The army chief, General Bajwa, used the passing out parade at the Pakistan Military Academy to make a surprising foreign policy initiative. He called for talks with India. The Indians should take him up on the offer. Like Prime Minister Vajpayee, Modi knows that the real power in Pakistan resides in the army. It might be time to review the lessons learned from the Agra Summit and hold another one, perhaps this time in Islamabad. Pakistan’s relations with India are once again taut with tension. The war of words between the countries has begun. There is gun fire in the mountains of Kashmir. Nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles are being fired over the high seas. The Agra summit had taken place against a similarly hostile backdrop. In early 1999, things had appeared to be on the mend. Vajpayee had visited Lahore for talks with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Unfortunately, behind the scenes, General Pervez Musharraf, then the army chief, was seeking a military solution to the Kashmir issue by attacking Indian positions in Kargil. Having failed in that endeavour, Musharraf seized power in October and declared himself the Chief Executive. Relations with India plummeted to an all-time low. Two years later, in May 2001, Vajpayee decided to give peace a second chance. He made a radical announcement, that he was inviting General Musharraf to India. The omens were propitious. It seemed that the decades-long deadlock between the two siblings was about to be broken, giving way perhaps to an era of peace, stability and economic cooperation. In talking with India, it would be important to discuss cross-border terrorism. They regard it is as much a ‘core issue’ as Pakistan regards Kashmir This was a bold move by the Indian prime minister, especially knowing that his last peace initiative been ‘rewarded’ by Musharraf’s attack on Indian positions in Kargil. Vajpayee made the gesture because he wanted to bring Musharraf out of isolation and raise his standing internationally after the coup. Myra Macdonald, in her book, ‘Defeat is an Orphan,’ notes astutely that Vajpayee made the move ‘even as Pakistan continued to allow militant groups to flourish.’ She says that Musharraf ‘approached the summit with the same impatience and ideological myopia that had blinded him to the risks of Kargil.’ Always eager to display his commando instincts and derring-do, Musharraf thought he could achieve on the negotiating table what he had failed to achieve militarily. To prepare himself for the summit, he elevated himself from Chief Executive to President. The general was given a red carpet welcome in India. The Indian media followed him everywhere he went. He relished the spotlight and wasted no opportunity to make bold and sweeping statements about the ‘core issue’ of Kashmir wherever he went. He also met with the Kashmiri leaders. Musharraf, in a gracious gesture, paid tribute to Gandhi at the memorial marking the spot of his cremation in 1948. His was given the opportunity to tour his old birthplace in Delhi. At a reception to honour him, Indian President KR Narayanan called him one of ‘Delhi’s most distinguished sons.’ Both leaders were hawkish and it was felt that if anyone could negotiate peace between the two countries, it would be these two leaders. In some ways, the summit evoked hopes of the breakthrough that had occurred in Beijing between Nixon and Mao. General Musharraf had the full confidence of the army and could make concessions to India without fear of being dubbed a traitor. Vajpayee was the head of the conservative BJP and could make equally aggressive concessions without being called a sell-out. In Agra, Musharraf and his wife toured the Taj Mahal and posed for the media. Expectations for a breakthrough between the warring siblings hit an all-time high. Then the leaders sat down for business. Several drafts of a peace agreement were exchanged by the foreign secretaries of both sides. But they came to naught. Nothing was signed. Pakistan cannot risk a repetition of Agra. Much has been written on why the Agra Summit flamed out. In his book, “In the Line of Fire,” Musharraf blamed the senior BJP leader, Lal Krishnan Advani, for the summit’s failure. Advani, in his book, My Country, My Life, provided his perspective. He said the summit was his idea: “In May 2001, when the Prime Minister had called Jaswant Singh and me for lunch at his residence to discuss the next course of action, I suggested to him, ‘Atalji, why don’t you invite the General to come to India for talks? It does not matter that your Lahore initiative failed. It was highly appreciated both at home and abroad. Similarly, your invitation to him will be welcomed as an act of statesmanship, both within India and internationally.’ Advani met Musharraf in Agra. They began by talking about their memories of St. Patrick’s High School in Karachi where both had studied, albeit decades apart. Advani said after 53 years Musharraf had been fortunate to return to his birthplace but millions of others had not been so fortunate. They both agreed it was time to restore peace so families could be reunited. But things became testy when Advani raised the issue of cross-border terrorism. At issue was the known terrorist Dawood Ibrahim. Advani wanted an extradition treaty. Musharraf took umbrage at the suggestion that Ibrahim was in Pakistan, calling it ‘small tactics’ on Advani’s part to bring that up so early into the dialogue. The next day Musharraf had a televised breakfast meeting with Indian editors in which he blasted India’s position on cross-border terrorism and Jammu and Kashmir. The general declared, ‘If India expects that I should ignore Kashmir then I better buy the Nehravali Haveli back and stay there.’ In Advani’s view, it was that bluster which killed the summit. The usual blame game between the countries picked up where it had stopped a few months ago. Macdonald writes, ‘Musharraf missed an opportunity to embark on a serious peace process with an Indian prime minister who, because of his backing by the Hindu right, had the political capital to deliver concessions…. After arriving in India in such style, Musharraf left Agra with his wife in the dead of night, his departing car caught by the flashbulbs of the press pack.’ This was a painful letdown. Years later, Musharraf tried to reinitiate negotiations with India but by then both he and Vajpayee were on their way of out of office. Nothing happened. General Bajwa has claimed that Pakistan has eliminated almost all organized terrorist presence and infrastructure from its soil. But then why are people like Hafiz Saeed roaming around scot-free? In talking with India, it would be important to discuss cross-border terrorism. They regard it is as much a ‘core issue’ as Pakistan regards Kashmir. That cross-border scourge has to be exterminated just as much as domestic terrorism. Otherwise, peace with India will remain a mirage. There is another big decision that needs to be made this time, which was not an issue during the Agra Summit. Who will represent Pakistan at the talks with India? Would it be the army chief, or the prime minister, or both? The writer has written, Musharraf’s Pakistan, Bush’s America, and the Middle East. He can be reached at hmadfaruqui@gmail.com Published in Daily Times, April 20th 2018.