The issue of extension for an Army commander has always been a contentious issue. In post-Independence subcontinent we get the first example of this in form of the extension given to RajendraSinhji in 1953 to basically sideline Nathu SinghRathore in India. This has an interesting history. Cariappa, Sinhji and Rathore were the highest ranking Indian officers in the British Indian Army. Rahorehad been closely connected to the Indian nationalist leaders including Sarojini Naidu, Jinnah and the Nehrus, especially during the Skeen Committee. In December 1946, SardarBaldev Singh, the Defence Minister in the interim government of India, had informed Nathu SinghRathore that he was “earmarked” to be the first Indian Commander in Chief after all parties including the Muslim League had agreed on his name unanimously. Rathore however was the junior of the three ranking officers and on that ground refused in favour of K M Cariappa, who was the senior most in terms of service. After partition of India, there were several question marks on Cariappa including his fraternizing with Pakistani officers and the fact that he was considered too Anglicized but he ultimately took over as the Indian Commander in Chief on January 15 1949. He retired after four years of service as per superannuation rule that required that a commanding officer would retire after four years of command. RajendraSinhji of the Eastern Command was due to retire on 31 December 1952 15 days before Cariappa’s retirement but was given an extension to enable him to succeed Cariappa. The idea in part was to sideline Nathu Singh Rathore who had by then fallen out with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The issue had its roots in a meeting where Nehru had suggested that given the lack of experience, Indian military should persist with British officers in the interim period. At this meeting, Rathore had pointedly asked Nehru what his experience was to become the Prime Minister of India. This is said to have rubbed off Nehru the wrong way. Nehru of course was no alone in wanting British officers. Jinnah in Pakistan had insisted on having British officers in command of Pakistan’s military. Jinnah too had received similar complaints by Pakistani officers but he had told them bluntly that it was the job of the civilians to make policy and for the military to obey. One of those Pakistani officers was none other than Ayub Khan. He was to prove Jinnah wrong in little over a decade later. As military historians have pointed out that despite a tradition of considering politics a poison, professional armies are usually more likely to intervene when they see things going south. To guard against this, India had done some serious restructuring in the mid 1950s such as replacing the office of Commander in Chief (now vested in the President of India) with Chief of Army Staff through an Act of Parliament. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto attempted to do the same but it came two decades too late. As military historians have pointed out that despite a tradition of considering politics a poison, professional armies are usually more likely to intervene when they see things going south By the late 1950s, in the chaos that was Pakistani politics, changing prime ministers every few months, the army emerged as a beacon of stability. The key difference between military organization and our civilian political system is the vertical progression in the former. A military officer rises through the ranks, gradually commanding smaller units, to bigger units to the entire army. In absence of devolution and a local government structure, Pakistani politicians progress horizontally, changing parties and allegiances at the very top level – i.e. National Assembly – and in some cases the Provincial Assemblies. Consequently, the civilian politicians are always at a disadvantage, being out of touch with the local issues. As a result, you have incompetence at the top with people being parachuted into ministries with little or no experience. Nathu Singh Rathore’s question to Nehru was perhaps too harsh for Nehru had been at the helm of Congress politics for two decades by then but it would be fair criticism of our civilian politicians today. How many of our civilian politicians have held offices in local councils? How many of them have been mayors? The reason why Pakistan is susceptible to military dictatorship is because there is no devolution and hence no vertical path to leadership. Hardly anyone makes it through the ranks. On the contrary it seems that no matter who is elected, there is a general disdain against local governments and politics at the grass roots level. In contrast, the military dictators have repeatedlyrealised this inherent weakness. Every dictator, with the possible exception of General Zia, has brought a local government system. Sadly every self styled democrat has discontinued it. One of the reasons I had enthusiastically joined Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf after returning to Pakistan in 2002 was its manifesto which called for devolution. Strangely PTI has done the exact opposite of what it promised then. Devolution promises two key things: it takes away the rationale for military rule and at the same time breaks the hegemony of entrenched political families. Given that Imran Khan gladly made the Faustian bargain, it is now too much to ask of him to deliver on what was the main distinguishing feature of his manifesto all those years ago. PTI’s actions vis a vis local governments in Punjab is a case in point. Article 140A of the Pakistani Constitution is completely ignored. The general lack of political grooming that one sees in the rank and file of PTI and its Cabinet is because of this. People with no real political experience have become MNAs and ministers. It never ceases to amaze me, how different Imran Khan the Prime Minister is from Imran Khan the Cricket Captain. The Prime Minister is defensive and scared down by circumstances, quite unlike the Cricket Captain who was always on the offensive. It is about the fundamentals. It is about getting the wickets my dear Captain. It is as true of politics as it is of cricket. So long as the fundamentals remain unaddressed, it wouldn’t matter whether larger constitutional issues are sufficiently addressed at the Supreme Court level. The issue is and will always be effective governance and service delivery. That in turn is only possible through effective devolution not just from center to provinces but from provinces to districts. Once is power is divided up in this manner, the military too will revert to being a wholly apolitical institution and issues such as the constitutional crisis of last week will not arise. The writer is is an Advocate of the High Courts of Pakistan