Recap: Since its “premature” birth, the “truncated” state of Pakistan, with every conceivable neo-natal vulnerability, had to scramble for perennial life support. Having parted ways with erstwhile masters, missed the Soviet bus and disregarded the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) bandwagon, desperate Pakistan jumped into an unenviable relationship with the US. In a bid to become a valued ally of the Super Power, it ended up as its most bullied camp-follower. As such, whatever it did was spurned as not enough. “Do more” was the catchword; “no more”, not an option; and sanctions, or threats thereof, were just a matter of routine. Hence the unending replays of “the Wolf and the Lamb”. As discussed, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 marked the end of the Pak-US second honeymoon. The US wasted no time in slapping the Pressler sanctions on Pakistan, thereby suspending all military assistance and fresh economic aid. And, to add insult to the injury, it not only disallowed the release of 28 F-16s, built, paid for and ready for delivery, but also refused to refund $658, paid in advance for the aircraft. It took Pakistan’s diplomacy almost five years to convince the US that it was mutually beneficial to cooperate, at least, in anti-terrorism and anti-narcotics activities; Pakistan could play a useful role in peace-keeping operations in the trouble spots all over the world; and that it was inappropriate to withhold the items (other than F-16s), which had been paid for long ago. The Clinton Administration did relent but, in doing so, it was guided by its agenda and strategy – to wheedle Pakistan into signing CTBT. Consequently, in 1995, Congress passed the Brown Amendment, authorising the Administration to increase anti-terrorism and anti-narcotics trafficking cooperation with Pakistan; and, release $368 million worth of impounded military equipment, Pakistan had purchased and paid for before the imposition of the Pressler sanctions. The amendment was passed despite allegations of Chinese transfers of nuclear and missile components and technologies to Pakistan.The release of $368 million worth of equipment included F-16 spare parts and weapons ordnance but excluded 28 F-16 aircraft, paid for in 1989. It also exempted several forms of assistance from the embargo, including for counter-narcotics purposes; for military-to-military contact, training, humanitarian, and civic assistance projects; for peacekeeping and other multilateral obligations; and for anti-terrorism assistance. (Typically their funding was accompanied by the statutory language, stating that they were to be implemented, “notwithstanding any other provision of law”). However, while the release facilitated the expansion of the industrial base capabilities, yet limited fiscal resources and various sanctions significantly constrained Pakistan’s efforts to modernize the Armed forces. It took Pakistan’s diplomacy almost five years to convince the US that it was mutually beneficial to cooperate, at least, in anti-terrorism and anti-narcotics activities. For an agonising decade, Pakistan kept pleading, without any luck, for the release of 28 aircraft or a refund of $658 million. In May 1998, the US relented conditionally when India conducted nuclear tests. To secure India’s supremacy over Pakistan, it brazenly demanded of Pakistan not to go for tit-for-tat tests. Nothing could have been more high-handed! Pakistan rejected this mala fide offer. It regarded nuclear status as an effective deterrent against nuclear India. This enraged the US and provided it with another excuse to play wolf and the lamb with Pakistan yet again. Nuclear tests, thus, caused a serious setback to Pak-US relations, which had seen renewed US interest during the second Clinton Administration. At that point in time, Pakistan was facing several restrictions on assistance in pursuance of the Pressler Amendment (triggered by Pakistan’s possession of a nuclear explosive device) and the Symington Amendment (triggered by Pakistan’s receipt of uranium enrichment equipment). Within days, President Clinton slapped Glenn Amendment sanctions on both India and Pakistan. Accordingly, US aid to both the nuclear neighbours, under the Foreign Assistance Act, including economic development assistance, was terminated. Foreign military sales under the Arms Export Control Act were suspended. Credits and credit guarantees by the US government were suspended. US banks stopped all loans to the governments of India and Pakistan. Loans from international financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, were also suspended. And, exports of dual-use nuclear or missile items were prohibited.In July 1998 i.e. within three months of the imposition of the Glenn Amendment sanctions, the Congress, under pressure from the farmers’ lobby at home, rushed to pass legislation, granting India and Pakistan a one-year exemption from Glenn amendment restrictions on the purchase of agricultural commodities from US farmers. A day later, Congress also passed the India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, referred to as Brownback-I. This legislation authorised the President to waive, for a period of one year, Glenn, Symington, and Pressler amendment sanctions against India and Pakistan, except for restrictions on military assistance, dual-use exports, and military sales. Brownback-I was signed into law in October 1998.Pakistan announced in September 1998 that it would sign CTBT, with certain conditions, by September 1999. During November 1998, President Clinton exercised his waiver authority under Brownback I, restoring some non-military aid programmes in India and lifting restrictions on the activities of US banks in India and Pakistan. In June 1999, Congress passed Brownback-II, giving the President permanent authority to waive sanctions. The amendment also allowed the President to waive Symington and Pressler amendment sanctions that had prohibited all military and economic assistance to Pakistan since 1990. Brownback – II paved the way for the refund of the advance paid for 28 F-16s a decade ago. Six months later, the Administration agreed to refund, surprisingly enough, only $ 467 million in cash and the balance in kind – grains. And, the self-proclaimed non-NATO ally of the US heaved a sigh of relief despite the utterly preposterous mode of the refund. (To be continued) The writer is a former diplomat, based in Canberra, and can be reached at firstname.lastname@example.org.