Henry Kissinger, storied academic and secretary of state to US presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, is arguably the finest political brain of his generation. In 2014 at the ripe old age of 91, Kissinger published his magisterial tome World Order, a peerless peek at history tracing the evolution of the incumbent international system of rules from pre-Westphalian Europe to the global response to militant Islamic extremism over half a millennium later. It is a treasure trove of wisdom even for the most casual fan of international relations. For this piece, I will cherry-pick one from a series of questions Kissinger outlines in the epilogue that he considers imperative for all nation states to introspect on and honestly answer. Especially the major powers America, China and Russia if they are to maintain internal order, and proactively help shape the external one. The answers will naturally be unique to each culture, predicated on individual definitions of the ‘national interest’, which Kissinger defines as the narrative created by persons or groups harnessing both legitimacy and power. In Pakistan, as history bears out, legitimacy and power together have rarely been the province of democratically elected governments. Many times, unfortunately, various state actors have consciously maneuvered at cross-purposes to the detriment of the polity. Kissinger’s first question frames the “minimum condition for the survival of society” by asking: “What do we seek to prevent, no matter how it happens, and if necessary alone?” Pakistan for much of its existence has lurched from one crisis to another primarily wrought by its geo-location in a historically volatile neighbourhood, and the political naiveté of its leadership (both civil and military) that valued instant gratification over long-term strategy. Together, they created a perpetual state of economic serfdom to international lending bodies controlled by major powers that while preaching from the pulpit of inviolable national sovereignty have had no qualms about impinging on Pakistan’s own. This may sound like reductionist rhetoric, but the simple fact that Pakistan today finds itself tangled in the same moral, political and military dilemmas that it did 30 years ago attests to this vicious cycle. Unsurprisingly then, watching old episodes of Alif Noon can feel like you’re stuck in a time-warp. Now it is amid a regional realignment where traditionally free-agent India is prioritising its strategic relationship with America, both militarily and economically. Where Pakistan’s diminished role in the Afghan peace settlement coincides with an increasingly strident Kabul. And where all-weather ally and key economic partner China risks being drawn into an armed conflict with the US and Japan farther east, it behooves Pakistan’s leadership to place a premium on establishing internal order for the “survival of society.” Securing Pakistan’s borders and stamping out the fresh wave of militant secessionism sponsored by hostile neighbours should be accomplished ruthlessly and without apologies. India and Afghanistan are the immediate external challenges as they partake in the same insidious activities they routinely accuse Pakistan of plotting against them. If India wishes to wage a covert war in Balochistan and Karachi by arming and financing treasonous groups like the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the Baloch Republican Army, then Pakistan reserves the right to respond in kind at battlegrounds of its choosing. Furthermore, if India refuses to recognise the aspirations of the people of Kashmir, and doubles down on violence despite a surfeit of multilateral resolutions and bilateral promises and yet dreams of sitting at the UN high table, then it is Pakistan’s prerogative to exhaust India’s diplomatic energies, and chip away at its soft power by relentlessly advocating the Kashmir issue at international fora. Indeed, India makes this easy with its poor human rights record, a fact made plain by the gentle yet firm scolding every American dignitary — including President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry — offers on a trip to its shores. Afghanistan poses a whole different set of challenges made complex by cross-border tribal linkages and ethno-linguistic affinity. For starters, it would be disingenuous to deny that Pakistan’s once staple ‘strategic depth’ doctrine helped kindle a flame east of its border that in time exploded into a monster blaze of homegrown militancy. The Taliban not only continue to confound the international community’s best attempts to stabilise Afghanistan, they have also cost Pakistan enormously in blood and treasure. When conceived, however, it was a sound plan to counter pre-Soviet, Republican-era Afghanistan’s long-standing policy of stoking Pashtun separatism in what is now the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province with India’s blessing and support. Incentivising the forces of religious identity to stalemate racial politics is an age-old trick and it worked so long as the idea wasn’t co-opted by an ambivalent superpower and its Arab lieges that insisted on loosening the leash and putting the prizefighter on steroids. Consequently, despite initial gains, it all went downhill from there, though it took the best part of two decades to take stock of the Frankenstein that emerged from this calculus. Confronted with an armed insurgency that refuels inside Afghan territory, which the Ashraf Ghani government cannot or will not prevent, Pakistan needs to board up its eastern border with or without Kabul’s acquiescence. If Afghanistan keeps refusing to validate the Durand Line’s legitimacy as an international boundary, it can take up the issue with the Queen of England or Mortimer Durand’s descendants. Moreover, local Pashtuns prone to full-throated condemnations of a fenced border need to assess whether their loyalties lie with Pakistan or some fantasy, transnational tribal state. Concomitantly, Pakistan must endeavour to close fissures in the federation along ethno-sectarian lines by seeking result-oriented dialogue with dissidents who have taken to sabotage out of desperation or at the behest of traitorous leaders. Reconciling with the Taliban may be a lost cause, but the MQM and Baloch nationalists are not there yet. Both have established constituencies with historical grievances that simply cannot be snuffed out by force or swept out of sight. Factions of both groups willing to disavow anti-state activities should be allowed concessions to make up for the earlier indifference of the state. Madrassas, similarly, must be mainstreamed and brought under rigorous oversight to prevent young minds from being poisoned by self-serving jihadists or takfiris peddling a convoluted brand of Islam aimed either at overthrowing the state or targeting religious minorities. Above all else, prior experience behooves Pakistan to forever eschew chasing monsters abroad — as the Saudis recently urged it to in Yemen — for any number of economic or political favours lest this awakens their slumbering ilk at home. The writer is an Islamabad-based freelance journalist