Ceasefires are often seen as a simple action to end violence and allow more substantive negotiations to begin. Contemporary conflict resolution models thus posit the ceasefire as a fundamental step in the peace building trajectory. Offering an in-depth analysis of Taliban militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA Pakistan, ceasefires should rather be understood as a part of the dynamics of conflict. Northwest Pakistan is a site of protracted conflict involving multiple contestants, where Taliban organisations play a key role. A string of ceasefires between the Pakistan government and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has contained fighting between security forces and militants, while violence has continued unabated in different cities of Pakistan among an array of other armed groups, claimed by non-TTP factions, with serious consequences for local communities.
Ceasefires may impact conflict dynamics in at least three ways, which are all interrelated. It may affect the internal cohesion of belligerent groups, the operational space of armed groups and the relations between multiple stakeholders and parties to a conflict, including the challenger and the state. The terms of negotiating agreements, the strategic use of ceasefires by conflict actors, and the opportunities created by effective binding of ceasefire ground rules have facilitated the reduced operations of militants vying for territory and political stakes.
The Taliban’s presence in the tribal belt creates a significant security threat for Pakistan, which may result in either a direct or indirect intervention by the Pakistan army to eliminate targets within the specified regions. Military intervention into North Waziristan was strongly backed by Washington. Though Afghanistan does not fulfil the quality of a failed state that pundits claim may transpire after the US withdrawal scenario, intervention by the Afghan National Force will be necessary for clandestine operations. Similarly, more sovereignty-breaching operations may take place in the future if opportunities to eliminate Taliban leaders arise. Both of these instances may destabilise the region through interrupted diplomatic relations between neighbouring countries or possible cross-border violence leading to regional warfare.
Analysis shows that TTP violence has targeted innocent civilians and perceived supporters of the Pakistan army. This would indicate that their struggle has been less about maintaining supremacy regarding religious goals and more centralised around territorial spats and resources. This, I predict, will be the major point of contention since implementation of sharia is just a red herring between negotiators and the TTP. Taliban cells in Pakistan and Afghanistan have not been mobilised for religious gain but largely for the economic and political development of the militant organisation. Thus, the kidnapping practices used by the Taliban would seem necessary and practical for these cells. Conflict along territorial lines in the drug trafficking market would be another plausible cause of violence between militant groups who have increasing numbers with limited resources.
This analysis has considered the impact of destabilising factors these joint ventures with the Taliban may have on the immediate threat of terrorism in the region. The central role required would be streamlining the relationship between various anti-Taliban Afghan groups as well as relationships with neighbouring countries. Otherwise, this will set the precedent for unstable political negotiations between Pakistan and the TTP. Consequently, strength and success for the Afghan National Forces against the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda would be the catalyst for these destabilising factors. Now the question is: will there be any changes from the upcoming election result in Afghanistan — the exit of President Hamid Karzai and the ushering in of the new Afghan President? On all counts, President Karzai describes himself as a moderate candidate who wishes to do away with the extremist tendencies of prior regimes and engage in warmer relations with Pakistan and India. These encouraging claims are to be taken with a pinch of salt though, as President Karzai still remains loyal to the US and his political agenda to do away with the policies of his more radical predecessors and compatriots faces large hurdles without the support of the US, which now has different plans for the region and ultimately determines the nation’s final decisions. As a result, warmer relations with Pakistan may be a feasible idea. The way forward may be a diplomatic triage of Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.
The ultimate concern is whether the diplomatic landscape between Afghanistan and Pakistan will move forward. The strength of the bilateral relationship between both countries relies on the shared vision between intelligence agencies and heads of state. With the regime change in Afghanistan, there arises the possibility of a complete diplomatic breakdown if the new leader is not more moderate than his predecessor and does not share the same approach. Consequently, this may cause either further destabilisation due to inability to control Taliban cells in the region, or increase the number of their militant operations due to political feuds, territorial supremacy and sectarian vengeance. It is possible that civil war will be reprised and that the Taliban may return walking into Kabul. Al Qaeda would be in a stronger position to launch global terrorist attacks and the Pakistani Taliban would be boosted by US withdrawal from Afghanistan, which could also destabilise Pakistan-India relations. At the end of the day regional stability will be at risk, especially in Pakistan.
Increased attacks on Pakistani targets by the TTP and their factions may cause a military backlash that either breaches state sovereignty through clandestine offensive measures or, more worrisome, produces an outright military operation against the TTP. Lastly, the presence of all three — the TTP, Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda — within the same regional territory coupled with their similar drug-centred revenue streams may cause one of two outcomes: either the immediate confrontation of both groups in an effort to muscle one another out of the drug market or the cooperative implementation of territorial boundaries that would indicate their individual territories and bases of operations.
These outcomes are not mutually exclusive and the conditions provided may allow for more than one destabilisation factor to be realised. Negotiations between the TTP and Pakistan are an eyewash and challenge the seriousness of the agenda presented on the table. It is the second screening of Talibanisation through the media to gather mass negative reaction before military intervention is justified. The Taliban’s game plan of waiting out looks more plausible than ever. The reality is that the future of peace in the region now rests squarely on the exodus of US forces and President Karzai’s shoulders. Despite recent troubles with his contentious election, he must be prepared to either maintain the same quality of relationships with Washington while in office or prepare himself for the possible hurdles left to his government in the wake of US and NATO leaving the region. In all this, the Taliban become the catalyst waiting to exhume the venal warlords of Afghanistan.
The Taliban will have to be politically engaged as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was in Northern Ireland. Otherwise, they will expand and survive because there is nowhere for them to go than to resort to violence and terrorism. Whether it is possible to distinguish and negotiate with so-called ‘moderate’ Taliban leaders remains to be seen but we can be sure a ceasefire will be a condition of their participation in any agreement. Inviting the Taliban to a democratic process may be key. In other words, instead of fretting over a negotiating strategy with the TTP we need a new political strategy, and fast. If Pakistan can get that right then the rest will follow.
The writer is a member of the Diplomate American Board of Medical Psychotherapists Dip.Soc Studies, member Int’l Association of Forensic Criminologists, associate professor Psychiatry and consultant Forensic Psychiatrist at the Huntercombe Group United Kingdom. He can be reached at [email protected]