Five decades ago, a popular song in America was Doris Day’s My Secret Love. The American ambassador to Laos, William Sullivan, was increasingly upset that the Nixon administration’s cherished secret war in Laos in 1970 was being leaked to the press. Playing off the song’s last line, Sullivan fired a cable to the White House concluding that if the leaks continued “our secret war won’t be a secret anymore.”
Vladimir Putin’s secret plan falls into a similar category, but it ain’t a secret. Over the past decade and a half, Putin has become convinced that the US is no longer trustworthy. The rot began in 2001 with the unilateral abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by George W Bush, followed by the disastrous Iraqi intervention two years later that Putin insisted would be a catastrophe. The expansion of NATO, the stationing of anti-ballistic missiles in Europe and the overtures to Georgia and Ukraine to join the Atlantic alliance all convinced Putin that Russia was being physically surrounded, internationally marginalised and, worse, disrespected. The 2011 Libyan raid that catalysed a civil war was the final straw.
In response to Putin’s annexing Crimea and occupying a chunk of eastern Ukraine in 2014, sanctions have hurt Russia’s fragile and petro-dependent economy especially as oil prices tanked. The Russian-Syrian intervention last year, in part, was to prevent that country from falling apart as Iraq, Libya and Yemen had. But few in the West or in Washington have understood Putin’s plans or intent beyond believing he was re-establishing a new version of the old Soviet Union and menacing Europe.
In Moscow earlier this year, I congratulated (or accused) a number of senior Russian government officials for plagiarising the Nixon two-pillar Persian Gulf doctrine. Both Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran under the Shah were united against the greater threat of a Communist Soviet Union. My suggestion was that Putin was building both a Shia and a Sunni crescent in order to exploit one or the other and if appropriate to use one against the other — a cynical, amoral and pragmatic plan. My Moscow interlocutors understood immediately.
Putin is allied with Shia Iran and Alawite Syria supporting Bashar al-Assad’s regime. That Russian aircraft flew strikes from Iran and that Moscow is engaged in substantial arms and nuclear reactor sales is evidence. But Putin is also cultivating Shia Iraq through the Iranian connection. Most interestingly, the flirtation with Turkey after the shoot-down of a Russian fighter last November gives additional strength to his initiative.
Putin sees the West in disarray. Brexit weakens — dramatically in his view — both NATO and the European Union. The refugee crisis has imposed huge strains on Europe amplified by the fear of terrorists entering the continent to launch further attacks.
America is in political paralysis. Beyond that, the Obama administration has signalled that it has no appetite to become bogged down in Syria and risk a military confrontation with Russia. Barack Obama’s initial desire to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan was overtaken by the Islamic State and the re-emergence of the Taliban. The lame duck White House has three months left in office. And Obama’s successor will not have a team in place for months thereafter.
Putin’s aims are clear. He wants to enhance Russian influence along with physical and economic security. Building a Shia and/or Sunni crescent partially accomplishes the former. Sanctions relief deals with the latter. That could arise by offering to negotiate seriously over Ukraine or possibly Syria.
Further, increasing Russian influence and prestige at the expense of the United States, NATO and Europe can be achieved through rhetorical bombast and more than a casual reference to military force. Hence, deploying Iskander missiles into Kaliningrad that threaten Europe is readily understood. And the overture to Turkey, especially when Iraq is preparing to retake Mosul, compounds Ankara’s fear of greater Kurdish involvement reinforcing President Tayyip Recep Erdogan’s current refusal to support this operation.
How does Pakistan play into this? Putin’s interest in South Asia is largely determined by the need to keep violent Islamists out through the southern route of the ‘-stans’ into Russia, meaning Afghanistan. China has a large geostrategic and economic role. And both Pakistan and India are of interest for arms sales and increased military cooperation.
Both Pakistan and India use Soviet/Russian military equipment. Some evidence exists to suggest Russia is engaging in Afghanistan in support of local elements including the Taliban as a means of attacking IS. However, those reports need to be confirmed.
The more significant regional actor is of course Iran noted above. In all probability, Putin is employing a variant of Mao’s “100 flowers bloom,” policy of reaching out to many states to see what works and what does not. Whether or not this produces any traction in Pakistan given the predominance of China, surely for economic support, remains to be seen. But as Putin seeks to enhance Russian access and influence with his Sunni and Shia crescents, the same applies to South Asia.
Given these realties, what should Washington and Brussels do? First, understanding Putin’s motivations and strategy is vital. Too often, the West fails to do this. Then, implementing a reverse strategy for neutralising Putin’s Shia and Sunni construct regarding Riyadh and Tehran is crucial. This is obviously more difficult given Saudi-Iranian rivalries and animosities exacerbated by the treaty approved by Tehran to prevent development of nuclear weapons.
Second, Putin wants respect and recognition. A final summit between Putin and Obama to resolve some of these pressing issues is high risk. But this is a risk worth taking. Sanctions are one lever. Implementing a reverse strategy in the region is another.
Third, whoever wins the presidency in November the Obama administration should obtain an agreement in principle with the new administration especially in dealing with Russia. This will establish continuity. And it will demonstrate to Putin that the US is consistent in how it will deal with Moscow.
The questions are will Obama listen and will he lead in his remaining days? The world awaits.
The writer is UPI’s Arnaud de Borchgrave Distinguished Columnist. He serves as Senior Advisor for Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Atlantic Council and Business Executives for National Security and chairs two private companies. His last book is A Handful of Bullets: How the Murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand Still Menaces the Peace. His next book due out next year is Anatomy of Failure: Why America Loses Wars It Starts