There is traditionally lot of literature available, mostly leftist, that points to the US role in Pakistan’s domestic politics. By and large, such accounts make one believe that the Pakistani army staged coups and imposed martial laws at the behest of the United States. From General Ayub to General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistani military leadership played second fiddle to Pentagon. Moreover, such literature portrays Pakistan as a “rentier state” without agency and thus overwhelmingly dependent, financially and militarily, on external powers especially the US.
I would, in the following, tend to disagree with this sort of thinking which, in my view, is not based on solid empirical foundation but rather is grounded in cursory understating of the (post) Cold War international relations.
Indubitably, Pakistan entered into the Cold War security alliances with Washington, what is overlooked is the fact that it was Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, who visited the United States in 1950 and paved the way for such strategic understanding. Moreover, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) were signed under a formal parliamentary system which was dominated by the civil bureaucracy. One wonders why the Ayub-led military did not stage a coup when he “called shots,” as a defence minister under Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad? Why did the United States abandon Pakistani military in its war with India in 1965 and 1971? From traditional logic, the United States was a partner of Pakistani military and, therefore, should have supported Pakistan against India.
Instead, Ayub Khan’s (1967) own account, Friends not Masters, belittles the essentialization of the United States as Pakistan’s partner and protector. Moreover, during the 1970s, Pakistan under Bhutto tilted further toward Beijing and Pakistani military started procuring Chinese military hardware as argues Andrew Small. Also, in July 1977, when General Zia-ul-Haq toppled the elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto through coup d’e´tat, the Carter Administration not only disapproved it but also criticized the sorry state of human rights and secret nuclear program under the Zia regime. It is in the post-coup period that U.S.-Pakistan relations improved in the wake of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. power struggle in Afghanistan (1979-1988). Paradoxically, the 1990s saw another phase of bitter bilateral relations between Pakistan and the United States. From Pressler Amendment to nuclear sanctions in 1998, Pakistan was a nonfavourite country.
Pakistan, owing to its exceptional diplomatic feats during the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s seemed to have had its bilateral relations well under control. Meaning that the US did not dictate Pakistani domestic politics, particularly when it came to military interventions. The latter being due to asymmetrical possession and application of institutional, if not individual, agency
In contrast, India-U.S. relations were opening up. In this backdrop, the October coup (1999) was staged by General Pervez Musharraf who toppled another elected government. Arguably, had no 9/11 happened, the Musharraf regime would have witnessed further sanctions. In the context of 9/11, the Bush Administration gave the Musharraf regime a choice “to either be with us or against us.” This reflects unequal scale of relationship for had Pakistan been fully dependent on the US money and weapons, the former should not have invoked crude vocabulary to communicate its geostrategic aims to Pakistan. Ironically, the Musharraf regime was constantly reminded to “do more” as the former did not deliver on the war on terror the way the United States wanted it. And, on November 3, 2007, when General-cum-President Musharraf staged his second coup ostensibly against the apex judiciary, the U.S.-Pakistan relations were already in bad shape.
The following years (2008-2017) witnessed further deterioration over issues such as drone attacks, killing of Bin Laden, Black Water, Memogate, Salala attack, NATO supply, A.Q. Khan, Al-Qaeda, Haqqani Networks, and so on.
The foregoing factually projects a different trajectory, which is replete with instances of mutual bargaining, misgivings and mistrust, realist approach to national interest and, in case, complete breakdown in bilateral relations. Interestingly, all this happened despite Pakistan being categorized as a ‘rentier’ country. Indeed, Pakistan, owing to its exceptional diplomatic feat during the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s seemed to have controlled the equation of bilateral relations. Which means the US did not dictate Pakistani domestic politics particularly military interventions. The latter is a purely a domestic problem caused due to asymmetrical possession and application of institutional, if not individual, agency.
If the above is applied to the prolonging predicaments of the current PML-N government, the latter is not going to be helped out by the US for the latter could not influence our domestic political structure, as argued already, in the past. Importantly, the Pakistani state led by the powerful military is not likely to get influenced by Washington owing to worsened relations on account of President Trump’s tough-on-Pakistan speech a few months ago. In the current scenario, Nawaz Sharif’s dilemmas are going to persist and PML-N may enter into dangerous zone in the wake up to general election, if they are held. Lastly, though the US could not influence, for instance, the Musharraf regime on eliminating various terror networks, it may pose serious challenges for the state of Pakistan. The latter ought to tread cautiously and carefully since the challenges posed are unprecedented.
The writer is Head, Department of Social Sciences, Iqra University, Islamabad. He is a DAAD, FDDI and Fulbright Fellow. He tweets @ejazbhatty
Published in Daily Times, October 8th 2017.