That the South Asian archrivals need to engage with each other is obvious. However, questions regarding the nature of the process, the level of engagement, the venue of negotiations and the agenda of the talks have often marred the dialogue process between them. The same is being discussed in the context of the upcoming National Security Advisors’ (NSAs) meeting.
In late July, New Delhi proposed dates for the NSA meeting in Islamabad. On August 13, Pakistan’s foreign and national security advisor, Sartaj Aziz, confirmed that he would hold talks with Indian NSA Ajit Doval in New Delhi on August 23. As per the Ufa joint statement, they will discuss “all issues connected to terrorism”. From the foreign secretary level composite dialogue to political engagement at the NSA level, this is not a first between India and Pakistan.
Between 2003 and 2007, Mr Tariq Aziz, the then NSA and secretary of the National Security Council (now defunct), and also a close aide to the then president, General Pervez Musharraf, held various rounds of talks with his Indian counterparts, first with Mr Brajesh Mishra in the Vajpayee government and later with Mr J N Dixit and Satinder Lambah, NSAs to the Manmohan Singh government. The Tariq Aziz-Brajesh Mishra talks paved the way for the January 2004 Islamabad joint statement, issued after the meeting between President General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister (PM) Atal Bihari Vajpayee on the sidelines of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit. It was the same joint statement in which “President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner.”
The Islamabad joint statement also announced further normalisation and resumption of the composite dialogue process in February 2004. The composite dialogue, with its eight specialised groups and expert level talks, continued till November 2008, only to be interrupted by the Mumbai attacks. However, the two NSAs also continued their discussions in India, Pakistan and sometimes in third countries. Tariq Aziz visited Amritsar to meet J N Dixit ahead of the September 2004 meeting between President General Musharraf and PM Manmohan Singh.
Similarly, it was the negotiations between the NSAs of both countries that produced a draft ‘non-paper’ (a draft text that cannot be attributed, thus providing deniability) for resolving the Kashmir dispute. The salient feature of the draft non-paper was the four-point Musharraf formula for a Kashmir settlement. The NSAs discussed a prospective solution to the Kashmir dispute separately, despite Kashmir being on the agenda of the composite dialogue process. The record of the NSAs’ level of engagement shows that it has been more productive, substantial and result-oriented than engagements at other levels. The reason lies in the necessary political support NSAs get from the political leadership even when it is a military government in Pakistan. Any eventual settlement reached by the NSAs or foreign secretaries would have to be finally owned by the political leaderships in both countries. Thus, for the political leadership, the NSA level political negotiations are a preferable option to the foreign secretary-led composite dialogue process, which is essentially a bureaucratic affair.
The forthcoming Aziz-Doval meeting will officially only be focusing on “issues related to terrorism”. Pakistan, over the years, has resisted getting into a bilateral dialogue where the only issue on the agenda is terrorism. Pakistan considers the Kashmir dispute to be the core problem between India and Pakistan. However, the upcoming talks are different for Pakistan. This time both countries are getting back to the table after a war of words, and accusations and counter-accusations regarding sponsoring terrorism in the other’s country. In April, during a visit to Balochistan, Military Chief General Raheel Sharif “warned foreign states and agencies trying to destabilise Pakistan by supporting terrorists in Balochistan”. In an unprecedented statement, the Pakistan army, after a meeting of its high command in early May, directly accused Indian intelligence agency RAW for “whipping up terrorism in Pakistan”. Later in the month, responding to belligerent statements by Indian political leaders, PM Sharif, in a meeting with Army Chief General Sharif and the Director General (DG) of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) at the ISI headquarters, expressed concern over such statements and announced that all steps to counter terrorist actions would be taken. In June, the army chief categorically said that “Pakistan is opposed to using proxies against other countries and will not allow any other country also to use proxies against Pakistan.”
These charges and accusations by Pakistan make it imperative that it engages India on issues related to terrorism at the negotiating table. Earlier, it was India that used to accuse Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism and letting its territory be used for terrorist operations against India. Now that Pakistan has also blamed India for engaging in similar activities aimed at internal destablisation, talks between the NSAs are an opportunity for both sides to present the evidence to support their accusations and address common concerns of the other.
The NSAs talks enjoy support from the political leadership in both countries. New Delhi and Islamabad need to take a step back from conflicting, maximalist and zero-sum positions. The time has come for India and Pakistan to decide if they want to remain hostage to the issue of terrorism or undertake substantial negotiations. In the backdrop of ongoing hostilities across the Line of Control (LoC) and working boundary, and bilateral concerns related to the issue of terrorism, upcoming security talks are a first step towards addressing the irritants that hinder constructive engagement and sustained forward movement in a relationship crucial for regional security and international peace. It is only to be hoped that the forthcoming NSA level talks between India and Pakistan will lead to some progress towards the improvement of bilateral relations.
The author is an Islamabad-based security analyst