A ceasefire, as reflected in the operational frameworks of the United Nations is a “temporary suspension of hostilities agreed upon by the parties to a conflict,”. It is neither a settlement of conflict for good, nor semantic in effect, but a controlled structural interruption in violence, bounded in time, space, and intent. Across centuries, ceasefires have consistently functioned as instruments to comprehend the cause and effect of wars, stabilizing the battlefields (the effect) within a timeframe and space, rather than resolve the disputes producing it (the cause). Ceasefires, therefore reflect optimizing pressure for later resolution of the causes, to settle the conflict. However, in short term and immediate perspective it is not convergence of political objectives but freezing hostilities in time; fragile in essence.
Understanding the ceasefire talks between the United States and Iran in Islamabad, is not an aberration; it is a continuation of a long-established logic. Both sides have entered a phase where continued escalation carries systemic costs that outweigh immediate gains. For Washington, the inability to impose decisive outcomes without triggering wider regional instability has imposed constraints. For Tehran, the demonstration of cost-imposition capacity, particularly through pressure on maritime flows and regional networks, has strengthened its negotiating position. It effectively seals the denial of USA-Israel objectives of war thus assigning a notion of victory to Iran in this asymmetric war. The ceasefire is therefore not a product of reconciliation but of global economic cost of the conflict.
The ceasefire is therefore not a product of reconciliation but of global economic cost of the conflict.
The issues on the table, nuclear capability, missile reach, sanctions relief, and regional posture, are not peripheral. They are the core drivers of the conflict. Their presence in negotiations does not indicate convergence; it highlights the depth of divergence. Each side is attempting to convert battlefield leverages into political concessions while preserving its strategic position. This is precisely how ceasefire negotiations have historically functioned. They do not bridge fundamental differences; they manage them.
The spine of this column stands on what ceasefire talks hold for USA and Iran, both, weakness and leverage of the process, talks’ effect on geopolitics and what it holds for Pakistan in particular, being the lead mediator and host.
The mutually agreed ceasefire, between Iran and the United States, has placed Iran on equal footing with the USA. Unlike Venezuela, Iran, resisted the imposed war / intrusion, made sacrifices, including its Supreme Leader, its National Security Advisor, many military generals, key figures, scientists, and even young girls who were killed when their school was bombed. Iran Imposed a cost through massive retaliation on USA and Israeli’s military and economic interests in the region. This is how strategic parity with USA was gained by Iran.
A critical weakness in the current process lies in its partial scope. If the ceasefire does not encompass the full theatre of conflict and renders Israel and non-state partners aligned with Iran external to the ceasefire, can result in renewed escalation and destabilization. Historical precedents show that ceasefires which fail to integrate all active fronts tend to remain fragile. They reduce immediate violence in one domain while allowing pressure to build in others. The result is not resolution but redistribution of conflict intensity.
Another defining feature is the centrality of leverage points that extend beyond the battlefield. The Strait of Hormuz has emerged as a decisive variable, not because of territorial contestation, but because of its systemic impact on global energy flows. Control, or even disruption, of this chokepoint translates directly into negotiating power. This is consistent with the evolution of asymmetric strategies, where economic and infrastructural vulnerabilities are leveraged to offset conventional disparities. In this sense, the current negotiations are not confined to military aspects only but are embedded in wider economic considerations.
This ceasefire has ripped through the hollow drum of the Abraham Accords, which has been a purported as carrot and stick, both, for Gulf and other Muslim countries, lately. The situation stands changed now. Muslim countries will think multiple times before becoming part of such agreements. Dissolution of Board of Peace is likely to follow as fate accompli.
Three so called “Greater Ideas” are now a fatality of this ceasefire. Foremost the idea of “Greater Israel”, which has dissipated in thin air along with the busted myth of Israel’s impregnability; the very reason why Israel is being considered as a disruptor in the ceasefire. Similarly, Trump’s vision of a “Greater North America,” threatening countries like Greenland and Canada, stands done and dusted. There is also a third one; Modi’s brain child “Akhand Bharat” or Greater India, which also bites the dust. Pakistan has always been the biggest obstacle to this idea. and with its rejuvenated global image, India should realize that the emerging new world order has no room for expansionists or asset plundering designs.
For Pakistan, this ceasefire has not only opened a path to peace in the Middle East but has also paved the way for lasting peace in South Asia. If as an outcome, the Palestine issue is resolved maybe in the long run, Kashmir issue can follow suit. However, for that to happen, being a nuclear power shall not be enough; Pakistan has to become a strong economic power too.
Three conclusions emerge directly from this historical and contemporary alignment. First, expectations of a comprehensive settlement emerging from the Islamabad talks are misplaced, this ceasefire can produce mutually agreed interim arrangements rather than final settlements. Second, the durability of the current ceasefire will depend less on formal commitments and more on the evolving balance of pressure. Compliance will not be sustained by agreement alone but by the understanding from all, that violation will bear costs disproportionately higher to that of adherence. Israel should clearly discern the same. Third, the most probable trajectory is not resolution but managed instability. The conflict will morph into less visible forms, through proxies, economic measures, and strategic signaling, even if large-scale hostilities remain contained. Nevertheless, it still affords an opportunity to seize the peace.
The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at zulfiqar.shirazi @gmail.com