Two recent attackson a van carrying Judges in Peshawar and outside Tangi court amplify the objective of the terrorists to persistently hit one of the most important components of the Criminal Justice System (CJS). These incidents lead to a number of questions that need to be addressed. During the climax of militancy,the police primarily remained in the line of fire but gradually other practitioners of CJS including judges, lawyers, prosecutors and jail officers also became victims of terrorism. Despite dismally low conviction rates, why are courts ideal targets? Actually, after long spell of militancy and large number of arrests of militants,the public expects higher conviction rates. And the extremists through their relentless attacks want to keep the courts under pressure. The list of attacks is long. In February 2007, detonation by a suicide attacker in the court of senior civil judge Quetta robbed lives of 16 including the judge and 6 lawyers. Two terror attacks at Peshawar court within the time span of a month claimed lives of many in 2009. In March 2013, two bombers again targeted the judicial complex Peshawar andfour lives were lost. In March 2014, in a gun-and-bomb attack 11 people, including an additional district and sessions judge, were killed inside the District Courts Islamabad. In March 2016, a suicide bomber detonated in front of Shabqadar court resulted into death of 10 persons. Jamaat-ur-Ahrar (JuA) claimed responsibility for the attack and pleaded the reason behind it was vengeance for the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri. In August 2016 a suicide bomber targeted lawyers gathered in a hospital in Quetta resulted in death of 70. Later in 2016, a Mardan court was attacked. Attacks on courts in Afghanistan and Pakistan show similarities of modus operandi and in the selection of targets. On 8th February 2017, a suicide attack outside the Supreme Court in Kabul killed 20. The bomber targeted court employees at time when they were about to leave their offices. A van carrying four judges in Peshawar was hit by a similar attack on 15th February 2017. Throughout 2016, court attacks in Kabul, Ghazni and Puli Alam Logar claimed lives of many. Due to a staggering backlog of cases, thousands of victims, unruly prisoners, disgruntled litigants, and upset family memberscome to the courts everyday. By hitting a court with a single bullet, the savages achieve myriad goals. When a victim or a litigant dies within the court premises it creates doubts about the judicial system. Aiming a bullet towards a court is in fact aiming it towards the state writ and its capacity to enforce rule of law. Apart from incidents of terrorism within the courts, there isan increasing tendency of killing opponents within the court premises and escaping. Such incidents badly damage the image ofthe judiciary. By mere installation of surveillance and detective gadgets the security of courts cannot be ensured. It also requires know how, optimum usage, state of the art monitoring and response apparatus. Deployment of security staff at courts is usually done upon the recommendations of the court administration. This arbitrary process needs to be replaced with selection on the basis of capability. Keeping in view incidents of attacks on courts premises and judges in Quetta, Shabqadar, Mardan, Tangi, Peshawar and Islamabad, it is imperative to carry out a security assessment. Such an assessmentcan inform allocation of funds. The professional standards of deployed personnel and efficacy of installed gadgets also need to be assessed. Contingency plans have to be tailored and drills need to be carried out within court premises. Pakistan urgently needs exclusive police protection services for courts. There are countries where specialized police units are entrusted with the task of courts security. The Supreme Court of United States Police is a small federal force formed inthe US in 1949 with a mandate to protect the building, judges, employees and guests. Haphazard parking of vehicles also poses serious threat to the courts. To avert likely employment of VBIED except judges’ vehicles no vehicle should be allowed. To ensure court premises as no weapon zones, it is imperative to install metal detectors, X-ray and baggage scanner machines. No camera, recording device, mobile phone and weapon should be allowed within the premises. Since most courts are located in congested vicinities, they remain vulnerable. Present challenge warrants observance of documented court security procedures, technological backup, deployment of trained personnel, and enhanced architectural features. To improve emergency response, thecourts should coordinatewith emergency services. Almost all the courts that have been attacked had police deployment. Foolproof courts’ security requires more strengthened outer most cordons however owing to limited space it is almost impossible. Militants have often exploited the overcrowded locations and structural flaws of courts. This is why there is a need forimmediate administrative intervention. Vetting of employees and vendors working in the court premises is also essential. Recent decision of the Interior Ministry to establish a special security force for judges is a step in the right direction. Provinces also need to think about the creation of dedicated small, specialised court police units and convert the current challenge into an opportunity of institution building. The writer is a police officer