One of the concerns raised during the recent show of agitation politics led by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) and Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) relates to the phenomenon and practice of bari lena (coming to power by turns) on the part of the PPP and PML-N. This urges one to ask whether the said political parties tasted political power through some mutual understating or agreement. With this in mind, this article attempts to explain civilian circularity as is propagated even by existing literature on Pakistan’s politics in the 1990s.
Quite contrary to existing narratives, based on my doctoral research, it is maintained that the Pakistani military made a tactical move in terms of allowing politicians to participate in elections post-Zia. Had the General Beg-led military opted to remain in politics overtly after Zia’s death, the political and economic cost of this choice would have been higher than the intended benefits. Thus, elections were allowed to be held in 1988. More importantly, a section of politicians rationally interacted with the military to pursue the politics of revenge. Hence, the formation of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) should not surprise us. Despite this, the PPP was able to form a government at the Centre. However, its political rival, Nawaz Sharif of the IJI, became the chief minister of Punjab. Though Benazir Bhutto chalked out a rational course on national issues, her say in Pakistan’s foreign affairs was next to nothing. Nonetheless, almost in the middle of her tenure, she attempted to assert her premiership in terms of meddling with military appointments and promotions. However, before Bhutto could make any meaningful change, her government was dissolved in 1990 by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan who operationalised Article 58(2)(b). Opposition politicians welcomed her dismissal for it provided them with another electoral opportunity.
Elections were held in the same year under the auspices of a pro-establishment caretaker government. Resultantly, Nawaz Sharif was able to form a government at the national level and Bhutto chose to sit in the opposition. Being a rational actor with experience of working with the military, Sharif initially opted not to interfere in the military’s matters, especially foreign and defence policy. His focus remained on reviving the country’s economy in strategic collaboration with international financial institutions (IFIs). However, almost in the middle of its tenure, the Sharif government started developing differences, apparently constitutional in nature, with the president over the appointment and promotion of military officers. In this respect, Sharif’s calculus aimed at strategically interacting with that part of the officer cadre who, in the former’s perception, was less harmful to his government. However, Sharif’s move brought more cost than benefit. The military viewed this as open interference in its internal matters. Moreover, the rational president also saw in Sharif a potential enemy. However, before the prime minister could affect any change in the political system of Pakistan, President Ishaq opted to dissolve his government by operationalising Article 58(2)(b) in 1993. A caretaker government was set up to take charge.
Sharif went to court and, quite ironically, the judiciary restored his government. However, the apparently ironic verdict of the apex court was rational in nature as it aimed at improving its institutional image in this specific political situation in which the president had already become controversial politically, if not legally. Little wonder then, in the post-restoration period, when their mutual differences resurfaced, the arbiter army provided the prime minister with two choices: make peace or face the music. Sharif saw more benefits in leaving the office through resignation. He was replaced by a caretaker setup that is believed to have had the establishment’s support. As a result of the 1993 elections, Ms Bhutto was once again able to form a government at the Centre. This time around, she was cautious. Instead of overtly interfering in the military’s matters, she was able to bring the PPP’s man, Farooq Ahmed Leghari, to the presidency. However, she remained unable to bring the opposition on board to repeal Article 58(2)(b).
Besides, Bhutto’s relations with the judiciary had soured over the issue of judges’ appointments. Moreover, ironically, President Farooq Leghari chose to differ with the prime minister over certain policy matters. The death of the prime minister’s brother further added insult to injury. Hence, being confronted with an unfriendly opposition and president, Bhutto’s set of choices was limited. Contextually, she signalled impeaching the president in order to politically stabilise her government. However, before the prime minister could move in this direction, her government was dismissed in November 1996. Once again, a caretaker setup was installed and elections were held in 1997 after which Mr Sharif became prime minister with a “heavy mandate”. Like his predecessor, Sharif devised a rational course of action vis-à-vis the military, where foreign policy was not touched. However, the prime minister chose to deal with GHQ politically. In this respect, Sharif was able to get his man, Justice (retd) Rafiq Tarar, elected as president and Article 58(2)(b) was repealed. Not only this, the prime minister started interfering in the internal mechanism of the powerful military, i.e. the resignation of the then army chief.
Last but not least, Sharif continued with his incremental policy of controlling the military. His next move was to invite, against the military’s wishes, India’s Prime Minister Vajpayee to Pakistan in 1999. Though the two states were able to sign the Lahore Declaration, the strategic implications of the ‘Hindu enemy’s’ visit were grave. Little wonder, a few months after the visit, a war broke out between India and Pakistan in Kargil. Sharif was bewildered for he believed he was not taken on board. However, the damage to his political legitimacy was done when the opposition in particular and public in general blamed Sharif, not the military, for the withdrawal from Kargil. Moreover, it further widened the gulf between the prime minister and GHQ. Consequently, having perceived growing military distrust, Sharif opted to replace Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Pervez Musharraf. However, this move was met with a coup d’état in October 1999.
To summarise, the phenomenon of civilian circularity is rational rather than structural in nature. The four dismissals during this period mark the military, judiciary and politicians’ agency and rationality. The latter, among others, accorded more preference to their own than a larger interest. Hence, the political contestation between the PPP and PML-N was a norm then. In other words, each (political) actor viewed the other from an oppositional, not friendly perspective as is made out by the PTI and PAT. Therefore, there is perhaps a need to develop a rational and agentive understanding of politics and the state rather than merely sticking to polemics.
The writer is a DAAD fellow and is the author of Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan. He works as an assistant professor at Iqra University, Islamabad and tweets @ ejazbhatty