This article attempts to explain the radicalisation of South Asia comparatively. For this purpose, five cases — Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka — have been selected for conceptual and empirical analysis. To begin with, Sunni radical movements in Pakistan and Afghanistan are closely linked while Shia movements in both countries are tied with Iran. Radical movements in Pakistan have played a paternalistic role in supporting Afghan radical movements. The Islamist movement in Afghanistan started during the late 1960s when these movements recruited university students who were influenced by professors returning from Al-Azhar University. The latter were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood. Afghan Islamist movements were supported and advised by Pakistan-based Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan gave impetus to jihadi movements across the Muslim world. Thousands of jihadists were dispatched to Afghanistan through Pakistan during the Afghan war against Soviet occupation. Most of them were trained in jihadi camps located in Pakistan. During the 1990s, Osama bin Laden used Afghan territory to train radicals. The institutionalisation of the jihadi culture gave birth to thousands of madrassas (seminaries) and training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Money flowed to Pakistan from Middle Eastern countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, and madrassas were used as recruitment centres for the jihad in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia also exported its Wahhabi ideology, which was more puritanical than the local Barelvi ideology. The main reason behind the radicalisation of madrassas in Pakistan and Afghanistan was the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the ensuing war of resistance, as well as Zia’s Islamisation process. Zia used Islamic ideology as a source of political legitimacy. Shia militancy in Pakistan arose in response to the state’s Islamisation process, which was considered anti-Shia. Interestingly, Shias are generally not involved in anti-western activities and their focus is to defend the Shia minority in Pakistan. Zia also enacted the blasphemy law, which has been misused against the minorities in Pakistan, particularly Ahmedis and Christians. The Afghan war cemented trans-frontier solidarities among different movements. During the 1990s, Islamic militants from Pakistan also started their activities in Kashmir, supporting anti-Indian forces. Radical Islamists also started to develop an anti-western — particularly anti-US — attitude. This anti-western feeling developed as a result of the Gulf War, the 1998 US bombing in Afghanistan and the US military campaign in Afghanistan post-9/11. The radicalisation of different conservative movements in Pakistan is also a corollary of the government’s strategy vis-à-vis Kashmir and the Taliban. Islamic movements in Pakistan have changed their agenda from being a pressure group in the first quarter after independence for the implementation of sharia, to an electoral and ultimately militant force. Religious extremism and intolerance are on the rise in Bangladesh too. The history of Islamic radicalisation in Bangladesh dates back to the immediate aftermath of independence. As in Pakistan, post-independence coups and dictatorial regimes in Bangladesh fostered the growth of Islamic radicalisation in Bangladesh to gain political legitimacy. Subsequent constitutional amendments have elevated the status of Muslims against the Hindus, Christians, Ahmedis and other minorities as they were considered second-class citizens. During the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) regime in 2001, the activities of Harkatul Jihad-al Islami and Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh increased significantly. Similarly, the JI of Bangladesh has links with other radical organisations in South Asia to the extent that, in 2013, Islamic radicals attacked and destroyed 47 Hindu temples and vandalised around 700 to 1,500 homes. Similar incidents took place during the 2014 elections. The Hefazat-e-Islam group has a 13-point radical agenda that includes the introduction of blasphemy laws and the segregation of the sexes in public places. Islamists are being supported by the BNP to gain political mileage out of the protests. The Ansarullah Bengali Team (ABT) has used the internet to spread its radical agenda as well as the message of al Qaeda. When Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa in 1999 for a jihad against the Jews and crusaders, it was endorsed by Fazlur Rehman, a Bengali radical religious leader of the Harkatul Jihad al-Islami (HUJI). Most of the radical organisations in Bangladesh use the internet to woo new recruits and to spread their radical agenda across the world. Islamist radicals in Bangladesh are successful in silencing many secular voices in the country. Besides, Hindu xenophobes in India can be compared to Islamist radicals in Pakistan and Bangladesh. But there is a fundamental difference in their methodology. While radical Islamists in Pakistan believe in exporting their ideology and terror, Hindu extremists do not export terrorism as such. Radicalisation of Hindu extremists is partly driven by Hindu nationalism and partly by religion. Hindu nationalism developed during the British Raj. V D Savarkar coined the term Hindutva to describe the spiritual, political and historical essence of being Hindu. While Savarkar’s historical narratives served to unite Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains, they depicted the Muslims and Christians as foreigners. This was crystallised during the 1947 partition when hundreds of thousands of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs lost their lives. Nevertheless, contemporary Hindu nationalism is driven by different events during the 1980s and 1990s. The long-standing dispute over the Babri Mosque resulted in its demolition in 1992 by Hindu extremists, leading to Hindu-Muslim riots. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) all follow a nationalist agenda. For example, the VHP is a hardline organisation and calls for all Hindus to protect their culture and religion from foreigners, i.e. Muslims and Christians. Interestingly, however, radicalisation in Sri Lanka is mainly driven by the ethnic divide. The country is composed of four major ethnic groups, Tamils, Sinhalese, Muslims and Burghers. The rivalry between Tamils and Sinhalese is age-old and is the major cause of radicalisation in Sri Lanka. The radicalisation of Tamils started in the 1970s; the Tamil youth was frustrated with the elite for its failure to address their issues. In this respect, India provided training and logistical support to the Tamil Tigers. Initially, the Tamils were influenced by a political cause rather than driven by religious beliefs. A pogrom against the Tamils led to their radicalisation leading to the emergence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Violence by LTTE members prompted the government to take tough action against not only LTTE activists but also the Tamil population at large. The military operation against the Tamils proved to be a catalyst for their further radicalisation and ascendancy in Sri Lanka. To summarise, the phenomenon of radicalisation in South Asia defies historical linearity. Rather, the variables are multiple in nature and character. In the case of Pakistan and Bangladesh, political Islam has been invoked by both Islamists and their sympathisers among the ruling elite for political and social legitimacy. In India, secular nationalism has, with time, morphed into localised religion while in Sri Lanka ethnicity played an important role in radicalising the political and socio-economic discourse. By and large, South Asian societies and states have been engulfed by a living radical discourse that requires discursive and political measures for deradicalisation. (To be continued) Dr Ejaz Hussain is an independent political scientist and the author of Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan. He tweets @ejazbhatty. Maqbool Ahmed Wasli is a security and development consultant based in Islamabad. He can be reached at maqbool.ir@gmail.com