The brazen openness with which the Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) has announced that it would hold countrywide protests for the Kashmir issue, starting from a conference on October 28 is an ominous reminder of the power that hardline religious right still exercises in Pakistan. Composed of far-right religious groups and even banned militant organisations, the DPC is not very different from militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) that Pakistan army fought in the military operation Zarb-e-Azb. If not open antipathy to the democratic structure of Pakistan these groups express an ambivalent distaste for it. Moreover, their ability to gather large crowds on the streets coupled with their use of religious slogans to justify their demands has given them great power to do what very few in Pakistan can: force government to capitulate. These groups spew hatred against Hindus, Christians and Jews, and incite their co-religionists to violence against Pakistan’s religious minorities. Openly threatening government of dire consequences if their demands are not met, such blackmail tactics by the hard line religious right shows that the fight against militants is still a long way to victory. Furthermore, government’s lack of action against such open threats, partly because of fear of backlash, is a reminder that in absence of a holistic counter-extremism strategy, it would be very difficult to defeat such groups. There is little doubt that the operation Zarb-e-Azb was a necessity as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had waged an open war against Pakistan, and hence breaking their base of operation was imperative to stop them from perpetrating terrorism in Pakistan. In this respect, the armed forces of Pakistan played a valiant role and effectively defeated the militants holed up in FATA. However, the TTP was just one part of the problem, as a big part of the extremist groups spread throughout the country continue to carry out their activities with impunity. One does need to look very far as within the capital, government has maintained silence over repeated threats by the Lal Masjid establishment, most recently over the issue of Aasia Bibi’s case in the Supreme Court. Far from taking action against such open challenges to the writ of government, there is even a complete absence of any condemnation from government. It has been the civil society that has taken charge and, despite danger to their lives, put pressure on government to crack down on such groups. Furthermore, the structural reforms that are needed, and were even laid down in the National Action Plan, such as regulation of madrassas and clamping down on hate speech have far from materialised. De-radicalisation of Pakistani society is contingent upon successful mainstreaming and monitoring of madrassas, along with an effective counter-narrative to replace the myopic worldview that these seminaries have inculcated. Unless a comprehensive and concrete policy is formulated in this regard, very little can be expected to change. Hence, the rally of the DPC is part of a much bigger problem in which extremism has appropriated a great deal of space for itself, and, ostensibly, left government relatively helpless. Moreover, in addition to its devastating effects on the domestic politics of Pakistan, such a state of affairs has to a great extent compromised Pakistan’s position on the international stage. The DPC consists of groups that have been blacklisted by the United Nations, and hence the ease with which they can organise in Pakistan raises serious questions over Pakistan’s policy of clamping down on them. More importantly, if Pakistan wants to use the forum of the United Nations to highlight and resolve the Kashmir dispute in the light of the UN Resolutions, how can it do so without taking action against individuals and groups that have been banned by the UN? Perceived as a country that has used militant groups for strategic gains in the past, Pakistan is in urgent need of showing the world that it is against all forms of terrorism. If the DPC successfully holds its rally, it would both provide fuel to Indian propaganda of internationally ‘isolating’ Pakistan, and weaken Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir dispute. The last thing Kashmiris need is for militant groups to hold a rally in its favour, delegitimising their legitimate struggle for freedom and rights and providing Indian state further pretence to beef its apparatus of suppression and oppression. For its own sake and for the sake of Kashmiris, Pakistan has to ensure that such an outcome does not materialise. *