Soviet Politburo minutes provide insights into the confused and divided policy-making body of the former Soviet Union just before the decision to invade Afghanistan. Pakistan’s continuing involvement along the western border is beginning to take an immense toll on domestic politics. Besides the rise in terrorism, clashes between the civilians and the establishment have intensified over control of Afghan policy. Civilians had doubts and tried to mend the policies for relations in the region. President Zardari’s administration and now Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sought to improve relations with neighbours in the area. Their efforts met with disdain. When they persisted, both faced sham crises to force them to back off. Under the 36-year long shadow of Afghanistan, the establishment has gone through many changes too. The onus to deliver on these policies encouraged intelligence outfits to take an assertive posture. Pakistan has now effectively been transformed from a security state into an intelligence state. Retired General Shahid Aziz referred to the trend in his book published in 2013. He made a distinction between the armed forces and the intelligence gathering entities. He appeared to have the view that headquarters and intelligence outfits are separate entities. The role of the agencies has metamorphosed from information gathering, analysis and recommendations into that of decision-making bodies. Three events in the last decade point to the growing separation. The lawyers’ movement to restore judges, the ‘Memogate’ brouhaha and the current political crisis show the new order. The primary reason for the shift appears to be the management of these organisations. Principal agencies, led by service officers, report to the prime minister and not the top brass within the forces, projecting equivalent command positions. At the security meetings with the civilian leadership, the representatives of the intelligence community appear with the forces chief. The political space in Pakistan has also heated up. Earlier this year, a series of bomb blasts tore through Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The federal government, under political leadership, pursued a dialogue with the militants. The mounting bomb blasts and an improbable terrorist attack on Karachi airport turned public opinion against the dialogue process. The army moved into the troubled FATA region. The former Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, favoured dialogue with the Taliban. He considered the Pakistan army’s move an attempt to place itself close to the Afghan border before US forces leave. The civilian government tried to placate Afghanistan by sending emissaries. Some retired army generals reportedly hotfooted a pro-Taliban party to launch a sit-in to wrest the Afghan initiative away from the civilians. The PML-N government is locked in a battle to gain control of these internal and external policies. However, there seems to be no resolution of the conflict in sight. The writer is a management consultant based in the US. He is a freelance writer and tweets at @HarPasha