In an attempt to create a congenial atmosphere for rational dialogue, the globally known non-profit organisation Pugwash arranged a two-day seminar on the Kashmir conflict in Islamabad on 29 March 2008. The purpose of the Pugwash conference was to facilitate a convention of public figures and intellectuals from India, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K),Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), and political and scholarly persons of international repute, in order to define conflict-mitigating strategies in South Asia. The governmental and military representatives at the conference discussed stability in the state of J&K; initiatives to promote peace and cooperation between India and Pakistan; volatility of the situation in Afghanistan and measures to counter the instability in that region and the impact of the changed Pakistani political scenario on the South Asian region. Such conferences were held on a regular basis but the propositions discussed have failed to make a substantive impact on the fragile Kashmir issue. Although representatives from both sides of the LoC make regular appearances at these venues, the prevalent discourse is rather elitist in natureand the woes of the marginalised remain unheard. Participants at the 2008 Pugwash conference in Pakistan were those with access to the higher echelons of power, and who till now, have not outlined a meaningful plan for conflict resolution and rehabilitation of the dispossessed in the fractious political sphere of J&K. A global discourse that is generated at international forums, like the Kashmir Summit Meet in Brussels, Belgium, held on April 1, 2008, can do little to formulate constructive programs for ethnic and religious minorities in the nation-states of India and Pakistan unless the bonafide effort is to demilitarise the region and rehabilitate the disenfranchised – those who have been languishing in Indian and Pakistani jails without a cause, militancy-affected people, and victims of counter-insurgency repression. Such summits and their organisers would need to willingly allow the dilution of their raison d’être, namely, conflict situations. A feasible solution to the conflict in Kashmir must fulfill the conditions delineated decades ago by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. It should not be designed to assuage the insecurities of either India or Pakistan. But it must,unconditionally, allay the fears of ethnic and religious minorities in both countries, and it must be in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state. International legal scholar Gidon Gottleib, in his discussion of the changing world order, underlines the need to deconstruct old notions of sovereignty and instead, construct a transnational community that would endow stateless peoples with citizenship, territorial and security guarantees: “Nations and peoples that have no state of their own can be recognised as such and endowed with an international legal status. Those that are politically organised could be given the right to be a party to different types of treaties and to take part in the work of international organisations.” (Gottlieb 1993,quoted in Wirsing 1994: 233) The intractability of the Kashmir conflict has made advocates of conflict resolution rather wary of applying a seemingly workable but facile solution to the complex political conflict But the solution outlined by Gottleib is unrealistic and rather utopian. It is predicated on the nullification of national identity, cultural integrity inter twined with attachment to territory, and is clearly a politically vexed issue for the people of the former princely state, who, as I have underlined in the introduction, would stop being altogether in the absence of a body politic built on national pride. A solution of this sort could lead to further balkanisation in the South Asian region, depleting national resources. In order to enhance their economic and political clout in the South Asian region, India and Pakistan require stability. Can both countries begin the process of establishing themselves as stable political forces by initiating a serious political process in Kashmir in which the people of the state have a substantive say? A political package short of autonomy for the entire state would be viewed with suspicion by Kashmiris. Can the governments of India and Pakistan make a smooth transition into the globalised world by recognising the autonomous status of the former princely state? I do not pretend to know the answer to these questions. The intractability of the Kashmir conflict has made advocates of conflict resolution rather wary of applying a seemingly workable but facile solution to the complex political conflict. Mainstream media in both India and Pakistan; intellectuals housed in academic institutions; formulators of public policy; members of think tanks are quick to point out that regardless of the bloody and seemingly infinite nature of a political, ethnic, or racial conflict a viable solution can always be found to dilute the fierceness of a conflictual situation. The writer is the author of Fiction of Nationality in an Era of Trans nationalism, Islam, Women, and Violence in Kashmir, The Life of a Kashmiri Woman, and the editor of The Parchment of Kashmir. Nyla Ali Khan has also served as guest editor working on articles from the Jammu and Kashmir region for Oxford University Press (New York), helping to identify, commission, and review articles. She can be reached at nylakhan@aol.com Published in Daily Times, August 20th 2018.