Civil-military relations in Pakistan have always been a hot topic for general discussion and, in cases, academic inquiry. It is a sad fact the majority of the people, especially our televangelists know little about the subject theoretically and empirically. Even the local scholarship on the subject is mostly polemical and biased to either side of the equation, those who pondered over and produced original thought, such as Hamza Alavi and Ayesha Siddiqa, are mostly nor read, and if somehow read, are poorly understood and, at times, are dubbed as traitors and anti-state. Factually, Pakistan’s history is replete with long phases of bureaucratic, civilian, judicial and military authoritarianism and, importantly, popular resisting to it. People did question Ayub regime, agitated against Zulfikar Bhutto, confronted the Zia and Musharraf regime. Even, a section of populace, that followed Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri, did sit-ins against the Zardari and now the Sharif government. In other words, authoritarianism is equally taken on by its antithesis. Therefore, if we place the current debate on civil-military relations on the touchstone of Pakistan’s history, there is then ample room for conceptualisation and contextualisation. However, to do this, one got to be objective in theory and data analysis as well as honest to oneself and the country.
The current debate on the said subject revolves primarily around two actors, ie Nawaz Sharif-led civil government and General Bajwa led army. The latter, indubitably, is the powerful force in the country institutionally (it is comparatively organised and disciplined organisation), politically (it has been involved in politics), strategically (it determines foreign policy), and socioeconomically (it is engaged in approaching to the people for popular legitimacy). The civil government is weak as per the foregoing variables. Constitutionally, the military has no political and strategic role. This is the reason why every coup-maker had to abrogate the constitution and issue its replacement in terms of provisional constitutional order (PCO). However, the 21st and, now, 23rd constitutional amendments have provided the military with military courts to try civilians for terrorism. Indeed, the very being of military courts point to the comparative weakness of other state institutions particularly parliament and the judiciary. In such a context, where the military is already a powerful actor and the civil government is weaker, why does the latter confront the former? Why did the PM meet Jindal in Murree without the prior approval of the security agencies? Why did Maryam Nawaz tweet back vis-à-vis the ISPR, JIT and Mr Imran Khan? Or, put differently, if the military is a powerful force, why is it so concerned about the civilian dispensation, the tactics employed by the Sharifs and the role of India and the US, as per circulating whatsapp messages, in our domestic politics?
To answer the posed questions, one has to grasp the means employed by the Nawaz government vis-a-vis the army. The former’s topmost priority is to complete the tenure, not to necessarily democratise the country but accrue political and economic dividends. To this end, the government approached the former army chief for arbitration. Resultantly, the government though survived the day but was weakened politically and institutionally. The formation of the military courts under Raheel Sharif is a case in point. To further appease the current top army brass and, to some extent, get itself absolved from governing responsibility, the Sharif government did its best to re-amend the constitution to re-establish military courts. Until this, Nawaz Sharif’s logic is simple and understandable for a lay reader. However, the former tried to assert in the domain for foreign policy, believing in his traditional formula: if Pakistan normalises with India, there would be less, and gradually zero, room for the army to stay relevant politically and strategically. Moreover, since the civil government has already bowed down by providing military courts and governance role even in Punjab, the military has no reason to stage coup. It is this conviction, which in my view, is at work with reference to inviting, first, India’s premier Modi and, now, businessman, Sajjan Jindal to Pakistan apparently without consulting the security establishment. Moreover, it is likely the civil government might have approached the Americans, reference Ishaq Dar’s recent visit to the US, to score a point over the army, at least in politically. Nevertheless, contrary to social media based conspiracy theories, it would be naïve on the part of the US to meddle in the domestic politics of Pakistan when the US is least interested in the county and has, instead, established strategic relations with India. Importantly, the past coups were never staged on the orders of the US. A basic text on US-Pakistan relations will be sufficient in this respect. In addition, Pakistan was brought closer to the US by the past military regimes of Ayub, Zia and Musharraf.
Another dimension of the Sharifs’ logic is domestic, whereby the PML-N, as a political party, is busy confronting its political opponents. Indeed, Nawaz Sharif’s speech in Okara reflects the party’s collective wisdom on the matter. Maryam’s tweets could be seen in this respect. Nerveless, the government’s approach of establishing civilian control of the military is, in my opinion, flawed and has instead caused a crisis in civil-military relations where the possibility of a coup cannot be ruled out given the military agency. However, a coup is always illegal and unconstitutional with political and economic cost. Will the military afford that? If so, will Pakistan afford that given plethora of problems the country is struggling with?
My answer is in the negative and I would urge our civil and military leadership to resolve the crisis within the constitutional framework. Pakistan’s survival in the 21st century onwards is contingent on adherence to the constitution on the part of every state institution and a citizen. Remember, if Pakistan’s interest as a state and society is compromised on account of any institutional interest, it is the state institutions, the society and overall the country that will suffer from within and outside as ours is a divided society with a weak state, struggling to establish its writ in a hostile regional and international environment. Lingering of the crisis or imposition of coup will put Pakistan in the past, not the future, and our neighbours (especially India) will surpass us economically and geostrategically. Pakistan’s initial and ultimate survival lay constitutional rule, balanced civil-military relations, tolerance and peace.
The writer is Head, Department of Social Sciences, Iqra University, Islamabad. He is DAAD, FDDI and Fulbright Fellow. He tweets @ejazbhatty